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This dissertation consists of three essays. I investigate information dynamics under different settings. In
Chapter 1, I consider a market with a profit-maximizing monopolist seller who has K identical goods to sell
before a deadline. At each date, the seller posts a price and the quantity available but cannot commit to future
offers. Over time, potential buyers with different reservation values enter the market. Buyers can strategically
time their purchases, trading off (1) a possibly lower price in the future with the risk of being rationed and (2)
the current price without competition. I analyze equilibrium price paths and buyers' purchase behavior. I
show that incentive compatible price paths decline smoothly over the time period between sales and jump up
immediately after a transaction. In equilibrium, high value buyers purchase immediately on arrival. Crucially,
before the deadline, the seller may periodically liquidate part of his stock via a fire sale to secure a higher price
in the future. Intuitively, these sales allow the seller to `commit' to high prices going forward. The possibility
of fire sales before the deadline implies that the allocation may be inefficient. The inefficiency arises from the
scarce good being misallocated to low value buyers, rather than the withholding inefficiency that is normally
seen with a monopolist seller. In chapter 2, I study dynamic bargaining with uncertainty over the buyer's
valuation and the seller's outside option. A long-lived seller makes offers to a long-lived buyer whose value is
private information. There may exist a short-lived buyer, whose value is higher than that of the long-lived
buyer. The arrival of a short-lived buyer, if she exists, is determined by a Poisson process. I characterize the
unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium displays price fluctuations: in some periods, the seller
charges a high price unacceptable to the long-lived buyer, in the hope that the short-lived buyer appears in that
period; in the other periods, he offers a price attractive to some values of the long-lived buyer. The price
dynamics result from the interaction between two learning processes: exogenous learning about the existence
of short-lived buyers, and endogenous learning about the long-lived buyer's value. In chapter 3, I study the
dynamics of workers' on-the-job search behavior and its consequences in an equilibrium labor market. In a
model with both directed search and learning about the match quality of firm-worker pairs, I highlight the job
search target effect of learning: as a worker updates the evaluation of his current job, he adjusts his on-the-job
search target, which results in a different job finding rate. I show that this model generates a non-monotonic
relation between the employment-to-employment transition rate and tenure, which provides a new
explanation of the hump-shaped separation rate-tenure profile.
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ABSTRACT
INFORMATION AND LEARNING IN MARKETS
Fei Li
George Mailath
This dissertation consists of three essays. I investigate information dynamics
under different settings. In Chapter 1, I consider a market with a profit-maximizing
monopolist seller who has K identical goods to sell before a deadline. At each date,
the seller posts a price and the quantity available but cannot commit to future offers.
Over time, potential buyers with different reservation values enter the market. Buyers
can strategically time their purchases, trading off (1) a possibly lower price in the
future with the risk of being rationed and (2) the current price without competition. I
analyze equilibrium price paths and buyers’ purchase behavior. I show that incentive
compatible price paths decline smoothly over the time period between sales and
jump up immediately after a transaction. In equilibrium, high value buyers purchase
immediately on arrival. Crucially, before the deadline, the seller may periodically
liquidate part of his stock via a fire sale to secure a higher price in the future.
Intuitively, these sales allow the seller to ‘commit’ to high prices going forward.
The possibility of fire sales before the deadline implies that the allocation may be
inefficient. The inefficiency arises from the scarce good being misallocated to low
value buyers, rather than the withholding inefficiency that is normally seen with a
monopolist seller. In chapter 2, I study dynamic bargaining with uncertainty over the
v
buyer’s valuation and the seller’s outside option. A long-lived seller makes offers to
a long-lived buyer whose value is private information. There may exist a short-lived
buyer, whose value is higher than that of the long-lived buyer. The arrival of a short-
lived buyer, if she exists, is determined by a Poisson process. I characterize the unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium displays price fluctuations: in some
periods, the seller charges a high price unacceptable to the long-lived buyer, in the
hope that the short-lived buyer appears in that period; in the other periods, he offers
a price attractive to some values of the long-lived buyer. The price dynamics result
from the interaction between two learning processes: exogenous learning about the
existence of short-lived buyers, and endogenous learning about the long-lived buyer’s
value. In chapter 3, I study the dynamics of workers’ on-the-job search behavior and
its consequences in an equilibrium labor market. In a model with both directed
search and learning about the match quality of firm-worker pairs, I highlight the job
search target effect of learning: as a worker updates the evaluation of his current job,
he adjusts his on-the-job search target, which results in a different job finding rate. I
show that this model generates a non-monotonic relation between the employment-
to-employment transition rate and tenure, which provides a new explanation of the
hump-shaped separation rate-tenure profile.
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Chapter 1
Revenue Management Without
Commitment
This chapter is a joint work with Francsec Dilme.
1.1 Introduction
Many markets share the following characteristics: (1) goods for sale are (almost)
identical, and all expire and must be consumed at a certain point of time, (2) the
initial number of goods for sale is fixed in advance, and (3) consumers have heteroge-
neous reservation values and enter the market sequentially over time. Such markets
include the airline, cruise-line, hotel and entertainment industries. The revenue man-
agement literature studies the pricing of goods in these markets, and these techniques
are reported to be quite valuable in many industries, such as airlines (Davis (1994)),
retailers (Friend and Walker (2001)), etc. The standard assumptions in this litera-
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ture are that sellers have perfect commitment power and buyers are impatient. That
is, buyers cannot time their purchases and sellers can commit to the future price
path or mechanism. In contrast, this paper studies a revenue management problem
in which buyers are patient and sellers are endowed with no commitment power.
We consider the profit-maximizing problem faced by a monopolist seller who has
K identical goods to sell before a deadline. At any date, the seller posts a price and
the quantity available (capacity control) but cannot commit to future offers. Over
time, potential buyers with different reservation values (either high or low) privately
enter the market. Each buyer has a single-unit demand and can time her purchase.
Goods are consumed at the fixed deadline, and all trades happen before or at that
point.
Our goal is to show that the seller can sometimes use fire sales before the deadline
to credibly reduce his inventory and so charge higher prices in the future. We accord-
ingly consider settings where the seller does not find it profitable to only sell at the
deadline and then only to high-value buyers, with the accompanying possibility of
unsold units. In such settings, we explore the properties of a pricing path in which,
at the deadline, if the seller still has unsold goods, he sets the price sufficiently low
that all remaining goods are sold for sure. For most of the time before the dead-
line, the seller posts the highest price consistent with high-value buyers purchasing
immediately on arrival, and occasionally, he posts a fire sale price that is affordable
to low-value buyers. By holding fire sales, the seller reduces his inventory quickly,
and therefore, he can induce high-value buyers to accept a higher price in the future.
Intuitively, these sales allow the seller to ‘commit’ to high prices going forward. Once
2
the transaction happens, whether at the discount price or not, the seller’s inventory
is reduced, and the price jumps up instantaneously. Hence, in general, a highly fluc-
tuating path of realized sales prices will appear, which is in line with the observations
in many relevant industries.1
The suboptimality of only selling at the deadline to high-value buyers could occur
for many reasons. For example, at the deadline, the seller may expect that there
will be little effective high-value demand in the market. This may be because the
arrival rate of high-value buyers is low, or because buyers may also leave the market
without making a purchase, or because buyers face inattention frictions and so they
may miss the deadline, which we discuss in detail below.
The equilibrium price path relies on the seller’s lack of commitment and buyers’
intertemporal concern. An intuitive explanation is as follows. At the deadline, due
to the insufficient effective demand, the seller holding unsold goods sets a low price
to clear his inventory, which is known as the last-minute deal.2 Before the deadline,
since a last-minute deal is expected to be posted shortly, buyers have the incentive to
wait for the discount price.3 However, waiting for a deal is risky due to competition
at the low price, from both newly arrived high-value buyers and low-value ones who
are only willing to pay a low price. By weighing the risk of losing the competition
and so the deal, a high-value buyer is willing to make her purchase immediately
1For example, McAfee and te Velde (2008) find that airfares’ fluctuation is too high to be
explained by the standard monopoly pricing models.
2In the airline industry, sellers do post last-minute deals. See Wall Street Journal, March 15,
2002, “Airlines now offer ‘last minute’ fare bargains weeks before flights,” by Kortney Stringer.
3In the airline industry, many travelers are learning to expect possible discounts in the future
and strategically time their purchase. See the Wall Street Journal, July 2002, “A Holiday for
Procrastinators: Booking a Last-Minute Ticket,” by Eleena de Lisser.
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at a price higher than the discount one. We name the highest price she is willing
to pay to avoid the competition as her reservation price. For any such high-value
buyer, her reservation price is decreasing in time, since the arrival of competition
shrinks as the deadline approaches, and decreasing in the current inventory size,
since the probability that she will be rationed at deal time depends on the amount
of remaining goods. To maximize his profit, the seller posts the high-value buyer’s
reservation price for most of the time and, at certain times before the deadline, may
hold fire sales to reduce his inventory and to charge a higher price in the future.
Figure 1.1 illustrates this idea in the simplest case with only two items for sale at
the beginning. Suppose the seller serves high-value buyers only before the deadline,
allowing discounts at the deadline only. Conditional on the inventory size, the price
declines in time. The high-value buyer’s acceptable price in the two-unit case is lower
than the price in the one-unit case, and the price difference indicates the difference
in the probability that a high value buyer is rationed at the last minute in different
cases. If a high-value buyer enters the market early and buys a unit immediately, the
seller can sell it at a relatively high price and earn a higher profit than he could earn
from running fire sales. However, if no such buyer ever shows up, then the time will
eventually come when selling one unit via a fire sale and then following the one-unit
pricing strategy is more profitable to the seller. To see the intuition, consider the
seller’s benefit and cost of liquidating the first unit via a fire sale. The benefit is that,
by reducing one unit of stock, the seller can charge the high-value buyer who arrives
next a higher price for his last unit. On the other hand, the (opportunity) cost is
that, if more than one high-value buyer arrives before the deadline, the seller cannot
4
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Figure 1.1: Necessity of FIre Sales Before the Deadline in the Two-Unit Case. The
solid (dashed) line shows how the list price will change in the case of one (two) unit
of initial stock if low-value buyers are served at the deadline only.
serve the second one, who is willing to pay a price higher than the fire sale price.
Since a new high-value buyer arrives independently, as the deadline approaches, the
probability that more than one high-value buyer arrives before the deadline goes to
zero much faster than the probability that one high-value buyer arrives. Thus, the
opportunity cost is negligible compared to the benefit, and therefore, the seller has
the incentive to liquidate the first unit via a fire sale.
Analyzing a dynamic pricing game with private arrivals is complicated for the
following reason. Since the seller can choose both the price and quantity available at
any time, he may want to sell his inventory one-by-one. Thus, some buyers may be
rationed when demand is less than supply before the game ends. Suppose a buyer was
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rationed at time t and the seller still holds unsold units. The rationed buyer privately
learns that demand is greater than supply at time t and uses the information to
update her belief about the number of remaining buyers. Buyers who arrive after this
transaction have no such information. As a result, belief heterogeneity among buyers
naturally occurs based on their private histories, and buyers’ strategies may depend
on their private beliefs non-trivially. Such belief heterogeneity evolves over time and
becomes more complicated as transactions happen one after another, making the
problem intractable.
To overcome this technical challenge, we assume that buyers face inattention
frictions. That is, in each “period” with a positive measure of time, instead of
assuming that buyers can observe offers all the time, we assume that each buyer
notices the seller’s offer and makes her purchase decision at her attention times
only. In each “period,” a buyer independently draws one attention time from an
atomless distribution.4 In addition, buyers’ attention can be attracted by an offer
with sufficiently low price, that is, a fire sale.5 This implies that (1) at any particular
time, the probability that a buyer observes a non fire sale offer is zero, (2) the
probability that more than one buyer observes a non-fire-sale offer at the same time
is zero too, and (3) all buyers observe a fire-sale-offer when it is posted. As a result,
high-value buyers would not be rationed except at deal time. Furthermore, we focus
on equilibria where high-value buyers make their purchases upon arrivals. Therefore,
4In the airline ticket example, it is natural to assume each buyer checks the price once or twice
per day instead of looking at the airfare website all the time.
5In practice, this extra chance is justified by consumers’ attention being attracted by advertise-
ments of deals sent by a third party: low price alert e-mails from intermediate websites that offer
airfares such as http://www.orbitz.com and http://www.faredetective.com.
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a high-value buyer being rationed at deal time attributes failure of her purchase to
the competition with low-buyer buyers instead of other high-value buyers, so she
cannot infer extra information about the number of buyers in the market. As we
will show, there is an equilibrium in which buyers’ strategies do not depend on their
private histories.6
As we described earlier, we are interested in the environment where the seller finds
selling only at the deadline and serving only high-value buyers to be suboptimal. In
the presence of inattention frictions, the seller cannot guarantee that the high-value
buyers will be available at the deadline. Hence, at the deadline, to maximize his
profit, the seller has to post a last-minute deal to draw full attention of the market,
which naturally leads the seller to start selling early.7
We believe that the importance of revenue management studies without commit-
ment is at least threefold. First, in the literature, reputation concerns are commonly
cited as a justification of the perfect commitment power of sellers. However, for such
a reputation mechanism to work and to act as a legitimate defense of commitment,
one needs to understand the benefit and cost of sustaining the commitment price
path. Obviously, an in-depth understanding of a world without commitment must
be the basis for building the cost of the seller’s deviation. Second, studying a model
6The idea that, in a continuous-time environment, decision times arrive randomly is not new. See
for example, Perry and Reny (1993) and Ambrus and Lu (2010) in bargaining models, and Kamada
and Kandori (2011) in revision games. In macroeconomics, there is a large literature analyzing
the role of inertia information on sticky prices. See the text-book treatment by Veldkamp (2011).
However, none of those papers employ such an assumption to avoid the complexities of private
beliefs.
7Notice that our economic prediction on the price path does not depend on the presence of
inattention frictions. As we mentioned before, a low arrival rate of buyers or the disappearance of
present buyers can also exclude the trivial case where the seller is willing to sell at the deadline
only. We explore the possibility of disappearing buyers in the extension.
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without commitment can help us to evaluate how crucial the perfect commitment
assumption is and to what degree the insights we have gained depend on it. Last,
a non-commitment model should be the starting benchmark to understand the role
of certain selling strategies with the feature of price commitment in reality. For
instance, in both the airline and the hotel industries, sellers use the best price guar-
antee or best available rate policy. That is, if the buyer finds a cheaper price than
what he paid within a certain time period, the seller commits to refund the difference
and gives the buyer some extra compensation. In a perfect commitment model, it is
hard to see the role of these selling policies.
1.1.1 The Literature
This paper is closely related to two streams of the literature. First, there is
a large revenue management literature that has examined the market with sellers
who need to sell finitely many goods before a deadline and impatient buyers who
arrive sequentially.8 However, as argued by Besanko and Winston (1990), mistakenly
treating forward-looking customers as myopic may have an important impact on
sellers’ revenue. Board and Skrzypacz (2010) characterize the revenue-maximizing
mechanism in a model where agents arrive in the market over time. In the continuous
time limit, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is implemented via a price-posting
mechanism, with an auction for the last unit at the deadline.
In the works mentioned above, perfect commitment of the seller is typically as-
sumed. Little has been done to discuss the case in which a monopolist with scarce
8See the book by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).
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supply and no commitment power sells to forward-looking customers. Aviv and
Pazgal (2008) consider a two-period case, and so do Jerath, Netessine, and Veer-
araghavan (2010). Deb and Said (2012) study a two-period problem where a seller
faces buyers who arrive in each period. They show that the seller’s optimal contract
pools low-value buyers, separates high-value ones, and induces intermediate ones to
delay their purchase.
To the best of our knowledge, Chen (2012) and Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011)
have made the first attempt to address the non-commitment issue in a revenue man-
agement environment using a multiple-period game-theoretic model. They assume
that the seller faces a fixed number of buyers who strategically time their purchases.
They show that the seller either replicates a Dutch auction or posts unacceptable
prices up to the very end and charges a static monopoly price at the deadline. How-
ever, as argued by McAfee and te Velde (2008), arrival of new buyers seems to be
an important driving force of many observed phenomena in a dynamic environment.
As we will show, the sequential arrival of buyers plays a critical role in the seller’s
optimal pricing and fire sale decision.
Additionally, our model is also related to the durable goods literature in which
the seller without capacity constraint sells durable goods to strategic buyers over an
infinite horizon. As Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011) show, the deadline endows the
seller with considerable commitment power, and the scarcity of the good changes
the issues surrounding price discrimination, with the impetus for buying early at a
high price now arising out of the fear that another buyer will snatch the good in
the meantime. In the standard durable goods literature, the number of buyers is
9
fixed. However, some papers consider the arrival of new buyers. Conlisk, Gerstner
and Sobel (1984) allows a new cohort of buyers with binary valuation to enter the
market in each period and show that the seller will vary the price over time. In most
periods, he charges a price just to sell immediately to high-value buyers. Periodically,
he charges a sales price to sell to accumulated low-value buyers.
In contrast to most durable goods papers, Garrett (2011) assumes that a seller
with full commitment power faces a representative buyer who arrives at a random
time. Once the buyer arrives, her valuation changes over time. He shows that the
optimal price path involves fluctuations over time. Similar to Conlisk, Gerstner and
Sobel (1984), most of the time, the seller charges a price just to sell immediately to
the arrived buyer when her valuation is high. No transaction implies that either (1)
the buyer did not arrive, or (2) she arrived but her valuation is low. After a long time
with no transactions, the seller is more and more convinced that the latter is true.
As a result, he charges a price acceptable to the arrived buyer with low valuation.
Even though, similar to both Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984) and Garrett (2011),
new arrivals and heterogeneous valuation are also the driving force of fire sales in
our model, the economic channels are very different. In their papers, the seller has
discounting a cost, so charges low price to sell to accumulated low-value buyers in
order to reap some profit and avoid delay costs. However, in our model, the seller
does not discount and can ensure a unit profit as the fire sales income at the deadline
for all inventory. Since the buyers face scarcity, the seller liquidates some goods to
convince future buyers to accept higher prices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the
10
model setting and define the solution concept we are going to use. In Section 1.3, we
derive an equilibrium in the single-unit case. In Section 1.4, the multi-units case is
studied. In Section 1.5, we discuss some modelling choices, applications and possible
extensions of the baseline model. Section 1.6 concludes. The discussion the set of
admissible strategies and the solution concept in this game, and all proofs are in
Appendix.
1.2 Model
Environment. We consider a dynamic pricing game between a single seller
who has K identical and indivisible items for sale and many buyers. Goods are
consumed at a fixed time that we normalize to 1, and deliver zero value after. Time
is continuous. The seller has the interval [0, 1] of time in which to trade with buyers.
There is a parameter ∆ such that 1/∆ ∈ N. The time interval [0, 1] is divided into
periods: [0,∆),[∆, 2∆), ...[1−∆, 1]. The seller and the buyers do not discount.
Seller. The seller can adjust the price and supply at each moment: at time t, the
seller posts the price P (t) ∈ R, and capacity control Q (t) ∈ {1, 2, ..K (t)} , where
K (t) ∈ N represents the amount of goods remaining at time t, and K (0) = K.9 The
seller has a zero reservation value on each item, so his payoff is the summation of all
transaction prices.
Buyers. There are two kinds of buyers: low-value buyers (L-buyers, henceforth)
and high-value buyers (H-buyers, henceforth). Each buyer has a single unit of de-
9We assume Q (t) 6= 0. However, the seller can post a price sufficiently high to block any
transactions.
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mand. Let vL denote an L-buyer’s reservation value of the unit, and vH that of an
H-buyer, where vH > vL > 0. A buyer who buys an item at price p gets payoff v− p
where v ∈ {vL, vH}.
Population Dynamics. The population structure of buyers changes differently
over time. At the beginning, there is no H-buyer in the market. As time goes on, H-
buyers arrive privately at a constant rate λ > 0. Let N (t) be the number of H-buyers.
An H-buyer leaves only if her demand is satisfied.10 For tractability, we assume that
the population structure of L-buyers is relatively predictable and stationary. At the
beginning of each period, M L-buyers arrive in the market, where M ∈ N is common
knowledge. When an L-buyer’s demand is not satisfied, she leaves the market, and
at the end of each period, all L-buyers leave.11 We assume M ≥ K (0).
Transaction Mechanism. If the amount of demand at price P (t) is less than
or equal to Q (t), all demands are satisfied; otherwise, Q (t) randomly selected buyers
are able to make purchases, and the rest are rationed. A price lower than vL is always
dominated by vL. Thus, L-buyers do not face non-trivial purchase time decisions.
To save notation, we assume that they are non-strategic and will accept any price
no higher than vL. We define such a price as a deal.
Definition 1. A deal is an offer with P (t) ≤ vL.
If i ≤ Q (t) goods are sold at time t, the seller’s inventory goes down. In other
words, limt′↘tK (t′) = K (t)− i. Over time, as buyers make purchases, the inventory
10Our results continue to hold when H-buyers leave the market at a rate ρ ≥ 0.
11An added value of this assumption is that it allows us to highlight our channel to generate fire
sales. In Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984), the presence of periodic sales is driven by the arrival
and accumulation of low-value buyers. By assuming that the population structure of low-value
buyers is stationary, their classical explanation of a price cycle does not work in our model.
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decreases. Hence, K : t→ N is a left continuous and non-increasing function. Once
K (t) hits zero or time reaches the deadline, the game ends.
Inattention Frictions. We assume that buyers, regardless of their reservation
value and arrival times, face inattention frictions. At the beginning of each period,
all buyers, regardless of their value, randomly draw an attention time τ , which is
uniformly distributed in the time interval of the current period.12 For an H-buyer
who arrives in the period, her attention time in the current period is her arrival time.
In the period where the seller posts a deal at time τ , each buyer has an additional
attention time at time τ in the current period. In the rest of this paper, we call
these random attention times exogenously assigned by Nature regular attention times,
while we call the additional attention time deal attention times. A buyer observes
the offer posted, P (t) , Q (t) and the seller’s inventory size, K (t) at her attention
time only. At that time, she can decide to accept or reject the offer. Rejection is not
observed by the seller and other buyers. Since, without deal announcements, each
buyer draws her attention time independently, once a buyer observes and decides to
take an available offer P (t) > vL, she will not be rationed. Thus the competition
among buyers is always intertemporal when P (t) > vL. At deal times when P (t) ≤
vL, buyers observe the offer at the same time, so there is direct competition among
buyers. Notice that ∆ capture the inattention fictions of buyers, and we focus on
the case where ∆ is small.
History. A non-trivial seller history at time t, htS = (P (τ) , Q (τ) , K (τ))0≤τ<t,
is a history such that the game is not over before t and it summarizes all relevant
12Our results hold for any atomless distribution with full support.
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transactions and information about offers in the past. Let HS be the set of all
seller’s history. The seller’s strategy σS determines a price P (t) and capacity control
Q (t) given a seller history htS. Due to the buyers’ inattention frictions, at any time
before the deadline, the seller believes that more than one buyer notices an offer
with probability zero. As a result, we focus on the seller’s strategy space in which
Q (t) = 1 for P (t) > vL without loss of generality.
Let a (t) be an index function such that it is 1 at an H-buyer’s attention times, and
0 otherwise. Thus, at = {a (τ)}tτ=0 records the history of an H-buyer’s past attention
times up to t. A non-trivial buyer history, htB =
{
at, {P (τ) , Q (τ) , K (τ)}τ :a(τ)=1 and τ∈[0,t]
}
.
In other words, a buyer remembers the prices, capacity and inventory size she ob-
served at her past attention times. LetHB denote the set of all history of an H-buyer.
Following Chen (2012) and Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011), we focus on symmetric
equilibria in which an H-buyer’s strategy depends only on her history not on her
identity. That is to say, the H-buyer’s strategy σB determines the probability that
she will accept the current price P (t) given a buyer’s history htB. We focus on a pure
strategy profile, so σB ∈ {0, 1}.
1.2.1 On Continuous Time Games
We choose a continuous time model in this project, since it has technical ad-
vantages in answering our questions. Specifically, the determination of the optimal
timing for fire sales is in fact an optimal stopping time problem; therefore, the
continuous-time properties of this problem make the analysis easier.
However, continuous time raises obstacles to the analysis of dynamic games. First,
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it is well known that, in a continuous time game, a well-defined strategy may not
induce a well-defined outcome. This is analyzed by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)
and Bergin and MacLeod (1993). The reason is that there is no well-defined “last”
or “next” period in a continuous time game; hence, players’ actions at time t may
depend on information arriving instantaneously before t. For example, in our model,
one seemingly possible pricing strategy is that the seller sets P (t) = 10 if t = 0
or P (s) = 10 for s ∈ [0, t); otherwise, P (t) = 1. Intuitively, this strategy should
imply a price outcome P (t) = 10 for any t ∈ [0, 1]. However, any for t∗ ∈ (0, 1), an
outcome P (t) = 10 for t ∈ [0, t∗] and P (t) = 1 when t ∈ (t∗, 1] is compatible with
the strategy above. See Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) for more examples.
Therefore, to make this game well-defined, we must impose additional restrictions
on the set of strategies. Following Bergin and MacLeod (1993), we restrict the
seller’s choices in the admissible strategy space. The formal restriction is presented
in Appendix A, and we provide the intuition here. To construct the set of admissible
strategies, we first restrict the strategy to the inertia strategy space. Intuitively
speaking, an inertia strategy is such that instead of an instantaneous response, a
player can change her decision only after a very short time lag; hence, such strategy
cannot be conditional on very recent information. The set of all inertia strategies
includes strategies with arbitrarily short lags, so it may not be complete. To capture
the instantaneous response of players, we complete the set and use the completion
as the feasible strategy set of our game. For each instantaneous response strategy,
we identify its associated outcome as follows. First, we find a sequence of inertia
strategies converging to the instantaneous strategy. In such a sequence, each inertia
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strategy has a well-defined outcome, which gives us a sequence of outcomes. Second,
we identify the limit of the outcome sequence as the outcome of this instantaneous
response strategy. Let Σ∗S as the admissible strategy space of the seller. Since H-
buyers face inattention frictions, they cannot revise their decision instantaneously,
so we do not need to impose any restriction on their strategy; let Σ∗B denote the set
of strategies of H-buyers, and let Σ∗ = Σ∗S × Σ∗B be the strategy space we study.
1.2.2 Payoff and Solution Concept
In general, a player’s strategy depends on his or her private history. A perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in our game is a strategy profile of the seller and the buyers,
such that given other players’ strategy, each player has no incentive to deviate, and
players update their belief via Bayes’ rule where possible. However, the set of all
perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game is hard to characterize.
We instead look for simple but intuitive no-waiting equilibria that satisfy the
following properties. First, the equilibrium strategy profile must be simple; that is,
players’ equilibrium strategies depend on their histories only through the state vari-
ables specified later. Second, on the path of play, H-buyers make their purchases once
they arrive. Third, we impose a restriction on buyers’ beliefs about the underlying
history off the path of play: each H-buyer believes that there are no other previous
H-buyers presently in the market.
Note that some H-buyers may wait because of the deviation of the seller: the
seller can post an unacceptable price for a time interval of positive measure in which
H-buyers have to wait for future offers. However, each buyer can observe only finitely
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many offers at her past attention times and, for the rest of time, she has to form a
belief about the underlying history. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept does
not impose any restriction on those beliefs where the Bayes’ rule does not apply.
To support a no-waiting equilibrium, we assume that each H-buyer believes that no
other H-buyers are waiting in the market. The justification of this refinement can
be found in Appendix A.
1.2.2.1 Payoff
To define the equilibrium, we need to specify an H-buyer’s payoff given she be-
lieves that no previous H-buyers are waiting in the market. Given a seller’s continu-
ation strategy σ˜S ∈ Σ∗S, other H-buyers’ symmetric continuation strategy σ˜B ∈ Σ∗B,
and a buyer’s history htB, an H-buyer’s payoff from choosing a strategy σ˜
′
B ∈ Σ∗B at
her attention time is defined as
U
(
σ˜′B, σ˜B, σ˜S, h
t
B
)
= Eτ |t [vH − P (τ)]
where τ ∈ [t, 1]∪{2} is H-buyers’ transaction time which is random and depends on
the other players’ strategies and the population dynamics of buyers. When τ = 2, the
buyer does not obtain the good because the seller’s stock is sold out before she decides
to place an order. In this case, P (2) = vH . At time t, an H-buyer employs a cutoff
strategy where she accepts a price if it is less than or equal to some reservation price
p, and this reservation price is pinned down by the buyer’s indifference condition:
vH − p = Eτ |t [vH − P (τ)] .
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Suppose all H-buyers play a symmetric σ˜B ∈ Σ∗B. The payoff to the seller with
stock k from a strategy σ˜S ∈ Σ∗S is given by
Πk
(
σ˜B, σ˜S, h
t
S
)
= Eτ [P (τ) + Πk−1 (σ˜B, σ˜S, hτS)] ,
where htS is the seller’s history, Π0 = 0. Because buyers face inattention frictions, by
posting any price P (1) > vL, the seller expects no buyer notices the offer, and his
expected profit is zero; by posting a deal price, the seller can sell all of his inventory.
Hence, we have
Πk
(
σ˜B, σ˜S, h
1
S
)
=
 0,kvL,
if P (1) > vL,
otherwise,
Note that the seller may or may not believe that there are previously arrived H-
buyers waiting in the market. His belief about the number of H-buyers depends on
the price he posted before.
1.2.2.2 (No-Waiting) Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We focus on Markov equilibria where an H-buyer makes her purchase decision
based on two state variables: calendar time and inventory size, and she makes the
purchase on her arrival time on the equilibrium path. The seller’s equilibrium strat-
egy depends on calendar time, inventory size, and his estimated number of present
H-buyers. Specifically, based on the his realized history, the seller forms a belief
about the number of H-buyers, N (t). Let Φ (t) be the seller’s belief over N (t) where
Φn (t) represents the probability that the seller believes that N (t) = n. Further-
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more, the seller needs to distinguish between H-buyers whose attention times were
before t, and those whose attention times are equal to or after t in the current pe-
riod. Let N− (t) denote the number of H-buyers whose attention times were before
t, and let N+ (t) denote those whose attention times are equal to or after t in the
current period. Let Φ− (t) and Φ+ (t) be the seller’s beliefs over N− (t) and N+ (t),
where Φ−n (t) (and Φ
+
n (t)) represent that the seller believes that N
− (t) = n (and
N+ (t) = n) at time t. Given Φ− (t) and Φ+ (t), we can calculate the seller’s belief
as follows: for any n ∈ N, Φn (t) =
∑n
i=0 Φ
−
i (t) Φ
+
n−i (t).
Definition 2. The set ΞS ⊂ [0, 1]∞ is a collection of seller’s beliefs [Φ− (t) , Φ+ (t)]
such that can be reached after any seller history.
As we mentioned before, we restrict the strategy space such that Q (t) = 1 for
P (t) > vL. Hence, the seller only needs to choose the price. We define a Markovian
strategy profile as follows.
Definition 3. A strategy profile (σS, σB) is Markovian if and only if
1. the seller’s strategy σS depends on the seller’s history via (t,K (t) , Φ
− (t) , Φ+ (t))
only, and
2. the H-buyer’s strategy σB depends on the buyer’s history via (t,K (t)) only.
In the definition, the H-buyer’s strategy is a function of the calendar time and
the seller’s inventory size, but it does not imply that the number of other H-buyers
is payoff irrelevant to an H-buyer. In fact, an H-buyer’s continuation value does
depend on her belief about the number of other H-buyers. However, we focus on
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no-waiting equilibria where each H-buyer believes that no other H-buyer is waiting
in the market; thus, her strategy does not depend on her belief about the number of
other H-buyers non-trivially.
Furthermore, we can define the solution concept in this game.
Definition 4. A (no-waiting) Markov perfect equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium)
consists of a (pure) strategy profile (σ∗B, σ
∗
S) such that, for any seller’s history h
t
S,
and for any buyer’s history htB,
1. given the seller’s strategy σ∗S, other buyers’ strategy σ
∗
B,
U
(
σ∗B, σ
∗
B, σ
∗
S, h
t
B
) ≥ U (σ˜B, σ∗B, σ∗S, htB)
for any admissible σ˜B,
2. given buyers’ strategy σ∗B,
Πk
(
σ∗B, σ
∗
S, h
t
S
) ≥ Πk (σ∗B, σ˜S, htS)
for any admissible σ˜S, k ∈ {1, 2, ..K},
3. the seller’s belief is consistent with the seller’s history and (σ∗B, σS) for any
admissible strategy σS ∈ Σ∗S, and
4. (σ∗B, σ
∗
S) is Markovian.
Nonetheless, note that potential deviations strategy can be either Markovian or
non-Markovian.
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Over time, the seller’s belief evolves based on the realized history. We leave
the formal law of motion of Φ+ (t) and Φ− (t) to the Appendix B but provide some
intuitive description here. The seller’s belief updating is driven by four forces. First,
at any time t, there are exogenous arrivals. When the price is too high to be accepted
by newly arrived H-buyers, they have to wait and therefore N− (t) increases. Second,
since each H-buyer independently draws her attention time, in a small but non-trivial
time interval, an H-buyer, if she is in the market and her attention time in the
current period does not pass, observes the offer posted with positive probability. As
a result, if an equilibrium offer is posted but the time without transactions grows, H-
buyers are likely to be fewer, and therefore, the seller adjusts his belief about N+ (t).
Alternatively, if the offer posted is not acceptable to H-buyers, the seller believes
that some H-buyers may have observed but rejected it, so N− (t) increases but N+ (t)
decreases. Third, as time goes to the end of the period, all buyers’ attention time
passes, so N+ (t) converges to zero, and N− (t) converges to N (t). At the beginning
of each period, all remaining buyers can draw a new attention time within the current
period, so N+ (t+) = N− (t−) when t = l∆ for l = 0, 1, 2, ...1/∆−1. Last, the seller’s
belief jumps after each transaction because of the endogenous departure of buyers.
The first two forces make the seller’s belief smoothly update, but the last two make
it jump.
Notice that in many dynamic price discrimination games, the seller’s equilibrium
pricing strategy is history dependent rather than Markovian, which makes the prob-
lem less tractable. In a two-period model, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) show that
there is no Markov equilibria. The non-existence of Markov equilibria continues to
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hold in an infinite horizon dynamic pricing game. See the discussion by Gul, Son-
nenschein and Wilson (1986) in a durable goods environment. The reason is that if a
buyer rejects an offer at a particular time, the continuation belief about the buyer’s
type would change dramatically. In our model, thanks to the presence of inattention
frictions, the seller cannot infer any information if a particular offer is not accepted,
since the probability the offer was observed by a buyer is zero. As we will show,
there is a Markov equilibrium.
1.3 Single Unit
We start by analyzing the game where K (0) = 1, the seller has one unit to sell.
Deriving equilibria in this game is the first step forward the analysis of more general
games. We first provide an intuitive conjecture on an equilibrium of this game and
verify our conjecture. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium we proposed is the
unique equilibrium.
The first observation is that the seller can ensure a profit vL because there are
M L-buyers at the deadline. An intuitive conjecture of the seller’s strategy is to
serve the H-buyers only before the deadline to obtain a profit higher than vL and
charge vL at the deadline if no H-buyer arrives. Since an H-buyer would like to avoid
a competition with (1) L-buyers at the deadline, and (2) other H-buyers who may
arrive before the deadline, she is willing to forgo some surplus and accept a price
higher than vL. Moreover, as deadline approaches, the competition coming from
newly arrived H-buyers becomes less and less intense, and therefore the H-buyer’s
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reservation price declines.
Specifically, we conjecture that in equilibrium, the seller charges a price such that:
(1) H-buyers accept it on arrivals, and (2) low type buyers make their purchases only
at the deadline if the good is still available. The optimality of the seller’s pricing
rule implies that, before the deadline, an H-buyer is indifferent between purchasing
at time t and waiting: on the one hand, if the H-buyer strictly prefers to purchase
the good immediately, the seller can raise the price a little bit to increase his profit;
on the other hand, if the price is so high that the H-buyer strictly prefers to wait,
the transaction will not happen at time t and all H-buyers wait in the market.
Furthermore, we will show that accumulating H-buyers is suboptimal for the seller
because the H-buyers’ reserve prices are declining over time. At the deadline, the
seller will charge the price vL to clean out his stock since he believes that there are
no H-buyers left.
We give a heuristic description of the equilibrium in the main text and leave the
formal analysis to the Appendix B. At the deadline, the H-buyer’s reservation price
is vH . However, the probability that an H-buyer’s regular attention time is at the
deadline is zero; thus, the dominant pricing strategy for the seller is to post a deal
price vL to obtain a positive profit. As a result, in any equilibrium, P (1) = vL.
For the rest of the time, we denote p1 (t) as an H-buyer’s reservation price at her
attention time t < 1 and the inventory size K (t) = 1. Consider an H-buyer with an
attention time t ∈ [1 −∆, 1); thus, the probability that new H-buyers arrive before
the deadline is 1 − e−λ(1−t). Suppose this H-buyer understands that on the path of
play, no H-buyer who has arrived before her waited. Therefore, she believes that she
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is the only H-buyer in the market. She then faces the following trade-off:
1. if she accepts the current offer, she gets the good for sure at a price which is
higher than vL;
2. if she does not accept the current offer, the seller will believe that no H-buyer
arrived and to obtain a positive profit, he will charge a price vL to liquidate
the good at the deadline. In the latter situation, the H-buyer has to compete
with M L-buyers for the item, and the probability she is not rationed is 1
M+1
.
These considerations can pin down an H-buyer’s reservation price, p1 (t), at which
she is indifferent between accepting the offer or not at time t. Specifically, the
indifference condition of an H-buyer whose attention time is t is given as follows:
vH − p1 (t) = e−λ(1−t) 1
M + 1
(vH − vL) . (1.1)
The left-hand side represents the H-buyer’s payoff if she purchases the good now; the
right-hand side represents the expected payoff if she waits, which is risky because
(1) other H-buyers may arrive in (t, 1) with a probability 1 − e−λ(1−t), and (2) she
has to compete with M L-buyers at the deadline. Differentiating equation (1.1) with
respect to t, we have p˙1 (t) = −λ [vH − p1 (t)].
Letting t→ 1, we obtain the limit price right before the deadline,
p1
(
1−
)
=
M
M + 1
vH +
1
M + 1
vL. (1.2)
Hence, if M is large, the limit price right before the deadline is very close to vH . Note
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that p1 (1
−) is different from the H-buyer’s actual reservation price at the deadline,
vL. Let U1−∆ denote an H-buyer’s expected utility at the beginning of the last period.
Since her attention time, t˜, is a random variable, we have
U1−∆ =
∫ 1
1−∆
1
∆
e−λ(t˜−1+∆)
[
vH − p1
(
t˜
)]
dt˜ (1.3)
=
∫ 1
1−∆
1
∆
[
e−λ∆
vH − vL
M + 1
]
dt˜.
Notice that, for each t˜, the H-buyer’s ex ante payoff, by considering the risk of the
arrival of new buyers and the price declining until t˜, is e−λ∆ vH−vL
M+1
, which implies that
an H-buyer at the beginning of the last period, is indifferent between being assigned
any attention time in the current period. Hence, U1−∆ = vH − p1 (1−∆).
Now, consider the H-buyer’s reservation price at an earlier time. Note that, when
K (0) = 1, the seller can ensure a profit vL at any time by charging the fire sale price.
However, he expects to charge a higher price to H-buyers who arrive early and want
to avoid competition with H-buyers who arrive in the future and L-buyers. As a
result, the fire sale price vL is charged only at the deadline. At any other time t,
the seller targets H-buyers only and offers a price p1 (t). Consider an H-buyer whose
attention time is t ∈ [1− 2∆, 1−∆). Her indifference condition is given by
vH − p1 (t) = e−λ(1−∆−t)U1−∆. (1.4)
where the left-hand side represents the H-buyer’s payoff if she purchases the good
now; the right-hand side represents the expected payoff if she waits, with probability
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e−λ(1−∆−t), she is still in the market at the beginning of the next period and the
good is still available; so she can draw a new attention time in the last period and
expect a payoff U1−∆. Differentiating equation (1.4) with respect to t, we have
p˙1 (t) = −λ [vH − p1 (t)]. As t goes to 1 − ∆, vH − p1 (t) converges to U1−∆. As a
result, p1 (t) is differentiable in [1 − 2∆, 1). Repeating the argument above for 1/∆
times, we have the ordinary differential equation (ODE, henceforth) for the H-buyers’
reservation price p1 (t) such that
p˙1 (t) = −λ(vH − p1(t)) for t ∈ [0, 1), (1.5)
with a boundary condition (1.2). In our conjectured equilibrium, the price the seller
charges is p1 (t) for t ∈ [0, 1) and it jumps down to vL at the deadline.
Similarly, we can derive the seller’s payoff Π1 (t). At the deadline, Π1 (1) = vL
since the good is sold for sure at the fire sale price. Before the deadline, for a small
dt > 0, the profit follows the following recursive equation:
Π1(t) = p1(t)λdt+ (1− λdt) Π1(t+ dt) + o (dt) ,
= p1(t)λdt+ (1− λdt)
[
Π1(t) + Π˙1 (t) dt
]
+ o (dt) ,
where an H-buyer arrives and purchases the good at time t with probability λdt, and
no H-buyer arrives with a complementary probability. By taking dt→ 0, the seller’s
profit must satisfy the following ODE:
Π˙1(t) = λ [Π1(t)− p1(t)] , (1.6)
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with a boundary condition Π1 (1) = vL. Note that, even though the equilibrium price
is not continuous in time at the deadline, the seller’s profit is because the probability
that the transaction happens at a price higher than vL goes to zero as t approaches
the deadline.
In short, in our conjectured equilibrium, H-buyers accept a price not higher than
their reservation price p1 (t), and the seller posts such price for any t < 1, and vL at
the deadline. No H-buyer waits on the path of play. The next question is whether
players have the incentive to follow the conjectured equilibrium strategies. A simple
observation is that no H-buyer has the incentive to deviate since she is indifferent
between taking and leaving the offer at any attention time. What about the seller?
Does the seller have the incentive to do so and accumulate H-buyers for a while
before the deadline? The answer is again no. This is because each buyer believes
that no previous buyers are waiting in the market, and the seller is going to follow
the equilibrium pricing rule in the continuation play. Since the H-buyer’s reservation
price declines over time, the seller always wants to serve the earliest H-buyer. Hence,
the seller’s equilibrium expected payoff at t is given by
Π1 (t) =
∫ 1
t
e−λ(s−t)λp1 (s) ds+ e−λ(1−t)vL.
Formally,
Proposition 1. Suppose K = 1. There is a unique equilibrium in which,,
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1. for any non-trivial seller’s history, the seller posts a price, P (t) s.t.
P (t) =
 p1 (t) ,vL,
if t ∈ [0, 1)
if t = 1,
where
p1 (t) = vH − vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t),
2. an H-buyer accepts a price at her attention time t ∈ [0, 1) if and only if it is
less than or equal to p1 (t) and she accepts any price no higher than vH at the
deadline.
Notice that neither p1 (t) not Π1 (t) depends on ∆ because each H-buyer makes
her purchase once she arrives but does not draw additional attention time on the
path of play.
Fire sales appear with positive probability at the deadline only, that is, the last-
minute deal. With probability e−λ, no H-buyer arrives in the market and the seller
posts the last-minute deal. The good is not allocated to an L-buyer unless no H-buyer
arrives. As a result, the allocation rule is efficient.
1.4 Multiple Units
In this section we consider the general case in which the seller has K > 1 units
to sell. Since most intuition can be explained for the two-unit case, we provide a
heuristic description of the equilibrium in a two-unit case, and we then state the
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equilibrium for K > 2.
1.4.1 The Two-Unit Case
Consider the case where K = 2. A simple observation is that, after the first
transaction at time τ , K (t) ≤ 1 for t ∈ (τ, 1], and what happens afterwards is
characterized by Proposition 1. The question is how the first transaction happens:
what is the sale price and when does the H-buyer accept the offer? Note that the
seller always has a choice to post a price vL at any t. Since this price is so low that L-
buyers can afford it, a transaction will happen for sure and the seller’s stock switches
to K (t+) = K (t)− 1. In equilibrium, the earliest time at which the seller is willing
to sell the first item at the price vL is denoted by t
∗
1. In principle, when K (t) = 2,
t∗1 can be any time before or at the deadline. As we have shown in Proposition 1, in
any continuation game with K (t) = 1, on the equilibrium path, the seller charges
the price vL only at the deadline; hence, the last equilibrium fire sale time is always
t∗0 = 1. However, it is not clear yet when the first equilibrium fire sale time is. Note
that, because of the scarcity of the goods at the price vL, an H-buyer may be rationed
at t∗1. Consequently, she is willing to pay a higher price before t
∗
1.
We conjecture that the equilibrium should satisfy the following properties. Before
t∗1, the seller posts a price such that an H-buyer is willing to purchase the good once
she arrives. Once an H-buyer buys the good, the amount of stock held by the seller
jumps to one. From that moment on, the equilibrium is described by Proposition
1. Similar to the single-unit case, when K (t) = 2, an H-buyer’s reservation price at
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t ≤ t∗1, p2 (t), satisfies the following ODE:
p˙2 (t) = −λ [p1 (t)− p2(t)] for t ∈ [0, t∗1) (1.7)
The intuition is as follows. Suppose, at t < t∗1, an H-buyer sees the price p2 (t).
It is risky for her to wait because a new H-buyer arrives at rate λ and gets the first
good at price p2 (t), in which case the original buyer can get the second good only
at price p1 (t). At her attention time t, the H-buyer is indifferent between taking the
current offer and waiting only if the price declining effect, measured by p˙2 (t), can
compensate the possible loss.
Since the seller may obtain a higher unit-profit by selling a good to an H-buyer
instead of to an L-buyer, a reasonable conjecture is as follows. In equilibrium, the
seller does not run any fire sales prior to the deadline. In other words, the first
fire sale time is t∗1 = 1, and the seller’s optimal price path, P (t), is such that (1)
P (t) > vL for t < 1, (2) an H-buyer takes the offer once she arrives, and (3) the
seller runs a clearance sale at the deadline. Now that K (t) = 2, the equilibrium
price satisfies the ODE (1.7) with t∗1 = 1. At the deadline, the seller has to post vL,
and an H-buyer can obtain a good at the deal price with probability 2
M+1
; thus, the
boundary condition of the ODE (1.7) at t = 1 is p2 (1
−) = 2
M+1
vH +
M−1
M+1
vL. This
strategy profile, however, is not an equilibrium!
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, t∗1 < 1.
Lemma 1 rules out the aforementioned conjecture. To see why, first note that
p2 (t) < p1 (t) for t < 1 since an H-buyer is more likely to get the good when the
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supply is 2. As t approaches the deadline, the probability that a new H-buyer arrives
before the deadline becomes smaller and smaller. The probability that only one H-
buyer arrives before the deadline is approximated by λ (1− t). In this case,
1. if the seller naively posts price p2 (t), his profit is p2 (τ) + vL where τ is the
H-buyer’s arrival time.
2. Alternatively, if the seller runs a one-unit fire sale before the arrival, he can
ensure a payoff of vL immediately and expect a price p1 (τ) > p2 (τ) in future.
When t is close to the deadline, the benefit of price cutting is approximated by
p1 (1) − p2 (1). On the other hand, there is an opportunity cost to holding a fire
sale before the deadline. More than one H-buyer may arrive before the deadline
and the probability of this event is approximated by λ2 (1− t)2. In this case, if
the seller naively posts price p2 (t) and p1 (t) to the end but does not post vL, his
profit is approximated by p2 (1) + p1 (1). Thus the opportunity cost of the fire sale
is approximated by p2 (1) − vL when t is close to the deadline. As t goes to 1,
λ2 (1− t)2 goes to zero at a higher speed than λ (1− t); thus, the cost is dominated
by the benefit for t close enough to 1, and therefore, the seller will post the fire sale
price vL to liquidate one unit at t
∗
1 < 1 to raise future H-buyers’ reservation price.
In other words, the fire sale plays the role of a commitment device.
We leave the formal equilibrium construction to the Appendix B but illustrate
the idea here to provide intuition. Suppose ∆ is small enough; thus, a buyer can
make her next purchase decision soon after one rejection. Suppose buyers believe
that the fire sale time is t∗1. For t < t
∗
1, and K (t) = 2, an H-buyer’s reservation
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price satisfies the ODE (1.7); for t ∈ [t∗1, 1) and K (t) = 2, H-buyers believe that the
seller is going to post vL immediately, and thus their reservation prices satisfies the
following equation
vH − p2 (t) = 1
M + 1
(vH − vL) + M
M + 1
[vH − p1 (t)] ,
where the left-hand side of the equation is the H-buyer’s payoff by accepting her
reservation price and obtaining the good now, and the right-hand side is her expected
payoff by rejecting the current offer. With probability 1
M+1
, the H-buyer gets the
good at the deal price right after time t, and with a complementary probability, an
L-buyer gets the deal and the H-buyer has to take p1 (t) at her next attention time.
Since ∆ is small, one can ignore the arrivals and the time difference between two
adjacent attention times of the H-buyer, and therefore, the H-buyer’s reservation
price at t ∈ [t∗1, 1) is given by
p2 (t) =
1
M + 1
vL +
M
M + 1
p1 (t) .
The incentive-compatible condition of the H-buyer implies that p2 (t) must be con-
tinuous at t∗1, and thus the boundary condition of the ODE (1.7) is
p2 (t
∗
1) =
1
M + 1
vL +
M
M + 1
p1 (t
∗
1) . (1.8)
As a result, an H-buyer’s reservation price at t when K (t) = 2 critically depends on
her belief about t∗1.
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Given H-buyers’ common beliefs about t∗1, and their reservation prices when
K (t) = 2, the seller’s problem is to choose his optimal fire sale time to maximize his
profit; i.e.:
Π2 (t) = max
t1
∫ t1
t
e−λ(s−t)λ [p2 (s) + Π1 (s)] ds+ e−λ(t1−t) [vL + Π1 (t1)] .
In equilibrium, buyers’ belief is correct, so the seller’s optimal fire sale time is t∗1
itself. The first-order-condition of the seller’s problem at t∗1 is:
λ [p2 (t
∗
1)− vL] + Π˙1 (t∗1) = 0. (1.9)
At t∗1, a transaction happens at price vL for sure, so we have
Π2 (t
∗
1) = Π1 (t
∗
1) + vL, (1.10)
which is the well-known value-matching condition in an optimal stopping time prob-
lem.
For t < t∗1, and K (t) = 2, the seller posts the H-buyer’s reservation price, p2 (t),
and his expected profit is given by
Π2 (t) = λdt [p2 (t) + Π1 (t+ dt)] + (1− λdt) Π2 (t+ dt) +O
(
dt2
)
.
Taking dt → 0, the seller’s profit satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
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(henceforth, HJB) equation
Π˙2 (t) = −λ [p2 (t) + Π1 (t)− Π2 (t)] . (1.11)
Combining (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) at t∗1 yields
Π˙2 (t
∗
1) = Π˙1 (t
∗
1) , (1.12)
which is known as the smooth-pasting condition.
As a result, at the equilibrium fire sale time t∗1, three necessary conditions (1.8),
(1.10), and (1.12) must hold. The necessity of the value-matching condition (1.10)
and the smooth-pasting condition (1.12) comes from the optimal stopping time prop-
erty of the interior fire sale time, and condition (1.8) results from the H-buyers’
incentive-compatible condition. When time is arbitrarily close to t∗1, the probabil-
ity that new H-buyers arrive before t∗1 shrinks, and the H-buyer needs to choose
between taking the current offer and waiting to compete with the L-buyers for the
deal. Therefore, her reservation price must make the H-buyer indifferent between
taking it and rejecting it. If t is not close to t∗1, the competition from newly arrived
H-buyers before t∗1 is non-trivial, and therefore, to convince an H-buyer to accept
the price, it must satisfy the ODE (1.7) with a boundary condition (1.8) at t∗1. The
seller’s equilibrium profit when K (t) = 2 is given by
Π2 (t) =
 Π1 (t) + vL,∫ t∗1
t
e−λ(s−t)λ [p2 (s) + Π1 (s)] ds+ e
−λ(t∗1−t) [vL + Π1 (t∗1)] ,
t ≥ t∗1
t < t∗1
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where t∗1 satisfies conditions (1.8),(1.10) and (1.12), Π1 (t) is characterized in Propo-
sition 1, and p2 (t) satisfies ODE (1.7) with a boundary condition (1.8).
The following proposition formalizes our heuristic description of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Suppose K(0) = 2. There is a ∆¯ > 0 such that when ∆ ∈ (0, ∆¯),
there exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is a fire sale time t∗1 ∈
[0, 1) such that:
1. on the path of play, the seller posts
P (t) =

p1 (t) ,
p2 (t) ,
vL,
when t < 1 and K (t) = 1,
when t < t∗1 and K (t) = 2,
otherwise.
where
p2 (t) =
 vH −
vH−vL
M+1
e−λ(1−t)
[
eλ(1−t
∗
1) + M
M+1
+ λ (t∗1 − t)
]
,
1
M+1
vL +
M
M+1
p1 (t) ,
t ∈ [0, t∗1),
t ∈ [t∗1, 1),
and p1 (t) is specified in Proposition 1,
2. an H-buyer’s reservation price is p1 (t) and p2 (t) when t < 1, K (t) = 1 and 2,
respectively, and vH at t = 1.
Note that the first fire sale time t∗1 always exists, even though for some parameters
it is not an interior solution, i.e., t∗1 = 0. In that case, the seller is so pessimistic
about the arrival of H-buyers that he prefers to liquidate the first unit at the very
beginning. Figure 1.2 shows a simulated equilibrium price path.
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Figure 1.2: The equilibrium price path for the two-unit case. The solid line is the
equilibrium price when K (t) = 1, while the dashed line is that when K (t) = 2.
The first fire sale time is t∗1 = 0.84. When t ≥ t∗1 and K (t) = 2, the seller posts
the deal price, vL, to liquidate the first unit immediately. The parameter values are
vH = 1, vL = 0.7,M = 3, and λ = 2.
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In the equilibrium, for t < t∗1, the price is p2 (t), and it jumps up to p1 (t) once a
transaction happens. If there is no transaction before t∗1, the price jumps down to vL,
and one unit is sold immediately; it then jumps up to the path of p1 (·). The first fire
sale actually happens at t∗1 with probability e
−λ(1−t∗1). Since two or more H-buyers
arrive after t∗1 with positive probability, the allocation is inefficient. However, in
contrast to the standard monopoly pricing game where the inefficiency results from
the seller’s withholding, the inefficiency in this game arises from the scarce good
being misallocated to L-buyers when many H-buyers arrive late.
It is worth noting that our equilibrium prediction on the fire sale critically depends
on two assumptions: (1) H-buyers are forward-looking, and (2) the number of L-
buyers is finite. First, suppose each H-buyer can draw at most one attention time,
and thus she cannot strategically time her purchase. As a result, for any t ∈ [0, 1]
and k ∈ N, the H-buyers’ reservation price is always pk (t) = vH for any k. Hence, the
optimal price path P (t) = vH when t < 1 and P (t) = vL when t = 1 for any k ∈ N.
In this particular model, the price is constant until t = 1. In a more general model,
for example, buyers may have a heterogeneous reservation value v ∈ [vL, vH ]. Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004) consider many variations of this model. In these models, the
result does not depend on the seller’s commitment power. Second, when the number
of L-buyers, M , is finite, an H-buyer can get a good at the deal price with positive
probability. However, if M is infinity, the probability that an H-buyer can get a good
at the deal price is zero. Hence, the difference between p1 (t) and p2 (t) disappears.
In fact, an H-buyer cannot expect any positive surplus and is willing to accept a
price vH at any time.
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1.4.2 The General Case
In general, the seller has K units where K ∈ N. In the equilibrium, the seller may
periodically post a deal price before the deadline. Specifically, there is a sequence of
fire sale times, {t∗k}K−1k=1 , such that t∗k+1 ≤ t∗k for k ∈ {1, 2, ..K − 1}. When t ∈ [t∗1, 1),
if K (t) = 1, the seller posts p1 (t); if K (t) > 1, the seller liquidates K (t) − 1 units
via a fire sale immediately and makes his inventory size jump to 1. When t ∈ [t∗2, t∗1),
if K (t) = k, the seller posts pk (t) for k = 1, 2 and serves H-buyers; if K (t) > 2, he
liquidates K (t)−2 units via a fire sale. By the same logic, for any k ∈ {2, ...K − 1},
when t ∈ [t∗k, t∗k−1), the seller’s equilibrium pricing strategy is as follows: if K (t) ≤ k,
the seller serves H-buyers only by posting a price P (t) = pk (t); if K (t) > k, the
seller posts a deal price and liquidates K (t)− k units of stock immediately.
We derive the equilibrium by induction. Suppose in the K − 1-unit case, H-
buyers’ reservation price is pk (t) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..K − 1}, and the seller’s equilibrium
strategy is consistent with the description above. The seller’s equilibrium profit
is represented by Πk (t) for k ∈ {1, 2, ..K − 1}. Now we construct the H-buyers’
reservation price and the seller’s pricing strategy and payoff in the K-units case. To
satisfy the H-buyers’ incentive-compatible condition, the equilibrium price at t when
K (t) = k ∈ N satisfies the following differential equation:
p˙K (t) = −λ [pK−1 (t)− pK(t)] for t ∈ [0, t∗K−1), (1.13)
38
where t∗K−1 is the first equilibrium fire sale time when K (t) = K, and
pK (t) =
i
M + 1
vL +
M + 1− i
M + 1
pK−i (t) for t ∈ [t∗K−i, t∗K−i−1)
where i = 1, 2, ...K − 1 and t∗0 = 1. The incentive-compatible condition of the H-
buyer implies that pK (t) must be continuous at t
∗
K−1; thus, the boundary condition
of the ODE (1.13) is given by pK
(
t∗K−1
)
= 1
M+1
vL +
M
M+1
pK−1
(
t∗K−1
)
, and therefore,
the H-buyer’s best response is specified for any t ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ {1, 2, ...K}.
The seller’s problem is to choose the optimal fire sale time and quantity to max-
imize his profit. Formally,
ΠK (t) = max
tK−1∈[0,1]
∫ tK−1
t
e−λ(τ−t)λ [pK (s) + ΠK−1 (s)] ds
+ e−λ(tK−1−t) [vL + ΠK−1 (tK−1)] .
In equilibrium, buyers’ beliefs are correct, so the seller’s optimal fire sales time when
K (t) = K is t∗K−1, which satisfies the value-matching and the smooth-pasting con-
ditions.
If there exists an interior solution, t∗K is pinned down as follows. At t
∗
K−1,
pK
(
t∗K−1
)
=
1
M + 1
vL +
M
M + 1
pK−1
(
t∗K−1
)
, (1.14a)
ΠK
(
t∗K−1
)
= ΠK−1
(
t∗K−1
)
+ vL, (1.14b)
Π˙K
(
t∗K−1
)
= Π˙K−1
(
t∗K−1
)
. (1.14c)
In equilibrium, we have t∗K−1 ≤ t∗K−2. The intuition is simple. In a no-waiting
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equilibrium, no previous arrived H-buyers are waiting in the market; thus, the de-
mand from H-buyers shrinks as the deadline approaches. What is more, the prob-
ability that more than k H-buyers arrive before the deadline is approximated by
λk (1− t)k when the current time t is close to the deadline. Apparently, the higher
k is, the smaller the probability is. Hence, the seller who holds more units has the
incentive to liquidate part of his inventory early. What is more, when ∆ is small, on
the path of play, the seller does not run more than one fire sale in the same period.
For a history in which K (t) = k ∈ {1, 2, ..K} and t ∈ [tk′ , tk′−1) for k′ < k − 1,
the seller would try to liquidate multiple units of goods as soon as possible. The
seller’s profit when K (t) = k is given by
Πk (t) =

{∫ t∗k−1
t
e−λ(s−t)λ [pk (τ) + Πk−1 (τ)] dτ
+e−λ(t
∗
k−1−t)
[
vL + Πk−1
(
t∗k−1
)]},
vL (k − k′) + Πk′ (t) ,
kvL,
if t < t∗k−1
if t ∈ [t∗k′ , t∗k′−1)
if t = 1
where k > k′ ∈ {1, 2, ...K − 1}, and t∗k−1 satisfies conditions (1.14a), (1.14b) and
(1.14c).
The following proposition formalizes our heuristic equilibrium description.
Proposition 3. Suppose K ∈ N. There is a ∆¯ > 0 such that when ∆ ∈ (0, ∆¯),
there is a unique equilibrium in which there is a sequence of fire sale times {t∗k}K−1k=1
such that:
1. t∗k+1 ≤ t∗k, and t∗k − t∗k+1 > ∆ when t∗k > ∆,
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2. the H-buyers’ reservation price is pk (t) for t < 1 and K (t) = k ∈ {1, 2, ...K (0)}
and vH at t = 1,
3. on the path of play when K (t) = k, the seller posts
P (t) =
 pk (t) ,vL,
if t < t∗k−1,
if t ≥ t∗k−1 and K (t) ≥ k.
In equilibrium, when K (t) = k, the price is pk (t) for t < t
∗
k−1. Without any
transaction, the price smoothly declines and jumps up to pk−1 (t) once a transaction
happens at t. If there is no transaction before t∗k−1, the price jumps down to vL,
and the price path jumps back to pk−1 (.) after a transaction at t∗k−1. Consequently,
a highly fluctuating price path can be generated. In Figure 1.3, we provide some
simulation of equilibrium price path.
1.5 Discussion
In this section, we briefly discuss some possible extensions and applications of
our baseline model.
1.5.1 Application: Best Available Rate
In the baseline model, we assume the seller has no commitment power. What
if the seller has partial commitment power? In practice, sellers in both the airline
and the hotel industries sometimes employ a best available rate (BAR) policy and
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Figure 1.3: Simulated price path for different realizations of H-buyers’ arrival in the
8-unit case. The upper edge of the shaded area describes the equilibrium list price,
and dots indicate transactions. The parameter values are vH = 1, vL = 0.7, M = 10,
K = 8 and λ = 7.
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commit to not posting price lower than this best rate in the future. Does the seller
have the incentive to do so in our model? Suppose the seller can commit to not
posting a deal before the deadline. Then the seller may benefit. The intuition is as
follows. An H-buyer’s reservation price depends on the next fire sale time. If there is
a deal soon, the reservation price is low, since there is a non-trivial probability that
an L-buyer can obtain a good at the fire sale price. At the beginning of the game, if
the seller can employ a BAR and commit to not posting vL before the deadline, he
can charge a higher price conditional on the inventory size. To illustrate the idea,
we can consider the two-unit case. The seller’s payoff by committing P (t) > vL for
t < 1 is
ΠBAR2 =
∫ 1
0
e−λsλ [p2 (s) + Π1 (s)] ds+ e−λ2vL,
such that p2 (t) satisfies the ODE (1.7) with a boundary condition p2 (1
−) = M−1
M+1
vH+
2
M+1
vL. By committing to no fire sale before the deadline, the seller can ask a higher
price when K (t) = 2. As a result, ΠBAR2 > Π2 (0) for certain parameters. In
Figure 1.4, we plot the profit with BAR, ΠBAR2 (t) and that without it, Π2 (t). In the
beginning ΠBAR2 (t) > Π2 (t). As time goes on, the difference between them vanishes
and becomes negative when the time is very close to the deadline.
1.5.2 Extension: Disappearing H-Buyers
In the baseline model, we assume an H-buyer leaves the market only when her
demand is satisfied. Our results do not qualitatively change if buyers leave at a
non-trivial rate over time. Suppose a buyer leaves the market at a rate ρ > 0 at any
time, and her payoff by leaving the market without making a purchase is zero. If
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Figure 1.4: The solid line is the profit with BAR, while the dashed line is that
without BAR. When t is close to 0, the profit with BAR is higher than that without
BAR. The parameter values are vH = 1, vL = 0.7,M = 3, and λ = 2.
a buyer chooses to wait in the market, she faces the risk of exogenous leaving. In
particular, when K = 1, an H-buyer’s reservation price satisfies the following ODE
p˙1 (t) = − (λ+ ρ) [vH − p1 (t)] for t ∈ [0, 1),
with the boundary condition (1.2). By rejecting the current offer, an H-buyer needs
to take into account two risks: (1) another H-buyer arrives and purchases the first
units before her next attention time, and (2) her exogenous departure. Her payoff is
zero if either happens.
In the two-unit case, for t < t∗1, the H-buyer’s reservation price follows
p˙2 (t) = −λ [p1 (t)− p2 (t)]− ρ [vH − p2 (t)] ,
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and for t ≥ t∗1, the form of p2 (t) is identical to that in the baseline model. The
intuition behind it is as follows. For t < t∗1, by rejecting a current offer, an H-buyer
needs to take into account the risk that (1) another H-buyer arrives before her next
attention time, and (2) she exogenously leaves the market. In the former case, she
has to pay p1
(
t˜
)
instead of p2
(
t˜
)
at her next attention time t˜ > t; in the latter case,
she obtains a payoff of zero, which is equivalent to paying a price vH . Since the risk
of exogenous departure will only change the H-buyer’s reservation price qualitatively,
our main results still hold.
1.6 Other Related Literature and Conclusion
1.6.1 Other Literature
In the revenue management literature, in addition to the papers we discuss in
section 1.1, there are numerous papers that have examined similar problems in differ-
ent environments. Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009) extend the benchmark model to
the heterogeneous objects case. The standard assumption maintained in these works
is that buyers are impatient, and therefore cannot strategically time their purchases.
However, as argued by Besanko and Winston (1990), mistakenly treating forward-
looking customers as myopic may have an important impact on sellers’ revenue.
Hence, the revenue management problem with patient buyers draws the economists’
attention. For example, Wang (1993) considers the case in which a seller has one
object for sale and buyers arrive according to a Poisson distribution and experience
a flow delay cost. He shows that with an infinite horizon, the profit-maximizing
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mechanism is to post a constant price and it may induce a delay of purchases on the
path of play.
In a framework similar to that of Board and Skrzypacz (2010), Li (2012) con-
siders a similar model and characterizes the allocation policy that maximizes the
expected total surplus and its implementation. Mierendorff (2011a) assumes that
buyers randomly arrive and their valuation depends on the time at which the good
is sold and characterizes the efficient allocation rule as a generalization of the static
Vickrey auction. Pai and Vohra (2010) consider a model without discounting where
agents privately arrive and leave the market over time. They show that the revenue-
maximizing allocation rule can be characterized as an index rule: each buyer can
be assigned an index, and the allocation rule allots the good to a buyer if her index
exceeds some threshold. Mierendorff (2011b), on the other hand, considers a similar
environment but studies the optimal mechanism design problem when the regularity
condition fails. Shneyerov (2012) studies a single-unit revenue management problem
where the seller is more patient than the buyers. Su (2007) studies a model where
buyers are heterogeneous in both valuation and patience and derives the optimal
pricing policy. Deneckere and Peck (2012) study a perfect competitive price post-
ing model where buyers arrive over time. They show that buyers endogenously sort
themselves efficiently, with high valuations purchasing first.
In the durable goods literature, Stokey (1979, 1981) provides an early discussion
of the monopolist’s dynamic pricing problem. To consider the issue of new arrivals,
Sobel (1991) considers a model with a more general setting and shows that the Coase
conjecture does not hold. Sobel (1984) extends the model of Conlisk, Gerstner and
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Sobel (1984) by considering a multi-seller case. He shows that, in some equilibria,
all seller lower their price at the same time and to the same level. Board (2008)
allows the entering generations to differ over time. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010)
study a Coasian bargaining model in which exogenous events (for example, new
buyers) may arrive according to a Poisson process. They show that the possibility
of arrivals leads to delay. Huang and Li (2012) allow the existence of new arrivals to
be initially uncertain but it can be learned by players over time. They show that the
interaction between screening and learning about new arrivals can generate frequent
price fluctuations when the seller’s commitment power vanishes. Mason and Valimaki
(2011) study a monopoly pricing problem where a seller faces a sequence of short-lived
buyer whose arrival rate is unknown and can be learned over time. Biehl (2001) and
Deb (2010) study a durable goods model where consumers’ reservation value may
change over time. Said (2012) studies a monopoly pricing problem of perishable
goods, where buyers arrive over time. He shows that the seller can implement the
efficient allocation using a sequence of ascending auctions. McAfee and Wiseman
(2008) consider a durable good selling model where the seller can choose the capacity
and they show that the Coase conjecture fails. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2011) study
the role of deadlines in a Coasian bargaining model where the seller has a single unit
to sell. Dudine, Hendel and Lizzeri (2006) consider a durable good model where
demand changes over time and buyers can purchase and store goods in advance.
They find that if the seller cannot commit, the prices are higher than in the case
in which he can commit, which is inconsistent with the prediction of the standard
Coase conjecture literature.
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Instead of pricing, many authors study other mechanisms a seller can use to sell
her product to strategic buyers. McAfee and Vincent (1997) assume that the seller
can run a sequence of auctions and adjust his reservation price over time. Skreta
(2006) examines the case where the seller faces one buyer with private valuation in a
finite horizon model, allowing the seller to use general mechanisms, and shows that
posted prices are revenue-maximizing among all mechanisms. Skreta (2011) extends
the model to the case where the seller faces many buyers.
In the industrial organization literature, some papers study the role of different
kinds of sales. Lazear (1986) studies firms’ pricing strategy in a two-period model
and provides the first justification of clearance sales. Nocke and Peitz (2007) allow
the seller to optimally choose his capacity and price in a two-period model and
show that clearance sales may be optimal under certain conditions. Mo¨ller and
Watanabe (2009) investigate a monopolist’s profit-maximizing selling strategy when
buyers face uncertainty about their demands. They show that, when aggregate
demand exceeds capacity, both advance purchase discounts and clearance sales may
be optimal. Lazarev (2012) studies the time paths of prices for airline tickets offered
on monopoly routes in the U.S. Using estimates of the model’s demand and cost
parameters, he compares the welfare consumers receive under the current ticketing
system to several alternative systems. In an oligopoly market where sellers face
capacity constraint, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that a mixed pricing strategy
profile is supported as the equilibrium under certain conditions. Maskin and Tirole
(1988) study a duopoly market where firms adjust their price alternately and show
that in a Markov perfect equilibrium, the price pattern satisfies the Edgeworth cycle:
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each firm cuts its price successively to increase its market share until the price war
becomes too costly, at which point some firm increases its price. The other firms
then follow suit, after which price cutting begins again. In a consumer search model,
Varian (1980) justifies the role of sales by a mixed pricing strategy, and Armstrong
and Zhou (2011) investigate the role of exploding offers and buy-now discounts.
1.6.2 Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions. First, we highlight a new channel for gen-
erating the periodic fire sales. When the deadline is approaching, the seller, if he
still has a large inventory, does not expect many arrivals of high-value buyers, so he
has the incentive to liquidate part of his stock via a sequence of fire sales to increase
future H-buyers’ reservation price. This insight can justify the price fluctuations in
industries such as airlines, cruise-lines and hotel services. Second, by introducing
the inattention frictions of buyers, we provide a tractable framework to study dy-
namic pricing problems in both finite and infinite horizon games. On the theory side,
by introducing the inattention frictions of buyers, one can study a relatively simple
equilibrium, the (no-waiting) Markov perfect equilibrium in such games. We believe
that the inattention frictions can simplify the analysis in more general environments.
On the application side, one can investigate the role of commitment associated with
selling strategies, such as the best price guarantee, which is meaningless in a perfect
commitment model.
There are many future research projects one can pursue following our work.
Multiple Buyer-Types. In general, considering buyers’ multiple reservation
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values is complicated in our model. Nevertheless, we can discuss a conjecture equi-
librium in the three-type case. Specifically, a new buyer arrives with rate λ. Con-
ditional on arrival, the buyer’s reservation value of the good is vH with probability
η, and it is vM with probability 1 − η, where vH > vM > vL. Similar to the Coase
conjecture literature, a skimming property holds; that is, if a price p is acceptable
to an M-buyer, it must be acceptable to an H-buyer as well. Define a θ-buyer’s
reservation price when K (t) = k as pθk (t). The skimming property implies that
pHk (t) ≥ pMk (t). At equality, the seller can serve both H-buyers and M-buyers at
the same price. Otherwise, the seller can post either pMk (t) to serve both, or p
H
k (t)
to serve H-buyers only and potentially accumulate M-buyers for a positive measure
of time. Over time, if there is no transaction at pHk (t), the seller is more and more
convinced that there are some M-buyers. If the seller holds a large number of goods
and t is close to the deadline, he has the incentive to charge pMk (t) to sell a unit to
the M-buyer. Similar logic is adopted by Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984), albeit
in a stationary model. In the case of continuous reservation values, v ∈ [vL, vH ], we
conjecture that the seller screens buyers smoothly.
Outside Offers and Competition Among Sellers. In the baseline model, we
assume that there is a single seller and we extend our results by considering buyers’
exogenous departure. However, in the real world, a buyer may leave the market
because she finds a better outside offer. Suppose for each buyer, other offers arrive
at rate γ, and each offered price p˜ is drawn from a commonly known distribution
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Ft (·). Hence, an H-buyer’s indifference condition at her attention time t implies that
p˙k (t) = −λ [pk−1 (t)− pk (t)]− γFt (pk (t)) {E [p˜|p˜ ≤ pk (t)]− pk (t)} ,
where the additional term γFt (pk (t)) {E [p˜|p˜ ≤ pk (t)]− pk (t)} reads that: at a rate
γ, an outside offer with a price p˜ is realized and, with probability Ft [pk (t)], it is
cheaper than the current price, in which case the buyer takes the offer. Hence, one
can easily extend our basic model to consider the effect of outside offers. Furthermore,
one can endogenize the distribution by considering a general equilibrium model in
which many sellers and buyers randomly match, the arrival and departure rates
are interpreted as the search frictions, and the outside offer distribution is given in
equilibrium. We conjecture that our mechanism to generate fire sales still holds as
long as the competition is not perfect.
Overbooking Policy. In the multi-unit case, we show that the allocation mech-
anism is generally inefficient. Some L-buyers can obtain goods via fire sales but the
H-buyers who arrive late may not. One possible selling strategy to overcome this
inefficiency is to allow overbooking. The seller can sell more than he has at a higher
price to H-buyers and buy back some goods previously sold to L-buyers. See Courty
and Li (2000), Ely, Garrett and Hinnosaar (2012) and Fu, Gautier and Watanabe
(2012) for studies of related issues in different environments.
Transparency Policy. In our baseline model, the inventory size is observable.
In practice, the inventory size is the seller’s private information. However, we can
imagine a similar game where the seller can provide verifiable information about
his current inventory size without paying any cost. Since the smaller the current
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inventory size, the higher the price H-buyers are willing to pay, Milgrom’s (1981) full
disclosure theorem can justify the symmetric information of the inventory size. If the
information disclosure is costly, a seller has the incentive to disclose his inventory size
only if it is small enough. Another natural question to ask is, if the seller can choose
the transparency of his inventory size and past price, is it ex ante optimal to hide
this information or not? Is the optimal ex ante transparency policy time-consistent?
Recently, Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009), Kim (2012), and Kaya and Liu (2012) study the
role of transparency of past prices in different environments and show that it has a
significant impact on the formation of future prices.
The Presence of the Secondary Market. In our baseline model, buyers
cannot trade with each other. This assumption applies in the airline, cruise and
hotel-booking industries, but not in other markets such as sport tickets and theater
tickets. We believe that it will be interesting to discuss the role of a secondary
market in our framework. See Sweeting (2012) for an empirical analysis of the price
dynamics in the secondary markets for major league baseball tickets.
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Chapter 2
Bargaining While Learning About
New Arrivals
This chapter is a joint work with Chong Huang.
2.1 Introduction
The arrival of new buyers has a great impact on the market where payoffs are
determined through bargaining. The seller may have an incentive to delay the trade
and wait for other buyers to arrive, whereas the present buyer will lose bargaining
power due to the competition that arises from the arrival of new buyers. Further, in
many situations, the likelihood of new arrivals may be uncertain.
Consider the following story, for instance. Suppose a seller and a buyer are
negotiating on the price of a house. There may be another buyer entering the market
at some point. This new buyer, if he exists, places a very high value on the house
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and has an urgent demand. However, it is not clear whether such a new buyer exists.
The possibility of new arrivals depends on the desirability of the current house, the
activity in the local housing market, and other factors that players may not be able to
foresee. It is initially unknown but can be learned over time. However, the likelihood
of new arrivals is initially uncertain and could be learned over time. When the seller
is very optimistic about the existence of new arrivals, she wants to wait for such a
new buyer by charging a high price that the current buyer would never take. As
time elapses and no new buyer shows up, the seller becomes pessimistic, and so she
begins to treat the current buyer seriously. Then in this environment, how do the
seller’s exogenous learning about new arrivals and her endogenous learning about the
current buyer’s value affect the transaction time and the equilibrium pricing path?
In this paper, we study a bargaining model, highlighting the interaction between
the seller’s exogenous learning about the existence of new arrivals and her endogenous
learning about the current buyer’s value. A long-lived seller, possessing a single unit
of an indivisible durable good, makes a price offer in each period. There is a long-
lived buyer whose reservation value is his private information. Observing the seller’s
offer, the long-lived buyer decides whether to accept it. In addition, a short-lived
buyer with a high reserve price may exist. If such a short-lived buyer exists, his
arrival is governed by a Poisson process. If the current offer is rejected by the long-
lived buyer, the arriving short-lived buyer makes the purchase decision immediately
and then leaves the market. The game ends once the good is sold.
We show that the model has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium and in the
equilibrium, the standard Coase conjecture fails when learning about new arrivals
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is non-trivial. 1 That is, when the seller can make offers arbitrarily frequently,
the initial price is bounded away from the seller’ reservation value. This is because
waiting for new arrivals serves as a non-trivial outside option of the seller. As long
as the likelihood of arrivals is non-trivial, terminating the bargaining by offering a
very low price is suboptimal to him. Since the learning speed of the existence of new
arrivals is exogenous, the value of the outside option smoothly declines over time.
Therefore, the seller slowly screens the long-lived buyer, which results in a strategic
delay of the transaction.
We also characterize the equilibrium price dynamics. We show that the interac-
tion between the seller’s exogenous learning about the existence of new arrivals and
her endogenous learning about the current buyer’s value determines the equilibrium
price dynamics. When the seller is optimistic about the new arrivals, she charges
a price equal to the short-lived buyer’s value. Such a high price offer is effectively
made to the potential short-lived buyer only. We call such an offer a waiting offer.
Charging a waiting offer forever, however, is suboptimal. If the good is not sold by
charging a waiting offer for a very long time, the posterior belief about the existence
of new arrivals drops below some threshold point. Then the seller finds that is is
more valuable to screen the long-lived buyer by cutting the price. We call such an
offer a screening offer. Of course, the screening offer may be accepted by an arriving
short-lived buyer, if it is rejected by the long-lived buyer. So if the good is still
not sold at a screening offer, both the seller and the long-lived buyer will adjust
downward their beliefs about the existence of the new arrivals. Apparently, when
1See Coase (1972), Bulow (1982), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and Ausubel and De-
neckere (1989).
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the likelihood of new arrivals is high enough, the seller chooses to post a waiting
offer. When the likelihood of new arrivals is relatively low, the seller chooses to post
a screening offer.
Specifically, Proposition 9 shows that if the time interval between two offers is
sufficiently small, screening offers cannot be charged in more than two consecutive
periods. The logic is similar to the Coase conjecture: when the seller can make offers
arbitrarily frequently, he always prefers to speed up the screening of the long-lived
buyer. As a result, after being rejected once or twice, the seller believes that the
long-lived buyer’s value is too low so that he switches to wait for new arrivals.
Dynamic bargaining models allowing new arrivals have not drawn economists’
attentions until recently. Sobel (1990) considers a dynamic pricing model in which
buyers keep arriving over time. In an equilibrium, the seller serves high value buyers
most of the time and periodically serves low value buyers, so the equilibrium price
fluctuates over time. However, in Sobel (1990), the price fluctuation is driven by
the accumulation of arrivals instead of learning. Inderst (2008) assumes that the
seller can choose whether to keep the original buyer or to switch to the new long-
lived buyer who arrives with a known probability. If he switches, he starts a new
screening, and thus the Coase conjecture is robust in this perturbation. Fuchs and
Skrzypacz (2010) also consider a bargaining game between a seller and a buyer for
a trade of one unit of an indivisible good, in which a stochastic event arrives in
each period with a known probability. If no event arrives, the seller posts a price to
the buyer whose value is his private information. Conditional on arrival, the seller’s
expected value depends on his belief about the buyer’s value. One example of the
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stochastic event is the arrival of a new buyer whose value is unknown. Conditional on
arrival, two buyers bid for the good in an auction, and the seller’s expected revenue
from the auction depends on the current buyer’s value. They show that there is a
delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations.
They characterize the continuous time limit of the price path, which turns out to be
very tractable. The existence of the arrival is commonly known in these models, so
equilibrium prices are strictly decreasing. As we show in our model, learning about
the existence of the short-lived buyer leads to price fluctuations in equilibrium.
In a parallel study by Faingold, Liu and Shi (2011), the buyer has an outside
option whose existence is learned over time. The belief about the existence of the
buyer’s outside option decreases over time, and the seller smoothly changes the price.
Our paper is different from Faingold, Liu and Shi (2011) in that the seller posts a
price at the very beginning of each period, and conditional on arrival, the seller has
to commit to the price. We show that the combination of learning and this marginal
commitment power generates price fluctuations in our model.
In addition, a number of papers have studied the problem of a seller who learns
about the demand it faces.2 Mason and Valimaki (2011) studied a monopolist who
faces a sequence of short-lived buyers with an unknown arrival rate and a commonly
known value distribution. The seller posts a price in each period and learns the
buyers’ arrival rate, which depends on both an unknown parameter of the Poisson
process and the posted price. As time passes without a sale, the seller becomes more
pessimistic about the arrival rate and therefore smoothly lowers the posted price. In
2See Rothschild (1974), McLennan (1984), Bergemann and Valimaki (1994, 2006), among others.
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this paper, the seller faces not only a sequence of short-lived buyers with degenerated
value but an unknown arrival rate but also a long-lived buyer with privately known
value. Hence, we see Mason and Valimaki (2011) as a complement to our research,
rather than a substitute.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sections 2.2 and 2.3, we intro-
duce the bargaining model with learning about new arrivals. Section 2.4 is devoted
to the no learning case as a benchmark. In section 2.5, we construct the unique
equilibrium of the bargaining game with learning and show the price fluctuation as
an inevitable phenomenon. Section 2.6 concludes. All omitted proofs are presented
in the appendix.
2.2 The Model
Time is discrete and is indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. Any period has the same
length ∆. A long-lived seller has one unit of a durable good for sale. The value
of the good to the seller is 0. There is a long-lived buyer, and the value of the
good to this buyer, v, is a random variable with support [v, 1]. In this paper, we
assume v > 0, so we focus on the “gap case” bargaining model. The value v is
drawn by Nature at the beginning of the game according to a commonly known
distribution, and the long-lived buyer privately knows it. Let F (v) and f(v) be the
cumulative distribution function and the density function of v, respectively. Assume
that f(v) ∈ (0, f¯ ] for all v ∈ [v, 1). In addition, we assume the density function
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satisfies f(1) = f ′(1) = 0.3 There may exist a short-lived buyer whose value of the
good is 1. The long-lived seller and the long-lived buyer share a common prior belief
about the existence of the short-lived buyer, denoted by α0 ∈ (0, 1].4 Conditional on
his existence, the arrival of the short-lived buyer is determined by a Poisson process.
Specifically, in each period, the short-lived buyer enters the market with probability
λ∆ if he exists. Intuitively, when the initial likelihood of arrival is small enough,
the seller may ignore the possibility of arrival and focus on screening the long-lived
buyer. To avoid a trivial case, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (non-trivial learning). v < λα0
λα0+r
.
In each period t, the seller first announces a price pt. The long-lived buyer,
observing pt, decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If he rejects it, the
short-lived buyer may arrive (with probability λ∆) if he exists. Conditional on his
arrival, the short-lived buyer decides whether to accept the current price if the good
is available. If there is no transaction in period t, the game enters period t+ 1. Once
the good is sold, the game ends.
The long-lived seller and the long-lived buyer share the same discount factor e−r∆,
where r > 0. If the transaction happens with price pt in period t, the seller’s payoff is
e−tr∆pt. If the game ends with the long-lived buyer buying the good at price pt, then
the long-lived buyer’s payoff is e−tr∆(v − pt). If the game ends with the short-lived
buyer accepting an offer, the long-lived buyer’s payoff is zero. The short-lived buyer’s
3This assumption helps us to show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, so that we
can focus on the discussion of equilibrium properties.
4When α0 = 0, the game is the canonical Coasian bargaining model.
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payoff is
vs =

1− pt, if the good is available and he accepts it,
0, otherwise.
Define Ht as the set of period t histories such that no transaction happens, so
ht ∈ Ht is a sequence of price {pτ}t−1τ=0, which has not been accepted by either the
long-lived or the short-lived buyer. Let H ≡ ∪tHt. A strategy of the seller is a
map from the histories of rejected prices to price offers in the current period. It
is obvious that any price strictly greater than 1 is dominated by the price 1 and
thus is suboptimal, because neither the long-lived buyer nor the potential short-lived
buyer will accept a price strictly greater than 1. Hence, we restrict the price space
on [0, 1]. Denote a pure strategy of the seller by the mapping P : H → [0, 1]. A
behavior strategy of the long-lived buyer specifies whether to accept the offer in any
period t, given the price pt, past rejected prices {pτ}t−1τ=0 and his value v. Formally,
let A : H × [0, 1] × [v, 1] → {0, 1}, where A(ht, p, v) = 0 means that the long-lived
buyer with value v and history ht rejects the offer pt at period t. The short-lived
buyer accepts any offer pt ≤ 1 if it is available.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Weak Markov Equilibrium
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth “PBE”) in this game consists of a
strategy profile, a system of beliefs about the long-lived buyer’s value, and a system
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of beliefs about the existence of the short-lived buyer. In a PBE, given the systems
of beliefs, all players behave sequentially rationally in any information set; and given
the strategy profile, the system of beliefs is calculated by Bayes’ rule, whenever it
can be applied.
Because whether the short-lived buyer shows up is publicly observable to both
the long-lived seller and the long-lived buyer, they share the same belief about the
existence of the short-lived buyer after any history ht. Denote such a belief at the
beginning of period t by αt, then if no short-lived buyer arrives and no transaction
happens in period t, both the long-lived seller and the long-lived buyer update their
beliefs by Bayes’ rule as
αt+1 =
αt(1− λ∆)
1− αtλ∆ . (2.1)
In the rest of the paper, we sometimes use α and α′ to denote the belief about the
existence of the short-lived buyer in the current period and in the next period, re-
spectively. Similarly, primes are used to denote next-period values of other variables.
Fixing a ∆ > 0, the updating rule of α implies that there are countably many realiza-
tions of α. We denote by B∆(αˆ) the set of realizations of α, which can be generated
from αˆ by the Bayes’ rule given ∆.
The belief αt+1 summarizes the information about the short-lived buyer’s exis-
tence from the no transaction history at the end of period t. The following Lemma,
extending the insight of Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) to this model, claims
that the long-lived seller’s belief about the long-lived buyer’s value after any no
transaction history is a truncated sample of the original distribution. As a conse-
quence, the long-lived seller’s posterior belief about the long-lived buyer’s value is
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summarized by the upper bound of the truncated distribution.
Lemma 2 (Conditional Skimming Property). In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
conditional on the current α, if the long-lived buyer with value v accepts an offer,
any long-lived buyer with v′ > v must accept it.
The conditional skimming property implies that in any perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium, after any relevant history of offered prices, there exists a value k such that the
long-lived buyer rejects all of these offers if and only if his value v ≤ k. The intuition
is as follows. The long-lived buyer’s benefit of waiting comes from the decline in the
future price, which does not depend on his value. But the cost of waiting results
from postponing consumption, which is increasing in the long-lived buyer’s value
v. Put differently, it is more costly for the high value long-lived buyer to delay his
consumption than it is for the low value buyers.
The conditional skimming property implies that in a PBE, the long-lived buyer’s
action in any period t depends only on his value, the current price, and the current
belief about the existence of short-lived buyers. In particular, after any history ht
in a PBE, if the long-lived buyer with value k is indifferent between taking the
current offer and waiting for future offers, the long-lived buyer with a value larger
than k strictly prefers the current offer. Hence, the cutoff k summarizes the payoff
relevant information about the long-lived buyer’s value, and it is common knowledge
that the seller’s belief about the long-lived buyer’s value is distributed according to a
truncated distribution of F (v) with support [v, k]. As a result, it is natural to consider
that in a PBE, players will condition their actions in any information set only on
two state variables (k, α), the highest value at which the long-lived buyer has not
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bought and the belief about the existence of the short-lived buyer. In the literature,
a PBE with such conditions is called a strong Markov equilibrium. However, as we
will explain in more details in section 2.3.2, a strong Markov equilibrium does not
generally exist. Therefore, in this paper, we use the weak-Markov equilibrium as the
solution concept of the model.
Definition 5. A strategy profile (P,A) is a weak Markov equilibrium (henceforth
equilibrium), if it is a PBE and there exist two functions
σ : [v, 1]×B∆(α0)× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and κ : [0, 1]×B∆(α0)→ [v, 1],
such that, in any period t,
1. P (ht) = σ(kt, αt, pt−1), if ht ∈ Ht induces (kt, pt−1); and
2. for any ht ∈ Ht and any price p, A(ht, p, v) = 0 if and only if v ≤ κ(p, αt).
We say (σ, κ) describes an equilibrium.
The functions σ and κ describe the seller’s equilibrium pricing strategy and the
long-lived buyer’s equilibrium acceptance rule, respectively. The first requirement of
the equilibrium definition states that the seller’s price in period t depends only on
her belief about the long-lived buyer’s value, her belief about the existence of the
short-lived buyer, and the last period rejected price pt−1. In addition, we will show
that on the equilibrium path, the continuation play depends only on (kt, αt), so we
abuse notation by treating σ as a function of (kt, αt) but not pt−1 on the equilibrium
path. However, we keep in mind that on the off-equilibrium path, σ may depend on
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pt−1. The second requirement of the equilibrium definition shows that the long-lived
buyer will employ a cutoff rule, on and off the equilibrium path. Given any price
and the belief about the existence of the short-lived buyer in period t, the long-lived
buyer at value κ(p, αt) will be indifferent between taking the offer p and waiting.
2.3.2 Why Not a Strong Markov Equilibrium?
A weak Markov equilibrium differs from a strong Markov equilibrium mainly in
that on the off-equilibrium path, the seller’s price may depend on the previous prices.
Though allowing the seller to set a price conditional on the previously rejected offers
seems unnatural, it is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. In this section,
we briefly discuss the non-existence of a strong Markov equilibrium, and more details
will be shown when we construct the equilibrium of the model.
To complete a description of a seller’s strategy, after any price is rejected, a
belief about the long-lived buyer’s value must be assigned. Because of the condi-
tional skimming property, we need to assign a k′ after any price is rejected. In an
equilibrium, such a k′ must have the property that the k′-value long-lived buyer is
indifferent between taking the rejected price and waiting. However, if the continu-
ation play depends only on (k′, α′), there may be some p˜ such that the long-lived
buyer’s indifference condition is violated, no matter what his value is. Therefore,
for us to assign a k˜ after this deviating price p˜ is rejected, the k˜-value long-lived
buyer’s continuation payoff has to depend on p˜. Suppose this is not the case. Then,
if the prescribed continuation play provides the k˜ long-lived buyer a high value, the
k˜ long-lived buyer will strictly prefer rejecting p˜; if the prescribed continuation play
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provides the k˜-value long-lived buyer a low value, the k˜-value long-lived buyer will
strictly prefer accepting p˜. So k˜ cannot be indifferent. As a result, for some k˜ long-
lived buyer to be indifferent, he must be facing some uncertainty for future plays;
that is, the seller must randomize after p˜ is rejected. But how the seller randomizes
will depend on what the deviating price is. So, the seller’s off-equilibrium price may
depend on her previous prices. To illustrate this intuition, let’s consider the following
two-period two-type example.
Ignore the short-lived buyer first. Consider that the buyer’s value is either 1 or
3. The prior belief is µ1 = Pr(v = 3) = 1/2. Let the discount factor equal 1/2.
The seller makes one offer in each of the two periods. In the unique PBE, p1 = 2
and p2 = 1. The high type buyer takes p1, and the low type buyer takes p2. If p1
is rejected, the belief becomes µ2 = 0. This is an equilibrium, since the high type
buyer is indifferent between taking p1 = 3 in the first period and taking p2 = 1 in the
second period. Now, suppose the seller deviates to p˜1, which is greater than 2 but
smaller than 3. If the high type buyer takes it with probability 1, in the continuation
game, µ2 = 0 and p2 = 1. Given this continuation play, the high type buyer should
not take any price greater than 2 in the first period. Conversely, if the high type
buyer rejects it with probability 1, µ2 = µ1 and p2 = 3. Given this continuation play,
the high type buyer should take p˜1. So to assign a belief on the high value, the only
possibility is to let the high type buyer randomize.
Suppose the high type buyer takes p˜1 with probability 1/2. If the price is rejected,
µ2 = 1/3 by Bayes’ rule. In the second period, the seller is indifferent between
charging 1 and 3. That is, in the continuation play in the second period, if the belief
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is the Markov state variable, we have two pure strategy Markov equilibria and infinite
many mixed strategy Markov equilibria. However, we also need the high type buyer
to be indifferent between taking and rejecting p˜1 in the first period. If he takes it,
he gets 3 − p˜1; if he rejects it, the seller may randomize between 3 and 1. If the
seller charges 1 with probability γ in the continuation game, the high value buyer’s
expected payoff is 3− [γ + 3(1− γ)] = 2γ. To make the high value buyer indifferent,
γ = 3−p˜1
2
. As a result, the seller’s price in the second period after a deviation depends
on the price charged in the first period.
In this example, after any deviation in the first period, the seller must randomize,
which implies that the seller’s belief about the high value buyer must be equal to
1/3. This is a crucial point that allows us to show that a strong Markov equilibrium
does not exist in this game. However, this unique off-equilibrium path belief results
from the assumption that the buyer has only two types. In the case that the buyer’s
value is distributed over the support [1, 3], in this two-period game, a strong Markov
equilibrium exists. In our model, the long-lived buyer’s value is distributed over the
support [v, 1], but the bargaining is a potentially infinite horizon game. Due to the
complication of the equilibrium construction, we are unable to show whether a strong
Markov equilibrium exists. Hence, in this paper, we use weak Markov equilibrium
as the solution concept of the model.
2.3.3 Screening Offer and Waiting Offer
Before moving to the formal analysis of the model, in this section, we introduce
some preliminary analysis, as well as some notations. Let’s first consider the belief
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about the existence of the short-lived buyer. Conditional on his existence, the short-
lived buyer arrives in any period with probability λ∆. Therefore, no transaction
in period t will make both the seller and the long-lived buyer shift downward their
belief about the existence of the short-lived buyer according to (2.1).
Second, in the standard bargaining models without the short-lived buyer, the
equilibrium price sequence is strictly decreasing over time because of the skimming
property. Consequently, the upper limit of the support of the seller’s belief about the
long-lived buyer’s value is also strictly decreasing over time. In our model, however,
the seller may charge a high price in equilibrium, which the long-lived buyer rejects
for sure, because the potential short-lived buyer places a higher value on the good
and thus takes the high price offer. Hence, the upper limit of the support of the
seller’s belief about the long-lived buyer’s value may not be strictly decreasing. If
the seller decides to charge such a price, he will set a price at 1, the short-lived
buyer’s value, and the long-lived buyer rejects the offer for sure.
Definition 6. A price is a screening offer if and only if the long-lived buyer with
some value v ∈ [v, k] may accept it, given α. The price p = 1 is a waiting offer.
If the seller provides a waiting offer, the long-lived buyer will reject it in an
equilibrium, no matter what her value is. Therefore, after a waiting offer, the seller’s
belief about the long-lived buyer’s value does not change. If the seller provides a
screening offer, there is a positive measure of values with which the long-lived buyer
will accept it. As a result, no transaction causes the seller to update his belief about
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the long-lived buyer’s value as
k′ =

κ(p, α), if p is a screening offer,
k, if p = 1 is the waiting offer.
(2.2)
For a given state variable vector (k, α), denote the seller’s value from optimally
charging a screening offer by V (k, α). If the seller chooses a waiting offer, we denote
his value by J(k, α). Therefore, given (k, α), the seller charges the optimal screening
offer if and only if V (k, α) ≥ J(k, α). Specifically, given the buyer’s cutoff strategy
κ(p, α), the seller’s problem is
R(k, α) = max{J(k, α), V (k, α)}, (2.3)
where
J(k, α) = λα∆ + (1− λα∆)e−r∆R(k′, α′) (2.4)
and
V (k, α)
= max
p
{[F (k)− F (κ(p, α))
F (k)
+
F (κ(p, α))
F (k)
αλ∆]p
+
F (κ(p, α))
F (k)
(1− αλ∆)e−r∆R(κ(p, α), α′)}. (2.5)
Denote the optimal screening offer given (k, α) by σs(k, α) (that is, σs(k, α) is the
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optimal policy for equation (2.5)), then
σ(k, α) =

σs(k, α), if V (k, α) ≥ J(k, α),
1, if V (k, α) < J(k, α).
Using the highest price accepted by the long-lived buyer with value v given α, we
reformulate (2.5) as
V (k, α)
= max
v≤k′≤k
{[F (k)− F (k
′)
F (k)
+
F (k′)
F (k)
αλ∆]κ−1(k′|α)
+
F (k′)
F (k)
(1− αλ∆)e−r∆R(k′, α′)}. (2.6)
Hence, the policy correspondence of the seller’s problem is
T (k, α) =

k, if σ(k, α) = 1,
Ts(k, α), otherwise,
where Ts(k, α) is the maximum of the set of solutions to problem (2.6).
By definition, when the seller charges a waiting offer, the long-lived buyer will
reject it for sure, no matter what her value is. When the seller posts a screening
offer, the best response of the long-lived buyer with value v can be characterized by
the following indifferent condition:
v − σ(k, α) = e−r∆(1− αλ∆)U(v, k′, α′|σ),
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where
U(v, k, α|σ) = max{v − σ(k, α), e−r∆(1− αλ∆)U(v, k′, α′|σ)}
denotes the continuation value of the long-lived buyer with value v, when the state
variable vector is (k, α) and the seller follows pricing strategy P . As argued above,
the equilibrium prices may not be strictly decreasing over time, because the seller
may charge waiting offers. Thus, given a price sequence, the indifferent condition of
the long-lived buyer can be written as
v − pt = e−(n+1)r∆
[
t+n∏
i=t
(1− αiλ∆)
]
(v − pt+n+1),
where on the right-hand side, the long-lived buyer waits for n+ 1 periods and takes
the risk that the short-lived buyer arrives between period t and period t+ n.
2.4 Bargaining Without Learning
In this section, we assume α0 = 1. That is, it is common knowledge that the
short-lived buyer exists. Though the arrival time of the short-lived buyer is still
random, there is no learning about the existence of the short-lived buyer. Therefore,
the analysis in this section provides a good benchmark for us to show the effect of
learning about the existence of the short-lived player in Section 2.5.
Because the seller is sure that the short-lived buyer exists, he can charge the
waiting offer forever and expect a time-invariant value. This is a non-trivial outside
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option for him. Denote such an outside option by J0, then
J0 = λ∆ + (1− λ∆)e−r∆J0.
When ∆ is small, e−r∆ can be approximated by 1 − r∆, so the value of waiting
for arrivals J0 can be approximated by
λ
r+λ
for small ∆ > 0. Furthermore, by
Assumption 1, we have J0 > v. That is to say, the seller prefers to wait for arrivals
rather than trading at an extremely low price (close to v) immediately. Consequently,
once the seller believes the long-lived buyer’s value is sufficiently low, he prefers to
stop screening him and wait for arrivals by using waiting offers.
Once the seller charges a waiting offer in period t, his belief about the long-lived
buyer’s value does not change. Hence, if there is no transaction in period t, his
belief about the long-lived buyer’s value in period t+ 1 is the same as that in period
t. Therefore, if it is optimal for the seller to charge the waiting offer in period t,
it is optimal for him to charge the waiting offer in period τ > t. Consequently,
the seller’s problem of when to charge the waiting offer is a stopping time problem.
Furthermore, λ
r+λ
< 1, so the seller will charge screening offers before switching to
the waiting offer forever. Hence, before switching to the waiting offer, the seller’s
problem is almost identical to that in the canonical Coase bargaining problem. The
following Proposition summarizes this intuition.
Proposition 4. When α0 = 1, an equilibrium exists. Generically, the equilibrium is
the unique PBE of the model. Furthermore, there exists an integer N such that, in
the equilibrium,
71
1. the seller posts screening offers in the first N periods,
2. the price decreases in the first N periods, and
3. from the N + 1 period on, the seller switches to the waiting offer forever.
Proposition 4 implies that, in equilibrium, there are two phases: the screening
phase and the waiting phase. That is to say, the seller first screens the long-lived
buyer for finitely many periods by gradually cutting the price. Once the price reaches
a certain cutoff level, the seller believes that the value of the long-lived buyer is
sufficiently low so that he will give up the long-lived buyer and wait for the arrivals
by charging a high price in the future. In the following proposition, we show that
the screening process ends very quickly when the time interval of two consecutive
periods converges to zero and the initial price converges to λ
λ+r
. Hence, a modified
Coase conjecture holds, and there is no strategic delay in the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. In the equilibrium, the following properties hold:
1. pt ≥ λλ+r for any ∆ > 0, t ≥ 0.
2. (No Strategic Delay) p0 goes to
λ
λ+r
as ∆ goes to zero.
2.5 Bargaining While Learning About Arrivals
In this section, we study the bargaining game when α0 ∈ (0, 1). In this case,
the interaction between the seller’s exogenous learning about the existence of the
short-lived buyer and his endogenous learning about the long-lived buyer’s value has
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significant effects on the equilibrium characterization, the equilibrium bargaining
outcome, and the equilibrium pricing path.
2.5.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Different from the no learning case, posting the waiting offer forever from some
period on cannot be part of an equilibrium. The reason is as follows. By posting a
waiting offer, the seller learns the likelihood of arrival only but not the value of the
long-lived buyer. After finitely many periods, the seller believes that the likelihood of
arrival is negligible, and his expected payoff from waiting longer for a new arrival is
almost zero! As a result, the seller can simply charge a price p = v to trade with the
long-lived buyer immediately. Hence, the “waiting offers forever” strategy cannot be
part of an equilibrium in any continuation game. In addition, the seller’s equilibrium
payoff in any continuation game with α is bounded below by max{J0(α), v}, so for
sufficiently large λα, the equilibrium screening price is bounded away from v.
Define
α† ≡ max{α|α ∈ B∆(α0) and v ≥ αλ∆ + (1− αλ∆)e−r∆v}
to be the largest realization of α, at which it is better for the seller to set a price
at v (to finish the bargaining) than to charge the waiting offer once and then set a
price at v.
Lemma 3. For any k ∈ [v, 1], if α ∈ B∆(α†) = B∆(α0)∩{α|α ≤ α†}, then the seller
does not charge the waiting offer in equilibrium.
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Lemma 3 implies that when α is small enough, the seller charges only screening
offers in any equilibrium. Therefore, the waiting offer, if charged in an equilibrium,
is a temporary phenomenon. Because when α > α†, the seller will not charge a price
p = v to finish the bargaining and, there is a positive probability that some α ≤ α† is
reached on the equilibrium path. Therefore, to analyze players’ equilibrium behaviors
when α is large, we first need to characterize the equilibrium behavior when α ≤ α†.
The following Proposition provides a detailed characterization of the continuation
equilibrium for such small α’s.
Proposition 6. In any continuation game starting at (k, α) ∈ [v, 1] × B∆
(
α†
)
, an
equilibrium exists, and it satisfies the following properties:
1. It is the unique PBE of the continuation game.
2. The game ends in finitely many periods.
When α ≤ α†, the belief about the existence of the short-lived buyer is so low that
the long-lived seller will charge only screening offers. We can construct the unique
equilibrium in the same way as in the no learning case. First, for each α ∈ B∆(α†),
we define k0(α) as the maximum k such that a seller at (k, α) optimally charges v
immediately rather than making other screening and waiting offers, and therefore, the
game ends in one period. The reason is that the seller is so pessimistic about both the
long-lived buyer’s value and the short-lived buyer’s arrival that he prefers to obtain
v immediately. As a result, the game ends within one period. Similarly, fixing any
α ∈ B∆(α†), we define k1(α), such that when k ∈ (k0(α], k1 (α)), the seller’s optimal
screening offer is a price σ(k, α), and there is a marginal type k′ ∈ [v, k0 (α′)) who is
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α(0, v) α†
k
α′α′′ α
k0(α′)
k0(α)
k0(α′′)
k1(α′)
k1(α)
k2(α′)
k2(α)
Figure 2.1: equilibrium construction in the learning case
indifferent between taking σ(k, α) and waiting for one more period. We show there is
an integer N , such that inductively applying this construction method for N times,
we have kN (α) > 1 for any α ∈ B∆(α†). This idea of equilibrium construction is
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In the original game, it takes finitely many periods for the belief to decrease
from α0 < 1 to α
† regardless of the players’ strategy profile. Hence, Corollary 1
immediately results from Proposition 6.
Corollary 1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the game ends in finitely many
periods.
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The next Proposition extends the equilibrium construction to the space of (k, α),
where (k, α) ∈ [v, 1]×B∆ (α0) \B∆
(
α†
)
, and shows that it is essentially the unique
PBE.
Proposition 7. The equilibrium exists. Generically, it is the unique PBE.
The equilibrium construction and the proof of its uniqueness are presented in
the Appendix. Here we present only the idea of construction as follows. First,
since the unique equilibrium strategy profile, (σ, κ), is constructed for any continu-
ation game starting at (k, α†) (k ∈ [v, 1]), the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived
buyer with any value is specified under (σ, κ). Second, extend the long-lived buyer’s
strategy profile κ (p, α) to α2 = min{α ∈ B∆ (α0) , α > α†} such that κ (p, α2) is
indifferent between taking p in this period and obtaining his continuation payoff,
U
(
κ (p, α2) , κ (p, α2) , α†|σ, κ), in the next period. Third, extend the seller’s screen-
ing strategy σs (·, α) to α2. Fourth, for any k ∈ [v, 1], compare the seller’s values
V (k, α2) induced by the optimal screening offer and J (k, α2) induced by a waiting
offer, and define R (k, α2) = V (k, α2) , σ (k, α2) = σs (k, α2) if V (k, α2) ≥ J (k, α2),
and R (k, α2) = J (k, α2) , σ(k, α2) = 1 otherwise. Finally, compute the buyer’s pay-
off, U (k, k, α2|σ, κ) for each k ∈ [v, 1]. Since it takes finitely many steps to go from
α0 to α
†, we can repeat the above construction method for finitely many times and
extend (σ, κ) to α0. We can essentially find a unique path of {kt, αt}N∗t=0 from (1, α0)
to (v, ατ ) where τ ≤ N∗.
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2.5.2 Strategic Delay and Price Fluctuation
In this subsection, we analyze properties of the equilibrium and demonstrate the
role of the interaction between the seller’s exogenous learning about the existence
of the short-lived buyer and his endogenous learning about the long-lived buyer’s
value. When the likelihood of new arrivals is sufficiently high, waiting for arrivals is
a non-trivial outside option, so that the seller has no incentive to post a sufficiently
low price to ensure a trade with the long-lived buyer takes place immediately, even
though the time interval between the two offers is arbitrarily small. The following
Proposition formalizes this intution. Therefore, with the potential new arrivals, there
are strategic delays of trades.
Proposition 8 (Strategic Delay with Non-trivial Learning). For any ∆ and T > 0,
there is an α¯ < 1 such that, for any α0 ∈ (α¯, 1), the equilibrium price Pt > v for any
t < T .
From Lemma 3, we know that, after finitely many periods, the seller charges only
screening offers in the equilibrium. Hence, in equilibrium, there are two phases. In
the second phase, the seller believes that the likelihood of arrivals is small and uses
screening offer only. In the first phase, the seller may use both waiting offers and
screening offers. Since the waiting price is high, the equilibrium price dynamics in
the first phase may exhibit jumps. Intuitively, when the likelihood of new arrivals
measured by α is large, the waiting offer may be optimal, because the expected
revenue from selling the good to the short-lived buyer is high. When charging the
waiting offer, only the belief about the arrivals changes, and the seller’s belief about
the long-lived buyer’s value does not change. Hence, after charging waiting offers for a
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while, α goes down over time, the waiting offer becomes less attractive, and the seller
will switch to screening offers. However, after several periods with screening offers,
α may become relatively large (compared with k), so the waiting offer may become
the optimal choice for the seller again. Therefore, the equilibrium price may exhibit
fluctuation: some decreasing screening prices are followed by the waiting offer in a
number of periods, and then even lower screening prices are charged. Unfortunately,
it is well known that fully analyzing the equilibrium strategies in a dynamic pricing
game is in genearl impossible. Hence, we focus on the games that satisfy certain
conditions. First, following Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010), we focus on the games with
atomless limits.
Condition 1 (Atomless Limit). In the equilibrium, for all t > 0, if the seller uses
screening offers in period t, t+ 1 and t+ 2, then κt+1 − κt+2 is O(∆).
Condition 1 simply means that, when the seller consecutively uses screening offers,
the possibility of trade in each period is not very large. That is to say, the seller will
smoothly screen the long-lived buyer. Second, we impose a smoothness condition.
Condition 2 (Smoothness). For all t > 0, κ(p, α) = κ(p′, α′), we have p − p′ is
O(∆).
Condition 2 means that when the likelihood of arrivals changes slightly, the long-
lived buyer’s equilibrium strategy does not dramatically change. Under both condi-
tions, we can further characterize the equilibrium price dynamics in the first phase:
when the time interval between two consecutive periods is small, in the first phase of
the equilibrium, the seller posts screening offers for one or two periods, then switches
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to waiting offers for some periods, and then switches back to screening offers for
one or two periods, and then switch back to waiting offers. This frequent switching
between waiting offers and screening offers stops at the end of the first phase. The
following Proposition formally shows this pricing pattern in the first phase.
Proposition 9 (Price Fluctuation). Suppose ∆ is small and α0 ∈ (α†, 1). Suppose
also both condition 1 and condition 2 hold. In equilibrium, when alphat is larger than
α†, (at most) two consecutive screening offers must be followed by a waiting offer.
The idea is that, when the seller can frequently revise the price, he always prefers
to speed up the screening of the long-lived buyer. Hence, after being rejected once or
twice, the seller believes that the long-lived buyer’s value is too low so that he starts
to post waiting offers. After several periods, the seller’s belief about the existence of
arrivals shifts downward, but his belief about the long-lived buyer’s value remains; so
he starts to screen the long-lived buyer again, and the screening process is very fast
again. As a result, the seller frequently switches between waiting offers and screening
offers in equilibrium.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a dynamic bargaining game between a long-lived seller and
a long-lived buyer. The seller makes all offers, and the long-lived buyer has private
information about his value. There may exist a short-lived player whose value is
commonly known to be high. Conditional on his existence, the short-lived buyer’s
arrival is determined by a Poisson process. We characterize the unique equilibrium,
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which exhibits strategic delays and price fluctuations. In particular, when the seller
is optimistic about the existence of the short-lived buyer, he charges a waiting offer,
which is never accepted by the long-lived buyer. By making the waiting offer, the
seller only adjusts her belief about the existence of short-lived buyers. Therefore, a
waiting offer not only exploits the value of a potential new arrival but also controls
the speed of learning. When the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the
existence of the short-lived buyer, she offers a price that is acceptable to the long-
lived buyer with some values. If such offers are not accepted, the seller’s beliefs
about both the existence of new arrivals and the long-lived buyer’s value change.
The interaction between these two learning processes is the driving force of the price
fluctuation.
We restrict our study to the situation where the short-lived buyer’s value is com-
monly known and equals 1. One can easily extend the result to any vs < 1. In
addition, one can assume that there may be a sequence of short-lived buyers whose
value are i.i.d. and who share the same distribution with the long-lived buyer’s value.
An arrival is observed only when the short-lived buyer takes the offer. In a model
without the long-lived buyer, Mason and Valimaki (2011) show that the equilibrium
waiting price declines over time. With the long-lived buyer, our conjecture is that the
equilibrium price sequence frequently switches between two price paths: a screening
price path and a waiting price path. There is another interesting extension of the
model. Assume that there may be a sequence of short-lived buyers whose values are
independent. Each short-lived buyer’s value is either high or low. Only the seller can
observe the arrival of the short-lived buyer. This is a difficult problem, because the
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seller and the long-lived buyer may have different beliefs on the equilibrium path.
We leave this question for future research.
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Chapter 3
Efficient Learning And Job
Turnover in the Labor Market
3.1 Introduction
An enormous number of employment-to-employment (EE) transitions take place
in the U.S. labor market. Based on the estimation by Nagypal (2008), 2.2% of
employed workers leave for a job in a different firm, and the flow of EE transitions
accounts for 49% of all exits from employers, versus 20% of separations that are
employment-to-unemployment (EU) transitions and 31% that are transitions from
employment to being out of the labor force. In the labor search literature, EE
transitions are generally accomplished through employed workers’ on-the-job search
(OJS) behavior. Numerous empirical studies show that workers’ OJS behavior and its
performance vary regarding tenure, the motivation for the OJS and other factors. In
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this paper, I develop an equilibrium search model to study the dynamics of workers’
OJS behavior and its consequences.1
Specifically, I consider a directed search model in which firms post contracts and
workers search for jobs. Once a worker and a firm meet, they form a one-to-one
match. Their pair-specific match quality is initially unknown (with the same prior
on both sides) and is revealed gradually over time. When the match is believed to
be bad with very high probability, the firm destroys the job to avoid further loss and
the worker becomes unemployed. Employed workers can search for a new job and
so can unemployed workers, and the optimal search strategy depends on a worker’s
evaluation (belief) of his current match quality. Since a job with an extremely bad
evaluation is going to be destroyed, an employed worker has an incentive to search
on the job because (1) he is willing to find a new job with better pay and (2) he is
afraid of losing his current job in the future.
Over time, a worker and his employer adjust their evaluation of the current job
match quality based on the worker’s past job performance. The diversity of individual
histories results in ex post heterogeneity in the evaluation of the current match and
therefore in the job search behavior of workers. This learning mechanism has two
conflicting effects on the tenure-EE transitions profile. On the one hand, there is
a standard selection effect, which was initially highlighted by Jovanovic (1979a,b
and 1984). Over time, the match quality will be learned. Known good matches
are kept and known bad matches are destroyed. Consequently, the proportion of
good matches raises over time. For a particular worker, the longer his tenure, the
1See, for examples, Mincer and Jovanovic (1982), Flinn (1986), Farber (1999), Fujita (2012) and
Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger and McEntarfer (2011).
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higher the probability that his current match is good. Since good matches will not
be destroyed, workers in good matches have less incentive to engage in OJS. Hence
the selection effect suggests a negative relation between tenure and the EE transition
rate. On the other hand, I show that there is a job search target effect of learning.
Some workers believe their current job’s match quality is good, and they don’t need
to worry about being fired in the near future, so they are attracted only by well-
paying jobs. Other workers believe their current job’s match quality is not good
enough, so they are afraid of losing their current job. As a result, they are less
selective and target their search to jobs with lower pay. A matched worker with a
long tenure but who has not revealed the type of his current match would be treated
as being working in a bad match with high probability. Hence these workers are
afraid of losing their job in the near future, and they have strong incentives to switch
to a new job as soon as possible. In a frictional labor market, a worker with a low
evaluation of his current job can adjust his OJS strategy to raise the probability of
transition. This job search target effect would raise the possibility of EE transitions
on average.
In general, this problem is hard to analyze in an equilibrium search framework.
In a standard search model, as Burdett and Mortenson (1998) and Shi (2009) show,
firms may post different wage schemes, which induces two dimensions of ex post
heterogeneity among employed workers: (1) their evaluation of the current match
quality, and (2) the wage scheme promised by their current employer. A worker’s
job search behavior depends on both of them, and therefore it is hard to analyze the
worker’s OJS dynamics in an equilibrium model. To obtain a tractable model, I follow
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Menzio and Shi (2011) and consider the socially efficient allocation, and implement
the efficient solution by allowing agents to sign complete contracts. By focusing on a
model with complete contracts, not only can I describe the interaction between the
selection effect and the job search target effect and its empirical implications in a
tractable model, but also I can separate their impact on labor markets from that of
other mechanisms’, such as the lack of agents’ commitment and the particular form
of wage formation, both of which have been well studied in the literature.
To characterize the socially efficient allocation, I start with the social planner’s
problem. A social planner decides (1) the separation rule of existing matches and (2)
the search strategy for each worker. The efficient separation rule is given as a cutoff
belief about match quality. When the belief about match quality is higher than the
cutoff level, the planner keeps the underlying match. Otherwise, the planner destroys
the match and naturally stops learning about its quality. Following the literature on
directed search (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Moen 1997), I assume that there are
numerous locations in the economy. A match forms only if a worker meets a firm
at the same location. To workers, locations differ from each other in terms of the
probability of finding a new job and promised pay. The efficient choice of a searching
location is determined by the current state of a worker. If an employed worker is in
a good match, he does not search for a new job. If an employed worker’s current
match quality is uncertain, he is sent to a specific location to find a new job, and
the probability of getting a new job is non-increasing in the belief about his current
match quality. An unemployed worker searches for a job at the location with the
highest job-finding probability.
85
Under the efficient allocation, the interaction between job search and learning has
a nontrivial impact on workers’ job turnover. For matches with a short tenure, the
job search target effect dominates the selection effect, so the EE transition rate is
increasing in tenure. For matches with a long tenure, the selection effect dominates
the job search effect, so the EE transition rate is decreasing in tenure. When the
tenure is long enough, all uncertainty is resolved, and only good matches are kept
and workers in those matches do not OJS anymore. As a result, the EE transition
rate as a function of tenure first increases at low tenure levels, then decreases, and
eventually becomes constant. Since the job separation rate is the sum of the EE
transition rate and the EU transition rate, the separation rate-tenure profile also
has a hump shape. These theoretical results are roughly consistent with a variety
of stylized facts emerging from the data at both the micro and macro levels. For
example, Farber (1994) find that the separation rate increases early in tenure and
decreases later, but in the end, the separation rate becomes constant, and Menzio,
Telyukova and Visschers (2012) find that the EE transition rate increases in tenure
in the first four months, and decreases thereafter.
The current model also generates an implication for the relation between the OJS
target of a worker and his motivation for OJS. When a worker has a high evaluation
of his current match quality, he is not too afraid of losing his current job, so he looks
only for promising new job if he searches on the job. Since promising jobs are also
competitive, his job finding rate is low. On the other hand, when a worker has a
low evaluation of his current match quality, he is afraid of being fired in the near
future, so he wants to find a new job as soon as possible. As a result, his target job
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is less promising and also less competitive, and therefore, his job finding rate is high.
This prediction is roughly consistent with a new empirical finding by Fujita (2012).
He finds that (1) some workers engage in OJS because they fear losing their current
job, while others search on the job because they are unsatisfied with their current
job, and (2) the unsatisfied on-the-job searchers have a lower job finding rate and a
higher wage growth due to the job transition.
My paper is closely related to Moscarini (2005), who nests Jovanovic’s model
(1984) into an equilibrium search model. There are several main differences. First,
the economic intuitions of the separation-tenure relation are different in the two pa-
pers. In Moscarini (2005), the initial period in which the separation rate is increasing
in tenure is called the wait-and-see phase, whose existence relies on the properties
of the learning process. In particular, following Jovanovic (1984), Moscarini (2005)
assumes that the production signal follows a diffusion process and therefore the sam-
ple path of the posterior of the match quality is continuous. Hence, an endogenous
separation cannot be instantaneous but ”kicks in” only after some time.2 Thus, on
average, the separation rate initially increases with tenure. However, the initial wait-
and-see phase disappears if the learning process has no continuous sample path.3 In
my model, the hump shape of the separation rate results from the combination of the
job search target effect and the selection effect. Should the tenure-varying job search
target effect be missing, both the EE transition rate and the separation rate would
be decreasing in the beginning. Second, in Moscarini (2005), wage is determined over
2Mathematically, the separation rate is zero for a new match. Since the sample path of diffusion
process is continuous and the separation rate is non-negative, the separation rate must increase for
a while and then decrease.
3For example, the learning process is a Poisson process, as in my model.
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time by Nash bargaining between a worker and his employer, which is not efficient
in general, while in my model, the learning and search allocation are efficient, which
implies that the hump shape of the separation rate does not rely on the inefficiency
of wage formation or workers’ OJS behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic envi-
ronment, individual payoff and learning process. I characterize the social planner’s
problem in Section 3. Section 4 considers a simple contract to implement the social
planner’s allocation in a frictional labor market. Section 5 discusses the empirical
implications. A number of extensions are discussed in Section 6. All technical proofs
can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a continuum of workers of
measure one and by a continuum of firms of measure greater than 1. Each worker
has the utility function
∫
e−rTCTdT , where CT ∈ R is the worker’s consumption at
time T and r is his discount rate. Each firm has the payoff function
∫
e−rTΠTdT ,
where ΠT ∈ R is the firm’s profit at T . Each firm has one vacancy and can hire at
most one worker. Vacant firms or unemployed workers are unproductive.
There is a continuum of locations indexed by a real number l ∈ [0, 1]. A vacant
firm and a worker can match only if they are searching in the same location. In
each period, both firms and workers decide which location to enter. A location is
interpreted as a submarket if there are firms and workers there. Different submarkets
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can be indexed by the promised value to the worker, x ∈ R, posted by firms in that
market. I denote mapping Υ : [0, 1]→ R∪∅ as the submarket assignment function.
In other words, x = Υ(l) is the promised value to the worker specified by the contract
offered at location l, while Υ(l) = ∅ means there is no submarket at location l. At
location l with Υ(l) 6= ∅, the ratio between the number of jobs that are vacant and
the number of searching workers is denoted by θ˜(l) ∈ R+. I refer to θ(x) as the
tightness of the submarket at location l such that x = Υ(l). In other words, I do not
distinguish between the two markets l 6= l′ with the same x.
All submarkets are subject to search frictions. In particular, workers and firms
that are searching in the same location are brought into contact by a meeting tech-
nology with constant returns to scale that can be described in terms of the market
tightness θ ∈ R+. In particular, at any time a worker finds a vacant job with
probability p(θ(l)) at location l, where θ(l) is the market tightness at location l
and function p : R+ → [0, 1] is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, which satisfies (i) p(0) = 0, (ii) lim
θ→0
p′(θ) = ∞, and limθ→∞ p(θ) is
bounded by a finite number. Similarly, a vacancy meets a worker with rate q(θ(l))
in location l where q : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
decreasing function such that q(θ) = p(θ)/θ when θ > 0, and q(0) is bounded. When
a firm and a worker meet, a new match is formed, and the worker’s old match, if
any, is destroyed.
Each firm chooses to enter at most one submarket by paying a maintenance flow
cost k at any time and posts an employment contract x, which is the promised value
to the worker. All workers, whether employed or unemployed, observe all available
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offers in the labor market and choose one submarket to enter and search for a new
job. Different wage dynamics are allowed given the identical initial expected promise.
In general, a worker’s individual wage dynamics can depend on both the aggregate
market variables and the match-specific payoff history.
The match between a firm and a worker is either good or bad. If the match is
good, at any time, the matched firm receives 1 unit of payoff at a rate λ; if the match
is bad, a matched firm receives nothing. Initially, a matched worker-firm pair shares
symmetric information about the match quality with a common prior α0 ∈ (0, 1) that
the current match is good. They observe the outcomes and hold common posterior
beliefs αt throughout time, where αt denotes the belief that they assign to the match
being good at t, where t denotes the worker’s tenure in his current job. For simplicity,
no extra flow payoff is generated by a match. A match is destroyed exogenously at a
rate δ at any time. An unemployed worker enjoys a flow payoff of b > 0, which can
be interpreted as his home production. To avoid a trivial case where the endogenous
separation is never optimal, assume α0λ > b > 0, that is, a new match is better than
no match, but no match is better than a bad match.
For a match with α = 1, no belief adjustment happens regardless of its current
period output. For a match with α ≤ α0, if the unit of payoff is received in tenure
period t, αt+ jumps to 1; otherwise, by standard Bayes’ rule updating, the evolution
of αt follows
α˙t = −λ(1− αt)αt, (3.1)
which is 0 if αt equals either 0 or 1.
The worker’s search strategy may depend on both the social state and his indi-
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vidual state. The former includes the unemployment rate and the distribution of the
current match quality. The latter includes: (1) whether the worker is employed, and
(2) the belief about the current match quality if he is employed. Formally, define
Ω = [0, α0] ∪ {u} ∪ {1} as a worker’s individual state space. A worker’s state ω ∈ Ω
can be interpreted as follows. For an uncertain matched worker, his type ω ∈ [0, α0]
is the belief about the current match quality. For a matched worker who has sent a
good signal before, ω = 1. For an unemployed worker, ω = u. Denote the probability
measure µT over Ω as the social state of the economy. Let Ξ = ∆(Ω) denote the set
to which µT belongs for all T . In this paper, I focus on the steady state, so µT = µ
∗.
3.3 Efficient Allocation
To characterize the efficient allocation in the steady state, I solve the social
planner’s problem in the steady state first. Since I focus on the steady state, µT = µ
∗,
the planer’s strategy depends on workers’ individual states only.
For an unemployed worker, he enjoys a flow payoff, b. The planner sends him to
search for a new job in submarket θ. In such a submarket, he finds that a new job
arrives at a rate p (θ). To support the market tightness θ, the planner sends θ firms
to this submarket for each unemployed worker. From the perspective of the planner,
an unemployed worker’s problem is governed by the following HJB function:
rS (u) = b+ p(θ (u))[S(α0)− S (u)]− kθ (u) , (3.2)
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where his efficient search strategy is pinned down by
k = p′(θ (u))[S(α0)− S (u)]. (3.3)
The left-hand side of (3.3) is the social marginal cost of vacancy creation, and the
right-hand side is the social marginal benefit.
For an existing match, a good signal arrives at a rate of either λ or 0, which
depends on the match quality, and an exogenous separation shock arrives at a rate
δ. Given the belief of the current match quality, the planner chooses (1) the worker’s
on-the-job search strategy θ (α), and (2) the separation strategy of the current match
z (α) ∈ {0, 1}. For any α, one can solve the associated value S(α) and policy function
θ(α), z (α).
Apparently, when α = 1, it is inefficient to ask the worker to search on the job,
so θ (α) = ∅, and z (α) = 0. Thus the social value of a good match is pinned down
by the following equation.
rS(1) = λ+ δ[S (u)− S(1)]. (3.4)
For an uncertain match, α ∈ (0, α0]. When z (α) = 0, the social value of this match
satisfies the following HJB function:
rS(α) = αλ+ λα(S(1)− S(α))− λα(1− α)S ′(α) (3.5)
+δ(S (u)− S(α)) + p(θ(α))[S(α0)− S(α)]− kθ(α),
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and the optimal on-the-job search strategy is pinned down by
k = p′(θ(α))[S(α0)− S(α)]; (3.6)
When z (α) = 1, I have S (α) = S (u). The following lemma shows that, given the
social value of a unemployed worker, the socially optimal separation strategy z (α)
can be characterized by a cutoff strategy.
Lemma 4. Fixing S (u), the constrained socially optimal problem of an employed
worker satisfies the follows:
1. the optimal separation strategy is given by
z (α) =
 10
if α < α∗
otherwise
2. the cutoff belief α∗ is the largest α such that
S (α∗) = S (u) (3.7)
S ′ (α∗) = 0 (3.8)
and therefore S (α) is the solution of ODE (3.5) with the boundary conditions
(3.7, 3.8).
3. the on-the-job search is characterized by (3.6).
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The proof directly follows the exponential bandit literature, so it is omitted.4
Given S (α), one can calculate the value of S (u) by using equation (3.2). Hence, the
efficient solution, S (u) , S (α) can be solved as a fixed point of the system (3.2, 3.5)
and satisfies (3.7, 3.8). The following proposition characterizes the properties of the
efficient steady state. The stationary distribution µ∗ is presented in the supplemen-
tary materials.
Proposition 10. The socially efficient allocation uniquely exists and it satisfies the
following properties:
1. S(α) is convex for all α ∈ [α∗, α0].
2. S(α) is strictly increasing for all α ∈ [α∗, α0],
3. θ(α) is strictly decreasing for all α ∈ [α∗, α0].
4. limα→α∗ θ
′ (α) = 0 and limα→α0 θ (α) = 0.
The efficient job search strategy θ (α) is strictly decreasing in α. The Bayes’ rule
of learning, equation (3.1), implies that α is decreasing in t, so the job finding rate
of an employed worker with a current belief αt, p (θ (αt)) is increasing in his tenure
t. When a worker starts to work at a firm, his evaluation of the current job is high,
and he is encouraged to look only at promising jobs. Since promising jobs are also
competitive, the job finding rate is low. When a worker stays at a firm for a long
time and does not have a good record, his evaluation of the current match is low,
4See Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Also see chapter 4 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an
intuitive discussion.
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so he is encouraged to look at less promising jobs to leave current position before it
is destroyed. Since less promising jobs are less competitive, the job finding rate is
high. As a result, I construct a theoretical link between a worker’ evaluation of his
current job and his efficient job finding rate.
Remark 1. When p(θ) = min{θ, θ¯} and θ¯ is finite, there are no labor frictions in the
market, and the on-the-job search decision problem is a linear programming problem
with a corner solution: θ(α) = θ¯ if S(α0)− S(α) > k, θ = 0 otherwise.
Remark 2. When the match quality is known, only a good match is created, so
α0 = 1. The absence of learning implies that matched workers’ and firms’ values are
constant over time and on-the-job search is not efficient. Hence, there is only one
active submarket in the social planner’s solution.
The intuition of the two remarks above is as follows. The social planner’s fun-
damental trade-off is between the replacement premium of an existing match and
the cost of creating a vacancy. When match quality is common knowledge, neither
learning nor on-the-job search has value; hence, the optimal allocation is a corner
solution. When the market is frictionless, the fundamental trade-off becomes a lin-
ear programming problem, and distinguishing a match with a different belief is not
necessary. Hence, the optimal allocation is a corner solution as well. The two re-
marks imply that, in such an environment, under efficient allocation, nontrivial OJS
dynamics can only result from the interaction between learning and search friction.
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3.4 Decentralization
In this section, I consider the implementation of the social planner’s solution.
I assume that the contracts offered by firms to workers are bilaterally efficient in
the sense that they maximize the joint value of the match, that is, the sum of the
worker’s expected lifetime utility and the firm’s expected lifetime profits. I make this
assumption because there are a variety of specifications of the contract space under
which the contracts that maximize the firm’s profits are, in fact, bilaterally efficient.
As Menzio and Shi (2009) show in a similar environment, the profit-maximizing
contracts are bilaterally efficient if the contract space is complete in the sense that a
contract can specify the promised utility to the worker, x, the separation probability
z and the worker’s on-the-job search strategy θ. This result is intuitive. The firm
maximizes its profits by choosing the contingencies z, x so as to maximize the joint
value of the match and by choosing the contingencies for w so as to deliver the
promised value x.5
In order to decentralize the social planner’s optimal allocation, I first define the
joint surplus of an uncertain existing match M(α). Note that M(α) is not the social
surplus generated by the match since the matched worker and firm do not take into
account the wage posting cost paid by the worker’s potential new employer.
5Moreover, one can prove that the profit-maximizing contracts are bilaterally efficient if they
can specify the wage only as a function of tenure and productivity (while the separation and search
decisions are made by the worker). This result is also intuitive. The firm maximizes its profits by
choosing the wage when it meets a worker so as to deliver the promised value x and by choosing the
wage as a function of the belief about the match so as to induce the worker to maximize the joint
value of the match (by setting the wage equal to the product of the match). Alternatively, profit-
maximizing contracts are bilaterally efficient if they can specify severance transfers that induce the
worker to internalize the effect of his separation and search decisions on the firm’s profits. See Moen
and Rosen (2004), and Menzio and Shi (2009, 2011) for more examples.
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Labor market supply side. First, consider an employed worker at the beginning
of the search and matching stage. Since the contract is bilaterally efficient, given
the equilibrium market tightness function θ, the worker chooses to search in the sub-
market with promised value x (θ) to maximize the continuation value of his current
match, which is given by
rM(1) = λ+ δ[Vu −M(1)] (3.9)
rM(α) = αλ+ λα(M(1)−M(α))− λα(1− α)M ′(α) (3.10)
+δ(Vu −M(α)) + p(θ(α))[x (θ)−M(α)],
and the optimal OJS strategy is
θ (ω) = arg max p (θ) [x (θ)−M (ω)] for ω ∈ [0, α0] ∪ {1} (3.11)
By the same logic, an unemployed worker chooses to search in the submarket
with tightness θ (xu) and promised value xu to maximize his value, which is given by
rVu = b+ p (θ (u)) [x (θ(u))− Vu] (3.12)
where the optimal search strategy is
θ (u) = arg max p (θ) [x (θ)− Vu] (3.13)
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with a similar interpretation.
Labor market demand side. Firms without a match are on the demand side of the
labor market. They choose whether to enter the labor market and which submarket
to enter. The competition in the labor market implies that firms’ expected discounted
profit is zero, and there is no difference between any of the submarkets for any firm.
A firm may form a new match at a rate q(θ), which depends on the tightness of the
market the firm is in, and its expected profit is given by M (α0)− x.
By posting a new job, a firm needs to pay a flow cost k . Hence, the firm’s
free-entry condition is given by
q (θ) [M (α0)− x (θ)] = k. (3.14)
Labor market equilibrium. The labor market equilibrium consists of (1)M (α) , Vu, θ (α) , θ (u)
and x (θ), which satisfy equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14), and
(2) a stationary distribution, µ∗, which is consistent with θ (α) and θ (u). The firm’s
free-entry condition implies that M (α0)− x = k/q (θ) for any submarket. The fact
that q(θ) = p(θ)/θ yields that
p (θ) [M (α0)− x] = kθ (3.15)
Plugging (3.14) into (3.10) and (3.12) implies that
rM(α) = αλ+ λα(M(1)−M(α))− λα(1− α)M ′(α) (3.16)
+δ(Vu −M(α)) + p(θ(α))[M (α0)−M(α)]− kθ,
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and
rVu = b+ p (θu) [M (α0)− Vu]− kθu (3.17)
So in the equilibrium M (α) = S (α), Vu = Su, and therefore the equilibrium search
strategy is efficient. Given the unique equilibrium strategy θ, one can uniquely pin
down the individual’s state transition and therefore the stationary distribution µ∗.
The following proposition summarizes the analysis above.
Proposition 11. A stationary equilibrium exists and it is efficient.
3.5 Empirical Implications
Selection Effect and OJS Probability. In this model, learning about match
quality generates a number of interesting empirical implications. First, as in Jo-
vanovic (1984), there is a selection effect of learning. Specifically, over time, good
matches should send signals with higher probability. Hence, the probability that the
match quality is good and is known is increasing in the tenure. Since workers in good
matches do not engage in OJS, the selection effect implies that the OJS probability
of workers is decreasing in their tenure. Consider a randomly picked worker with
tenure t. Without knowing his signal history, one does not know for sure whether
this match is good or whether this worker is searching on the job. Nonetheless, it is
possible to find the ex ante probability that a randomly chosen worker is searching
99
on the job, as a function of t, which is
σt ≡
 α0 Pr(τ > t) + (1− α0)0
t < t∗,
t ≥ t∗,
where τ is a random variable representing the time at which the good signal occurs,
so the probability that it has not happened by t is Pr(τ > t) = exp(−λt), which
is decreasing in t. The critical cutoff time is defined as t∗ = inf{t > 0|α0 − α∗ =∫ t∗
0
λαs(1−αs)ds}, at which point the belief hits α∗ and the firm optimally destroys
the current uncertain match, so the worker becomes unemployed. Before this point,
a match is bad with ex ante probability 1 − α0, and the worker always searches for
a new job. With complementary probability a0, the match is good, and the worker
searches only when a good signal has not arrived; hence, the quality remains uncer-
tain. Therefore, the model predicts that the OJS probability is at first decreasing in
workers’ tenure but eventually becomes constant. This negative relation between the
probability of OJS and tenure is supported by many empirical findings, for example,
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994).
OJS Target Effect. Departing from the standard learning literature, I highlight
another effect of learning: the job search target effect. If a match has not generated
good signal before, the belief about the current match decreases over time. As the
separation time t∗ approaches, the worker is afraid of being unemployed soon, so
he adjusts his OJS strategy to raise the job finding rate. However, to raise the job
finding rate, the worker must lower his OJS target because in an equilibrium labor
market, only less promising jobs are less competitive and so have higher job finding
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rates. The following proposition formalizes the intuition above.
Proposition 12. In the stationary equilibrium, the promised utility of the job tar-
geted by a worker’s OJS is increasing in his belief about his current match being good,
and his job finding rate is decreasing in his belief.
Owing to the lack of the data of workers’ belief, it is hard to directly test the
prediction in Proposition 12. However, this prediction is indirectly supported by the
recent empirical finding by Fujita (2012). Fujita (2012) distinguishes workers who
are searching on the job based on their motivation: some of them are unsatisfied
about their current job, and others are afraid of losing their current jobs. He finds
that (1) the job finding rate of the former is higher than that of the latter, and
(2) after job transitions, the former’ wage increment is significantly higher than the
latter’s.
EE Transition. An EE transition takes place only if an employed worker actively
searches for and gets a new job. At any moment, this tenure-dependent transition
rate is defined by
ξeet ≡ σtp (θ (αt)) .
The EE transition happens only if a worker is looking for another job. Given his
tenure, the probability that a worker is engaging in OJS is σt. Conditional on that,
the probability that he actually finds a new job is p(θ(αt)). The tenure effect on
ξeet is driven by two forces, the job search target effect and the selection effect in
opposite directions. The former implies that the probability of OJS declines over
tenure, and so does the EE transition rate; while the latter implies that the job
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finding rate increases over tenure, and so does the EE transition rate. Hence, these
two effects drive the EE transition rate in opposite directions over tenure. In the
following proposition, I show that the job search target effect dominates in the early
stage of a worker’s tenure, while the selection effect dominates later. The intuition is
that, in the early stage of a worker’s tenure, his belief is high, so in his target market
of OJS, market tightness θ is very small. By the Inada condition of the matching
function, p′ →∞ for small θ. As a result, a tiny change in the worker’s OJS strategy,
θ, has a huge impact on his job finding rate, and therefore the job search target
effect dominates the selection effect in the beginning and the EE transition rate is
increasing in tenure. When it comes to the worker with a long tenure, the job search
target effect is diminished, so the EE transition rate is decreasing in tenure. When
a worker’s tenure is long enough, all uncertainty is resolved and only good matches
are kept, so the match quality must be good and therefore the EE transition rate is
zero.
Proposition 13. There is t > 0, t¯ < t∗ such that (1) t¯ > t, and the EE transition
rate ξeet is increasing in tenure for t < t, decreasing for t ∈ [t¯, t∗], and zero for t > t∗.
EU Transition. The EU transition rate as a function of tenure is ξeut = δ for
any t 6= t∗, when the EU transition happens only as a result of exogenous separation.
At t = t∗, in addition to exogenous separations, all matches that did not send a good
signal will be endogenously destroyed, the measure of which is positive. The atom of
the EU rate results from the assumption of a precise and uniform learning process.
If the learning process is heterogeneous as a consequence of either different priors
or noisy observations, such an atom can be eliminated. The mass point in the EU
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transition rate showing at a particular tenure point is considered empirically irrele-
vant. However, it fits the observation in the academic job market, where learning is
based on relatively uniform and precise information on the quality and quantity of
research publications.
Separation Rate. Separation of an existing match may result from either EE or
EU transition; hence, the separation rate of an existing match with tenure t, ξt must
be ξt = ξ
ee
t + ξ
eu
t . When t 6= t∗, the EU transition rate δ is tenure-free, the tenure
effect on the separation rate is almost identical to that on the EE rate. At t = t∗, a
positive measure of matches will be separated. Just as for that of the EU transition
rate, this mass point of separation hazard at t∗ is also empirically irrelevant.
Corollary 2. Generically, the job separation rate is increasing in tenure for t < t,
decreasing for t ∈ [t¯, t∗], and equal to δ for t > t∗.
The prediction on the separation rate-tenure profile is consistent with the previ-
ous empirical literature. For example, using weekly data, Farber (1994) finds that
in the first six months, the separation rate is increasing in tenure. In the current
paper, to focus on the dynamics of the EE transition rate on the job separation rate,
I assume that the EU rate is constant for most t, and the hump-shaped job separa-
tion rate results from the similar shape of the EE transition rate. To the best of my
knowledge, there is no empirical study using weekly data to estimate the EE and the
EU transition rate-tenure profile. However, there is empirical evidence that supports
the non-monotone EE transition rate-tenure profile in the analysis of monthly data
sets. Using the U.S. Census’ Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012) find that (1) the EU transition rate is de-
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creasing in tenure, and (2) the EE transition rate increases in tenure in the first four
months (from 3% to 5%), and decreases thereafter. Since the EE transition makes
up 49% of all separations, while the EU transition makes up only 20%, the shape of
the EE transition rate should contribute more to the separation rate. Hence, it is
reasonable to believe that the hump-shaped separation rate-tenure profile is mainly
due to the similar shape of the EE-tenure profile.
3.6 Concluding Remark
I conclude the paper by discussing some possible extensions.
Bad News Cases. In this paper, I focus on the perfect good news learning pro-
cess. This is perfect reasonable for some industries, for example, academia. However,
an obvious and natural alternative is to study the perfect bad news learning process.
Assume that a match generates an quality-independent flow payoff is y > 0, and a
good match generates no extra loss but an bad one generates a 1-unit loss at a rate
λ. Furthermore, as in the good news model, I assume that a good match is better
than no match, and no match is better than a bad match to avoid a trivial case
where endogenous separation is never optimal, i.e., y− (1−α0)λ > b > y−λ. In this
case, when bad news is realized, the firm learns that the match is bad and therefore
fires the worker immediately. By observing a history with no bad news, a matched
firm and worker become more and more optimistic about their match quality. In
this economy, any existing match has a belief α higher than α0 in equilibrium; thus
on-the-job search is not valuable. The equilibrium has only one labor market with
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market tightness θ (u).
Imperfect Good News Cases. In the benchmark model, I assume that a bad
match cannot generate any profit, which seems restrictive. What if it can generate
one unit of reward at a lower rate λb ∈ (0, λ)? To avoid a trivial case, I assume
λb < b < α0λ+(1−α0)λb. In other words, a new match is better than no match, but
no match is better than a bad match. Then, given no reward arriving in [t, t+dt), the
belief at the end of that time period is αt+dt =
αt exp(−λdt)
αt exp(−λdt)+(1−αt) exp(−λbdt) by Bayes’
rule. Yet, if one reward is realized in [t, t + dt), the belief about the match quality
jumps up from αt to
αt+dt =
αt[1− exp(−λdt)]
αt[1− exp(−λdt)] + (1− αt)[1− exp(−λbdt)] ,
by Bayes’ rule. When dt goes to zero, the updating can be approximated by
α˙t = lim
dt→0
αt+dt − αt
dt
=
 −(λ− λb)αt(1− αt)λαt
λαt+λb(1−αt)
no reward at t,
one reward at t,
and the probability that more than one reward is realized isO(dt2), which is negligible
when dt is small. By the same logic, one can solve the social planner’s optimal
stopping belief and OJS strategy. Over time, good matches can survive with higher
probability than bad ones due to the dynamics of endogenous separation driven by
learning; thus, the empirical implications for job transitions still hold qualitively.
However, the implications are slightly different from those in the benchmark model
in the following sense: (1) No match is believed to be good for sure, and therefore,
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the endogenous separation will not disappear even for the match with long tenure.
(2) The arrival of a reward can increase the belief about match quality; thus, it is
possible that a belief αt ∈ (α0, 1) appears in equilibrium. Clearly, it is inefficient to
destroy a match with belief higher than α0, and therefore, employed workers with
belief α > α0 will not search on-the-job under a bilaterally efficient contract. At
the beginning of a match, the job search target effect works as well and dominates
the selection effect. When the difference between λ and λb is sufficiently large, the
learning process is similar to that in the perfect good news model. Hence, the non-
monotonicity of the EE transition rate is preserved.
Informative Interview. In the benchmark model, the match is modeled as
an experience good whose quality needs to be slowly learned over time. Yet, in
some situations, the employer can extract non-trivial information about the match
quality through an interview. Suppose a firm can draw an informative signal of the
match quality and update its belief about the match quality through an interview
before the match is formed. The signal is drawn from a match quality dependent
distribution that satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), and the
updated posterior α˜0 ∈ [α0, α¯0], where 0 < α0 < α¯0 < 1. In this extension, the
social planner will form a new match only if the updated posterior α˜0 is higher than
a cutoff level that depends on the worker’s current state. For an unemployed worker,
this cutoff is the stopping time belief α∗. For an employed worker, this cutoff is the
belief αt about the worker’s current match quality. Let Pr(α˜0 > αt) be the ex ante
probability that the posterior is larger than the worker’s current belief. Hence, the
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on-the-job search policy is determined by
max
θ
p(θ) Pr(α˜0 > αt){E[S(α˜0)|α˜0 > αt]− S(αt)} − kθ.
It is clear that both Pr(α˜0 > αt) and E[S(α˜0)|α˜0 > αt]− S(αt) are non-increasing in
αt; thus the optimal policy θ(α) is non-increasing in α, which is similar to that in the
benchmark model. Hence the empirical implications for workers’ turnover predicted
by the benchmark model are qualitively preserved.
Costly On-the-Job Search. Suppose workers’ on-the-job search requires a flow
cost dt. To avoid a trivial case where OJS is always suboptimal, I assume that  is
small enough. Since the gain from on-the-job search maxθ{p(θ)[S(α0)− S(α)]− kθ}
is increasing in the job replacement premium, [S(α0) − S(α)], for small enough ,
there exists a cut-off belief α such that
max
θ
p(θ)[S(α0)− S(α)]− kθ ≤  if α ≥ α,
max
θ
p(θ)[S(α0)− S(α)]− kθ >  if α < α.
In other words, matched workers would search on-the-job only if they believed the
match quality is low enough. When α < α, the social planner’s problem is un-
changed, and therefore, it is obvious that introducing costly OJS does not change
the main result but reduces the social surplus S(α) for each α and therefore shortens
the duration of experimentation.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix: Strategy and Equilibrium
A.1.1 Admissible Strategy Space
In general, the seller’s strategy is a mapping from the set of the seller’s history
to the price and target sold number.
σS : HS → R+ × N.
For each H-buyer i, let the index function, ai (t), denote her attention status at t.
It is equal to 1 at her attention time, and 0 at other times. At her attention time,
the H-buyer can decide to purchase the good or not. At the time she decides to
purchase the good, we let the index function, bi (t) = 1; at other times, bi (t) = 0.
Let ωi (t) = {ai (t) , bi (t)}, Ωi be the set of all ωi (t), and Ω =∞i=1 Ωi. A non-trivial
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private history of an H-buyer i at her attention time t is
htBi =
{
{ai (τ)}tτ=0 , {P (τ) , Q (t) , K (τ)}τ∈{τ ′|τ ′∈[0,t],ai(τ ′)=1}
}
and let HB represent the set of all non-trivial private histories of an H-buyer. The
H-buyers’ strategy at their attention time is
σB : HB → [0, 1] .
Denote the underlying outcome by o (t) = {P (t) , Q (t) , K (t) , {ωi (t)}∞i=1}, and let
ot be the underlying history. Given an underlying outcome, players’ expected payoff
can be calculated.
A metric on the sets of the seller’s history is defined as
D
(
htS, h˜
t
S
)
=
∫ t
0
[
||P (s) , P˜ (s) ||+ ||Q (s) , Q˜ (s) ||+ ||K (s) , K˜ (s) ||
]
ds.
define the metric on the sets of Ω as follows: for ω, ω˜ ∈ Ω,
Di (ωi, ω˜i, [0, t]) =
∫ t
0
[
||bi (s) , b˜i (s) ||+ ||ai (s) , a˜i (s) ||
]
ds,
and
D (ω, ω˜, [0, t]) =
∞∑
i=1
Di (ωi, ω˜i, [0, t]) .
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A metric on the sets of the underlying outcome is defined as
D
(
ot, o˜t
)
= D
(
htS, h˜
t
S
)
+D (ω, ω˜, [0, t])
where || · || is the Euclidean norm. Let BHS ,BHB be Boreal σ-algebra determined by
D.
Condition 3. σS is a BHS measurable function and σB is a BHB measurable function.
Condition 4. For all t ∈ [0, 1] and htS, h˜tS ∈ HS such that D
(
htS, h˜
t
S
)
= 0, σS (h
t) =
σS
(
h˜t
)
.
The first condition is a technical one, and the second condition implies that, if
two seller histories are the same almost surely, the strategy should specify the same
price and target supply.
Definition 7. A seller’s strategy σS satisfies the inertia condition if given t ∈
[0, 1), there exists an ε > 0 and a constant pricing and supply rule that
σS
(
h˜t
′
S
)
= σS
(
htS
) ∀t′ ∈ (t, t+ ε)
for every h˜t+εS ∈ H such that D
(
htS, h˜
t
S
)
= 0.
Note ε is time dependent. This assumption requires that at every time, players
must follow a fixed rule specified by σS for a small period of time. The key is that
the seller’s action in [t, t+ ε) cannot depends on each others’ action directly almost
everywhere. This implies that the seller can vary his actions rule a countably number
of times. Let Σ be the set of all σ satisfying inertia conditions.
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The following proposition shows that if σS ∈ Σ, a strategy profile (σS, σB) de-
termines a unique distribution on the underlying outcome space. The spirit of the
proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Bergin and MacLeod (1993).
Proposition 14. A strategy profile σ generates a unique distribution over the un-
derlying outcome if σS ∈ Σ.
Proof. Fixed an underlying outcome o, and t ∈ [0, 1], we want to show that there
is a unique distribution Γ ∈ ∆
(
{os}s∈[t,1]
)
generated by σ. When t = 1, it is
trivially given by condition 2. When t < 1, the underlying outcome ot and associ-
ated history htS, {htBi}∞i=1 are given. Let Aτ be the set of distribution on {os}s∈[t,τ)
which can be generated by σ. Since players’ actions are determined by σS (h
t
S) and
σB (h
t
B, P (h
t
S), K(s)) and the uncertainty is driven by the arrival of new buyers and
the selection of the seller when there are sales, Aτ is a singleton when τ ∈ (t, t+ ε).
Now we claim Aτ is a singleton for any τ ∈ [t, 1]. Suppose not; then there exists
a t∗ which is the largest τ such that there is a unique distribution on {os}s∈[t,τ) which
is generated by σ. By the inertia condition, there is an ε > 0 which depends on τ
such that there is a unique distribution on {os}s∈[τ,τ+ε) generated by σ, which is a
contradiction with the definition of t∗.
Since Aτ is nonempty, by the inertia condition, there is a ε > 0 such that Aτ+ε
is a singleton. Proceed iteratively in this way, constructing a unique outcome on
[0, t1), [0, t2), ... with tj > tj−1. The upper bound on this process is at 1; otherwise,
there is a contradiction by the definition of the inertia strategy. As a result, there is
a unique distribution Γ ∈ ∆
(
{os}s∈[t,1]
)
generated by σ.
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However, the seller cannot respond “instantaneously” to any defection by playing
the inertia strategy. So we take the completion of Σ with respect to a metric that
measures the underlying outcome distribution induced by a different strategy.
d (σS, σ
′
S) = sup
t∈[0,1]
{
sup
Bt∈Ft
|Γ (Bt)− Γ′ (Bt) |
}
where {Ft}t∈[0,1] is the filtration generated by the underlying outcome, so Ft is the
σ-algebra describing the time t outcome, and Bt is a measurable event at time t.
Two inertia strategies are equivalent if they generate the same distribution over
the underlying outcome space. Denote by Σ∗S the completion of Σs relative to d.
Hence, each strategy σS ∈ Σ∗ corresponds to some Cauchy sequence in Σ. Theorem
2 in Bergin and MacLeod (1993) immediately implies that, for each σS ∈ Σ∗S, there
is a sequence {σnS} where σnS ∈ ΣS and σnS → σS, such that there is a sequence of
distribution {Γn} where Γn ∈ ∆
(
{oτ}τ∈[t,1]
)
is the unique distribution generated
by σnS, σB and Γ
n → Γ ∈ ∆
(
{oτ}τ∈[t,1]
)
. Hence, we say σ can be identified with a
unique outcome Γ ∈ ∆
(
{os}s∈[t,1]
)
. We say a strategy σ is admissible if and only if
σ ∈ Σ∗. Q.E.D.
A.1.2 On No-Waiting Equilibria
We focus on no-waiting equilibria where buyers believe that no previous H-buyers
are waiting in the market both on and off the equilibrium path. We justify this
assumption in the following two cases of deviation: “wrong” price and ”wrong” in-
ventory size. First, when an H-buyer observes one or more deviation prices, she
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believes that the seller posts the equilibrium prices always except for at some of her
past attention times and the seller’s estimation about the population structure of
buyers is still the equilibrium one, and therefore the seller would follow the equi-
librium pricing rule in the continuation play. The second case is one in which the
seller is supposed to post a deal at a sales time. Since there exist many L-buyers
who can take the deal immediately, the seller can ensure that his inventory size is
consistent with the equilibrium requirement at all times by following the equilibrium
strategy. If an H-buyer observes a “wrong” inventory size after the supposed sales
time, she knows that there has been a deviation on the seller’s side for a positive
measure of time, but does not know what prices the seller has been posting. If the
prices have been acceptable to H-buyers, there will be no other H-buyers waiting
in the market; otherwise, there may be. In fact, we assume that, once an H-buyer
observes a ”wrong” inventory size, she always believes that the deviation prices have
been acceptable to previous H-buyers, and thus, off the path of play, she still believes
that no other H-buyers are waiting in the market, and the seller’s continuation play
is going to be consistent with the equilibrium strategy.
A.2 Appendix: Proofs
A.2.1 Belief Updating
In this subsection, we derive the law of motion of the seller’s belief, Φ+ (t) and
Φ− (t).
At t = l∆, for n ∈ N, Φ−n (t) = 0 for any l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..1/∆}. For any t ∈
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((l − 1) ∆, l∆), the updating depends on whether the price at time t is acceptable to
the H-buyer who notices it. Given H-buyer’s strategy σB. As a result, if the price is
not acceptable to H-buyers in [t, t+ dt), Bayes’ rule implies that, for any n ∈ N,
Φ−n (t+ dt) = Φ
−
n−1 (t)
{
λdt+
∞∑
n′=1
Φ+n′ (t)
(
n′
1
)( dt
l∆− t
)1(
1− dt
l∆− t
)n′−1}
+Φ−n (t)
{
1− λdt−
∞∑
n′=1
Φ+n′ (t)
(
n′
1
)( dt
l∆− t
)1(
1− dt
l∆− t
)n′−1}
+o (dt) ,
where
(
i
j
) (
dt
l∆−t
)j (
1− dt
l∆−t
)i−j
denotes the probability that j of i H-buyers whose
attention times are in [t, t + dt). They notice the offer but decide not to purchase
the good. Thus we have the endogenous updating equation of Φ− (t) :
Φ˙−n (t) = lim
dt→0
Φ−n (t+ dt)− Φ−n (t)
dt
=
[ ∞∑
n′=1
n′
l∆− tΦ
+
n′ (t) + λ
] [
Φ−n−1 (t)− Φ−n (t)
]
.
If the price is acceptable, by assuming that buyers follow the equilibrium strategy,
there is no change in Φ−n (t).
At t = l∆, for any n ∈ N, Φ+n (t) = Φ−n (t−) for any l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..1/∆}. For any
t ∈ ((l − 1) ∆, l∆), if there is no transaction, we can derive the law of motion of
Φ+n (t) similar to deriving that of Φ
−
n (t). Also, the law of motion of Φ
+
n (t) depends
on whether the price is acceptable to an H-buyer or not. If the price is acceptable,
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but there is no transaction, then for any n ∈ N,
Φ˙+n (t) = lim
dt→0
Φ+n (t+ dt)− Φ+n (t)
dt
= lim
dt→0
{
Φ+n (t)
[
1− dt
l∆−t
]n − Φ+n (t) Σ∞n′=0Φ+n′ (t) [1− dtl∆−t]n′
dt
∑∞
n′=0 Φ
+
n′ (t)
[
1− dt
l∆−t
]n′
}
= lim
dt→0
{
−Φ+n (t)
l∆− t
n− Σ∞n′=0Φ+n′ (t)n′ + o (dt)
Σ∞n′=0Φ
+
n′ (t)
[
1− n′dt
l∆−t
]
+ o (dt)
}
=
−Φ+n (t)
l∆− t
[
n− EN+ (t)] .
If the price is not acceptable, then
Φ˙+n (t) = lim
dt→0
Φ+n (t+ dt)− Φ+n (t)
dt
= lim
dt→0
{
Φn+1 (t)
(
n+1
1
) (
dt
l∆−t
)1 (
1− dt
l∆−t
)n
+ Φn (t)
(
1− dt
l∆−t
)n − Φ+n (t) + o (dt)
dt
}
=
1
l∆− t [(n+ 1) Φn+1 (t)− nΦn (t)] .
If there is a transaction at a price P (t) > vL, it must be an H-buyer who makes
the purchase, so we have a belief jump following Bayes’ rule:
Φ+n
(
t+
)
= lim
dt→0
Φ+n+1 (t)
(n+1)dt
l∆−t + Φ
+
n (t)λdt+ o (dt)∑∞
n′=0 Φ
+
n′ (t)
(
n′dt
l∆−t + λdt
)
+ o (dt)
=
(n+ 1) Φ+n+1 (t) + Φ
+
n (t)λ (l∆− t)∑∞
n′=0
[
Φ+n′ (t)n
′]+ λ (l∆− t)
=
(n+ 1) Φ+n+1 (t) + Φ
+
n (t)λ (l∆− t)
E [N+ (t)] + λ (l∆− t) ,
for any n ∈ N.
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If there is a transaction at a deal price P (t) ≤ vL, it may be an L-buyer or
an H-buyer who made the purchase, so the updating of Φ (t) would depend on the
current belief of the number of L-buyers. Let Υm (t) denote the seller’s belief that
M (t) = m at time t. At the beginning of each period, ΥM (t) = 1, but M (t) may
change within a period because some L-buyers may leave the market by making their
purchases at deal prices. Within a period, after the first deal at time t, we have
ΥM
(
t+
)
=
∞∑
n=0
Φn (t)
n
M + n
,ΥM−1
(
t+
)
=
∞∑
n=0
Φn (t)
M
M + n
, (A.1)
and ΥM−i (t+) = 0 for i = 2, 3, ...M . After the kth deal at time t, we have:
ΥM
(
t+
)
= ΥM (t)
∞∑
n=0
Φn (t)
n
M + n
, (A.2)
ΥM−i
(
t+
)
= ΥM−i (t)
∞∑
n=0
Φn (t)
n
M − i+ n + ΥM−i+1 (t)
∞∑
n=0
Φn (t)
M − i+ 1
M − i+ 1 + n,
(A.3)
for i = 1, 2, ...k, and
ΥM−k−i
(
t+
)
= 0 for i = 1, 2, ..M − k. (A.4)
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Similarly, the belief of N− (t) and N+ (t) will also jump as follows:
Φ+n
(
t+
)
= Φ+n (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ−n′ (t) Υm (t)
m+ n′
n+m+ n′
+Φ+n+1 (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ−n′ (t) Υm (t)
n+ 1
n+ 1 +m+ n′
,
Φ−n
(
t+
)
= Φ−n (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ+n′ (t) Υm (t)
m+ n′
n+m+ n′
+Φ−n+1 (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ+n′ (t) Υm (t)
n+ 1
n+ 1 +m+ n′
,
for any n ∈ N.
The law of motion of the seller’s belief can be summarized in the following propo-
sition. Denote tdk be the d
th deal times within the period.
Proposition 15. Let P (t) be the price at t. The seller’s beliefs Φ+ (t) and Φ− (t)
update as follows: for any n ∈ N,
1. at t = l∆, Φ−n (t) = 0. For any t ∈ ((l − 1) ∆, l∆), Φ− (t) smoothly evolves s.t.
Φ˙−n (t) = [1− σB (P (t))]
[ ∞∑
n′=1
n′
l∆− tΦ
+
n′ (t) + λ
] [
Φ−n−1 (t)− Φ−n (t)
]
,
2. at t = l∆, Φ+n (t) = Φ
−
n (t
−). For any t ∈ ((l − 1) ∆, l∆), if there is no trans-
action, Φ+ (t) smoothly evolves s.t.
Φ˙+n (t) = [1− σB (P (t))]
{
1
l∆− t [(n+ 1) Φn+1 (t)− nΦn (t)]
}
−σB (P (t)) Φ
+
n (t)
l∆− t
[
n− EN− (t)] ,
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3. at t ∈ [0, 1), if there is a transaction at a price P (t) ≤ vL, Φ+ (t) and Φ− (t)
jump as follow:
Φ+n
(
t+
)
= Φ+n (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ−n′ (t) Υm (t)
m+ n′
n+m+ n′
+Φ+n+1 (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ−n′ (t) Υm (t)
n+ 1
n+ 1 +m+ n′
,
Φ−n
(
t+
)
= Φ−n (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ+n′ (t) Υm (t)
m+ n′
n+m+ n′
+Φ−n+1 (t)
∞∑
n′=0
M∑
m=0
Φ+n′ (t) Υm (t)
n+ 1
n+ 1 +m+ n′
where Υm (t) is the seller’s belief about M (t) and its law of motion is given in
(A.1), (A.2), (A.3),and (A.4) for the kth deal, and
4. for any l = 1, 2, ..1/∆, t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, l∆), if there is a transaction at a price
P (t) > vL, Φ
+ (t) jumps as follows:
Φ+n
(
t+
)
=
(n+ 1) Φ+n+1 (t) + Φ
+
n (t)λ (l∆− t)
E [N+ (t)] + λ (l∆− t) ,
where Φ−−1 (t) = 0, l ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..1/∆}.
A.2.2 Proofs for the Single-Unit Case
A.2.2.1 Equilibria Construction
We construct an equilibrium such that the following conditions hold: (1) the
seller posts a price P (t) such that an H-buyer is indifferent between taking and
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leaving it for t < 1, (2) an H-buyer makes the purchase once she arrives, and (3)
P (1) = vL is posted at the deadline. Construct the H-buyers’ reservation price. At
the deadline, it is obviously vH . Since the seller posts P (1) = vL in any equilibrium,
at t ∈ [1−∆, 1), the H-buyers’ reservation price is
vH − p1 (t) = e−λ(1−t)vH − vL
M + 1
,
p˙1 (t) = −λ [vH − p1 (t)] .
As t→ 1, p1 (t)→ p1 (1−). Differentiating p1 (t) yields
p˙1 (t) = −λe−λ(1−t)vH − vL
M + 1
= −λ [vH − p1 (t)]
with a boundary condition p1 (1
−) at t = 1. Let U1−∆ be an H-buyer’s expected
payoff at the beginning of the last period. The expectation is over the random
attention time, and the risk of arrival of new buyers. Hence
U1−∆ =
∫ 1
1−∆
1
∆
e−λ(s−1+∆) [vH − p1 (s)] ds
= e−λ∆
vH − vL
M + 1
= vH − p1 (1−∆) .
Consider a t that is smaller than but arbitrarily close to 1 − ∆. At this attention
time, an H-buyer’s reservation price is
vH − p1 (t) = e−λ(1−∆−t)U1−∆,
p˙1 (t) = −λ [vH − p1 (t)] .
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As t → 1 − ∆, we have limt↗1−∆ p1 (t) = p1 (1−∆), thus p1 (t) is differentiable at
1 −∆. Repeating the above argument for 1/∆ times, the reservation price p1 (t) is
differentiable in [0, 1) and satisfies the ODE (1.5) with the boundary condition (1.2).
The deal price is posted at the deadline only, and H-buyers do not delay their
purchases, so neither the H-buyers’ reservation price nor the seller’s equilibrium profit
depends on ∆. The closed-form solution of p1 (t) and Π1 (t) are given by
p1 (t) = vH − vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t),
Π1 (t) =
[
1− e−λ(1−t)] vH + e−λ(1−t)vL − vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)λ (1− t) .
In sum, the equilibrium strategy profile (σ∗S, σ
∗
B) is given as follows. The seller’s
equilibrium strategy σ∗S (t,Φ
− (t) ,Φ+ (t)) = p1 (t) for any [Φ− (t) ,Φ+ (t)] ∈ ΞS and
t < 1, and σ∗S (1) = vL. The H-buyers’ equilibrium strategy σ
∗
B satisfies σ
∗
B =
1{P (t)≤p1(t),t∈[0,1)} + 1[P (1)≤vH ].
A.2.2.2 The Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Proposition 1 step by step. A simple observation is that, given the
seller’s equilibrium strategy, H-buyers do not have an incentive to deviate since they
are indifferent everywhere. To ensure the existence of the conjecture equilibrium,
we only need to rule out deviations by the seller. We show that the seller has no
incentive to post unacceptable prices for a positive measure of time. As a result, the
seller has no profitable deviation. Since the construction of p1 (t) is unique, there is
no other equilibria in addition to the equilibrium we proposed.
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Suppose the seller follows the equilibrium strategy. His expected profit satisfies
the following equation:
Π1 (t) =
∫ 1
t
e−λ(s−t)λp1 (s) ds+ e−λ(1−t)vL.
Taking the derivative with respect to time yields,
Π˙1 (t) = −λe−λ(1−t) (vH − vL) M + λ (1− t)
M + 1
< 0.
Now we show that the seller’s best response is indeed to post P (t) = p1 (t) for
t < 1 and P (1) = vL. The proof is given step by step.
Step 1. At the deadline, it is the seller’s dominant strategy to post P (1) = vL.
Step 2. At any time, a price P (t) < p1 (t) is dominated by p1 (t). Step 3. We claim
that the seller has no incentive to post unacceptable prices for a positive measure
of time. Suppose not, and the seller posts P (t) > p1 (t) for t ∈ [t′, t′′). We claim
that such strategy is dominated by an alternative strategy: replacing P (t) by p1 (t)
for t ∈ [t′, t′′) but keep playing the original continuation strategy. To see the reason,
consider two cases. Case 1: there is no arrival in [t, t′). In this case, the seller
is indifferent between two strategies. Case 2: some H-buyers arrive in [t, t′). In
this case, if the seller adopts the original strategy, his expected payoff is less than
p1 (t
′′), since (1) the H-buyer’s reserve (acceptable) price before the deadline, p1 (·),
is decreasing in time and (2) the seller’s payoff at the deadline is vL. If the seller
adopts the alternative strategy, his expected payoff is p1 (τ1) where τ1 is a random
time at which the first H-buyer arrives in [t, t′). Since p1 (τ1) ≥ p1 (t′′), for any
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history, the original strategy is dominated by the alternative one. In general, the
argument ensures that the seller has no incentive to post unacceptable prices in
finite many positive measure time-intervals. Hence, the seller has no incentive to
adopt the deviation strategy by posting unacceptable price for a positive measure
of time. Apparently, any P (t) < p1 (t) for a positive measure of time is dominated
by the equilibrium pricing rule. Consequently, it is the seller’s best response to
post P ∗ (t) = p1 (t) for t < 1, and P ∗ (t) = vL, and our conjecture equilibrium is
an equilibrium. By construction, p1 (t) is unique, so there is no other equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
A.2.3 Proofs for the Two-Unit Case
At any t such that K (t) = 1, the problems are the same as in the case where
K = 1; hence, p1 (t) and Π1 (t) remain in the same form, and so does U
1
l∆. At t = 1
and K (1) = 2, the seller posts p2 (1) = vL for sure. Now we need to look at the case
where t < 1 and K (t) = 2.
A.2.3.1 The Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose not. Since vL is posted only at the deadline, the seller’s equilibrium
profits at the deadline are given by
Πk (1) = kvL, k = 1, 2.
122
and pk (t), the reservation price at k = 1, 2, is post to serve H-buyers only at any
t < 1. Specifically,
p2 (t) = vH − vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t) [2 + λ (1− t)] , and
p1 (t) = vH − vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)
Define Π˜2 (t) as the seller’s profit if p2 (t) is always posted when t < 1 and K (t) = 2,
then
Π˜2 (t) =
∫ 1
t
λe−λ(s−t) [p2 (s) + Π1 (s)] ds+ 2vLe−λ(1−t)
= 2vH − 2 (vH − vL) e−λ(1−t)
−vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)
[
λ (1− t) (M + 3) + λ2 (1− t)2] .
Immediately,
Π˜2 (t)− [vL + Π1 (t)]
= (vH − vL)
(
1− 2e−λ(1−t))
+
vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)
[
M + 1− λ (1− t) (M + 2)− λ2 (1− t)2] .
Though this difference is not monotone, using a Taylor expansion and algebra, there
are two cases: (i) either Π˜2 (t) − [vL + Π1 (t)] < 0 for all t < 1 when Π˜2 (0) <
vL + Π1 (0), (ii) or, if Π˜2 (0) > vL + Π1 (0), ∃ t∗ < 1 s.t. Π˜2 (t∗) = vL + Π1 (t∗) and
Π˜2 (t) < vL + Π1 (t) for t ∈ (t∗, 1). Q.E.D.
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A.2.3.2 The Proof of Proposition 2
Equilibrium Construction. We first construct the H-buyers’ reservation price.
Suppose that all buyers believe that the seller posts a deal p2 (t
∗
1) = vL at t
∗
1 < 1 if
K (t∗1) = 2, the H-buyer’s reservation price p2 (t) before t
∗
1 if K (t) = 2, and p1 (t) at
any t s.t. K (t) = 1. Any H-buyer believes that she is the only one in the market
and she accepts any price that is not higher than the reservation price. Similar to
the single unit case, the H-buyer’s reservation price p2 (t) when t ∈ [t∗1, 1) satisfies:
vH − p2 (t) = 1
M + 1
(vH − vL) + M
M + 1
e−λ(l∆−t)U1l∆,
where, as in the single-unit case, U1l∆ = e
−λ(1−l∆) vH−vL
M+1
and t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, l∆) for
some l < 1/∆, hence
p2 (t) =
MvH + vL
M + 1
− M
(M + 1)2
(vH − vL) e−λ(1−t)
=
M
M + 1
p1 (t) +
1
M + 1
vL, for t ∈ [t∗1, 1−∆).
Observe that p˙2 = M/ (M + 1) p˙1 for t ∈ [t∗1, 1−∆). For t ∈ [1−∆, 1),
vH − p2 (t) = 1
M + 1
(vH − vL) + M
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)
vH − vL
M
,
and p2 (t) <
M
M+1
p1 (t) +
1
M+1
vL since no new L-buyer will enter and an H-buyer’s
reservation price is p˜1 (t) = vH − e−λ(1−t) vH−vLM in this case. To construct the equi-
librium, we study the auxiliary problem in which p2 (t) =
M
M+1
p1 (t) +
1
M+1
vL for
t ∈ [t∗1, 1), and show that the seller’s optimal fire sale time is t∗1 < 1 − ∆ in this
124
auxiliary problem when ∆ is small. Furthermore, we argue that the seller’s opti-
mal fire sale time is also equal to t∗1 in the problem where p2 (t) =
1
M+1
(vH − vL) +
M
M+1
e−λ(1−t) vH−vL
M
for t ∈ [1−∆, 1).
If t < t∗1, then for some l, t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, l∆) ∩ [0, t∗1). If l∆ ≥ t∗1, then p2 (t)
satisfies:
vH − p2 (t) = e−λ(t∗1−t)U2t∗1 + λ (t
∗
1 − t) e−λ(t
∗
1−t)e−λ(l∆−t
∗
1)U1l∆,
where U2t∗1 = vH − p2 (t∗1) . Otherwise, if l∆ < t∗1, then
vH − p2 (t) = e−λ(l∆−t)U2l∆ + λ (l∆− t) e−λ(l∆−t)U1l∆,
where U2l∆ = vH − p2 (l∆). In either of the two cases, we have
p2 (t) = vH − vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)
[
eλ(1−t
∗
1) +
M
M + 1
+ λ (t∗1 − t)
]
< p1 (t) ,
for t ∈ [0, t∗1), and p˙2 (t) = −λ (p1 (t)− p2 (t)) for t ∈ [0, t∗1). Note that p2 (·) is
continuous on [0, 1] .
In fact, for any buyer’s belief on t∗1, p2 (·) depends on t∗1 through the boundary
condition at t∗1 only but does not depend on ∆.
Now we consider the seller’s problem. Given the buyer’s reservation price p2 (·)
based on the belief of t∗1, the seller chooses the actual deal time, with p2 (·) forced to
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be the pricing strategy before the deal time. Hence,
Π2 (t) = max
t1
∫ t1
t
e−λ(s−t)λ [p2 (s) + Π1 (s)] ds+ e−λ(t1−t) [vL + Π1 (t1)] . (A.5)
In equilibrium, the buyers’ belief is correct, so the seller’s optimal choice is indeed
t∗1. The first derivative w.r.t. t1 at t
∗
1is
e−λ(t
∗
1−t)λ[p2 (t∗1)− vL] + e−λ(t
∗
1−t)Π˙1 (t∗1)
= λe−λ(t
∗
1−t) [p2 (t∗1)− vL − p1 (t∗1) + Π1 (t∗1)] = 0
Or equivalently, p2 (t
∗
1)− vL − p1 (t∗1) + Π1 (t∗1) = 0.
Define f (·) on [0, 1] as follows:
f (t) = p2 (t)− vL − p1 (t) + Π1 (t) .
For t ≥ t∗1, we have p2 (t1)− p1 (t1) = 1M+1 [vL − p1 (t1)], then
f (t) = Π1 (t)− vL − p1 (t)− vL
M + 1
=
vH − vL
M + 1
{
M − e−λ(1−t)
[
M +
M
M + 1
+ λ (1− t)
]}
Obviously, f˙ (t) < 0 and f (1) = −M/ (M + 1) < 0. Define t∗1 as the unique solution
to f (t) = 0 if it exists, otherwise define t∗1 = 0. By construction, for t ∈ (t∗1, 1), the
optimal solution of (A.5) is t; thus, the seller does not have any incentive to choose
a deal time later than t∗1 in the auxiliary problem. If t
∗
1 > 0 i.e. f (t
∗
1) = 0, for t < t
∗
1,
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p˙2 (t) = −λ (p1 (t)− p2 (t)), hence
f (t) =
1
λ
p˙2 (t) + Π1 (t)− vL,
and f˙ (t) = p˙2 (t) + Π˙1 (t) − p˙1 (t) in which both p˙2 (t) < 0 and Π˙1 (t) − p˙1 (t) are
negative therefore f˙ (t) < 0 for t < t∗1. Since p2, p1 and Π1 are all continuous over
[0, 1], we have a continuous f (t) and limt↗t∗1 f (t) = f (t
∗
1) = 0, consequently f (t) > 0
for t < t∗1; thus, the seller does not have any incentive to choose a deal time earlier
than t∗1.
Suppose ∆ is small; thus, after the fire sale at t∗1, new L-buyers enter and their
number is M at the deadline. Hence, after the fire sale, the H-buyer’s reservation
price for t ∈ (t∗1, 1) is p1 (t). Off the path of play, the story is different. Case 1.
Suppose the seller holds the fire sales at t < 1−∆. Then new L-buyers enter before
the deadline, and the H-buyer’s reservation price is still p1 (t). Case 2. Suppose
the seller runs the fire sale at t ∈ (1−∆, 1). Then there is no new L-buyer enters
after the sales. Hence, the H-buyer’s reservation price is p˜1 (t) = vH − e−λ(1−t) vH−vLM
after the fire sale, and p˜2 (t) = vH − 1M+1 (vH − vL) − MM+1e−λ(1−t) vH−vLM before the
fire sale. Since p˜k (t) < pk (t), the seller’s profit by running the fire sale after 1 −∆
is strictly less than that in the auxiliary problem. Hence, it is strictly dominated.
Consequently, in the real problem, the seller does not have any incentive to choose
a deal time later than t∗1.
Verification of the Conjecture. Next, we need to verify, when the seller can
freely choose any price at any time, whether our conjecture equilibrium is indeed an
equilibrium. By construction, H-buyers have no incentive to deviate. First, we show
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that the seller has no incentive to deviate from p2 (t) when K (t) = 2. We then show
that there is no other equilibrium in addition to equilibrium we proposed.
First, by the proof of proposition 1, when K (t) jumps to 1, the continuation play
of the seller in any equilibrium is P (t) = p1 (t) for t < 1 and P (1) = vL. Second, a
simple observation is that, when K (t) = 2, any strategy induces P (t) ∈ (vL, p2 (t))
is dominated by p2 (t), so it is suboptimal. Third, conditional on k, the H-buyer’s
reservation price declines over time. Different from the single-unit case, the seller
can enhance the H-buyer’s reservation price in future by reducing his inventory.
As a result, the seller may have the incentive to accumulate H-buyers by charging
P (t) > p2 (t) when K (t) = 2, and charge them p1 (·) after a fire sale. However, we
claim that, when K (t) = 2, the seller has no incentive to choose a strategy with a
price P (t) > p2 (t) when K (t) = 2 at any positive measure of time.
Given any seller’s strategy, denote td1 = inf {t|K (t) = 2, P (t) = vL}. Consider
the last period first. For t ∈ [1−∆, 1], it is obvious that the seller’s optimal price
is either p2 (t) or vL when K (t) = 2. The reason is that it is the last chance that
H-buyers will accept a price greater than vL, and there is no benefit to posting
unacceptable prices. Next we claim that, given H-buyers’ reservation price, the
seller’s best response satisfies the following properties: for t < td1, P (t) = p2 (t) when
K (t) = 2. We verify this step by step.
Step 1. Suppose in the seller’s best response, td1 ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, l∆). We call
this period the fire sale period. We claim that for t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, td1), P (t) = p2 (t)
when K (t) = 2. Suppose not. Then there are countably many time intervals with
a positive measure in the current period in which the seller posts P (t) > p2 (t)
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when K (t) = 2. We call them non-selling time intervals. Case 1. P (t) > p2 (t)
for t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, td1). By doing so, the benefit is to accumulate H-buyers whose
attention times are in such intervals and induce them to accept high prices after
the fire sale. However, such a pricing strategy is dominated by the following one:
posting vL at (l − 1) ∆ and p1 (t) for t > (l − 1) ∆. The reasons are that (1) p1 (t)
is decreasing over time, (2) an H-buyer who arrives at t ∈ ((l − 1) ∆, td1) is the only
H-buyer in the market, and he may take the deal at td1 instead of paying p1
(
t˜
)
at her
next attention time with positive probability. Hence, we have a contradiction! Case
2. Suppose there is a t′ ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, td1) such that P (t) = p2 (t) for t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, t′)
and P (t) > p2 (t) for t ∈ [t′, td1) when K (t) = 2. Similar to the argument in case
1, the seller can post vL at t
′ instead of at td1 and earn extra benefit. Case 3.
There are countably many mutually exclusive subintervals of [(l − 1) ∆, td1) in which
P (t) > p2 (t). Then there is a t
′′ ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, td1) such that td1− t′′ equals the measure
of the sum of those in the non-selling time intervals. Each H-buyer’s attention time
follows an independent uniform distribution, and newly arrived H-buyers’ arrival
rate is time-independent, so the population structure of H-buyers whose attention
times are in [t′′, td1) is identical to that in the non-selling time intervals. Since both
p2 (t) and p1 (t) decrease over time, the original pricing strategy is dominated by
the following one at t = (l − 1) ∆: the seller posts p2 (t) for t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, t′) and
P (t) > p2 (t) for t ∈ [t′, td1). Then, by the logic of case 2, we have a contradiction!
In short, the seller does not post P (t) > p2 (t) for t ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, td1).
Step 2. Now we claim that for any t ∈ [(l − 2) ∆, (l − 1) ∆), the seller’s best
response satisfies that P (t) = p2 (t). Suppose not. By the same argument in case 3
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of step 1, we can focus on the strategy where P (t) = p2 (t) for t ∈ [(l − 2) ∆, t′′) and
P (t) > p2 (t) for t ∈ (t′′, (l − 1) ∆). Then there must exist a t′ ∈ [(l − 1) ∆, t′′) such
that at time t the expected distribution of the number of H-buyers whose attention
times are in [t′, t
′+t1d
2
) equals that in [
t′+t1d
2
, td1). Two intervals have the same length,
so the process of the attention times is identical too. As a result, we claim that the
original strategy is dominated by the following one at time t: the seller posts p2 (t)
for t ∈ [t′, t′+t1d
2
) but P (t) > p2 (t) for t ∈ [ t
′+t1d
2
, td1). Again, by the logic of case 2 in
step 1, we have a contradiction!
Step 3. In the period before the fire sales period, the price is acceptable and each
H-buyer observes the price in that period. Thus, for periods before the seller has no
incentive to post P (t) > p2 (t). Hence, in the seller’s best response, P (t) = p2 (t)
or vL when K (t) = 2. By the construction of the auxiliary problem, we know
the optimal fire sale time is t∗1, thus the seller has no incentive to deviate from his
equilibrium strategy.
Uniqueness. Since t∗1is uniquely constructed, there is no other equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3
A.2.4.1 Equilibria Construction
We construct the equilibrium by induction. Suppose there is a unique equilibrium
for the game where K (0) = K in which there exists a sequence of {t∗k}K−1k=1 , and pk (t)
for k = {1, 2, ...K}, such that t∗k+1 < t∗k, pk+1 < pk, and p˙k < 0 where differentiable.
Consequently, by the indifference conditions of an H-buyer’s reservation price and
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uniform distributed attention time in a period, we can define Ukl∆ = vH − pk (l∆) as
the expected utility of an H-buyer if her next attention time is in next period starting
from l∆ < t∗k−1 and K (l∆) = k, and U
k
t∗k−1
= vH−pk
(
t∗k−1
)
the expected utility if the
next attention time is t∗k−1 and K
(
t∗k−1
)
= k. We construct the candidate equilibrium
for the game where K (0) = K + 1, which includes: the H-buyers reservation price
pK+1 (t), the equilibrium first fire sale time t
∗
K , and the seller’ pricing strategy.
When t∗K−1 = 0, t
∗
K = 0 as well. When t
∗
K−1 < 0, similar to the two-unit case, we
can construct a fire sale time t∗K ∈ [0, t∗K−1]. Suppose buyers believe that the seller
posts deals at 0 ≤ t∗K ≤ t∗K−1 < ... < t∗1 < 1 when K (t∗k) > k and posts the H-buyer’s
reservation price pk (t) when K (t) = k, k = 1, ..., K + 1. We consider the case where
∆ is small enough. We assume ∀k, ∃lk s.t. t∗k < lk∆ < t∗k−1, that is, there is at most
one deal time in a period. We will verify this hypothesis later.
First, consider t ≥ t∗K . Trivially, the seller will post pK (1) = vL at the deadline
and the reservation price of an H-buyer is vH . When t ∈ [t∗K−i, t∗K−i−1), and K (t) =
K + 1, an H-buyer expects the seller to post vL immediately and to reduce his
inventory to K − i, hence
pK+1 (t) =
i+ 1
M + 1
vL +
M − i
M + 1
pk−i (t)
for i = 0, ..., K − 1 and t∗0 := 1. Note that, when t > t∗K , pK+1 (t) is decreas-
ing but not continuous because limt↗t∗k pK+1 (t) > pK+1 (t
∗
k), ∀k < K and p˙K+1 =
(M − i) / (M + 1) p˙k−i < 0 where it exists.
Now consider t < t∗K . If (l − 1) ∆ ≤ t < t∗K < l∆, the H-buyer’s indifference
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condition is:
vH − pK+1 (t) = e−λ(t∗K−t)UK+1t∗K
+
K∑
k=1
λke−λ(l∆−t)
k∑
i=1
(t∗K − t)i
i!
(
l∆− t∆K
)k−i
(k − i)! U
K+1−k
l∆ ;
or if (l − 1) ∆ ≤ t < l∆ ≤ t∗K , the condition becomes:
vH − pK+1 (t) =
K∑
k=0
e−λ(l∆−t)
λk (l∆− t)k
k!
UK+1−kl∆ .
The continuation values Ukl∆ and U
K+1
t∗K
, defined in the same fashion as before, are
the expected utilities of an H-buyer if her next attention time is in the next period or
at t∗K , whichever comes first. The analytical expression for pK+1 (t) is then obtained
using the continuation values in a recursive way. It is straightforward to show that
pK+1 (t) is continuous at t
∗
K . In addition, we have
p˙K+1 (t) = −λ (pK (t)− pK+1 (t)) for t < t∗K . (A.6)
By construction, it is immediate that pK+1 (t) < pK (t), ∀t < 1, hence p˙K+1 (t) < 0
and p¨K+1 (t) = −λ2 (pK−1 − pK+1) < 0 where differentiable.
Second, we show some properties of the H-buyers’ reservation price. The results
are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For t < t∗k, p˙k+1 − p˙k < 0 where k = {1, 2, ...K}.
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Proof. We solve the closed-form solution of pk+1 − pk. Simple algebra implies that
p˙k+1 (t)− p˙k (t) = λ (pk+1 − pk) + λ (pk−1 − pk) ,
which is equivalent to
[p˙k+1 (t)− p˙k (t)− λ (pk+1 − pk)] e−λt
=
d
dt
[
(pk+1 − pk) e−λt
]
= −λ (pk − pk−1) e−λt.
Recursively, we have
dk
dtk
[
(pk+1 − pk) e−λt
]
= − (−λ)k vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ,
so
pk+1 − pk = − (−λ)k vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ
tk
k!
eλt +
k∑
i=1
Ci
tk−i
(k − i)!e
λt
where Ci is a constant number for each i, and
p˙k+1 − p˙k = − (−λ)k vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ
tk−1
(k − 1)!e
λt
+
k−1∑
i=1
Ci
tk−i−1
(k − i− 1)!e
λt + (λ+ ρ) (pk+1 − pk)
= (pk − pk−1) + λ (pk+1 − pk)
+ (λ+ 1) (−λ)k−1 vH − vL
M + 1
e−λ
tk−1
(k − 1)!e
λt.
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Hence, when k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, ...}, we have p˙k+1 − p˙k < 0. By the same logic, we have
p2 − p1 = λ (vH − vL)
M + 1
e−λ(1−t)t+ eλtC1 < 0
dk−1
dtk−1
[
(pk+1 − pk) e−λt
]
= (−λ)k−1
[
λ (vH − vL)
M + 1
e−λt+ C1
]
so
pk+1 − pk = (−λ)k−1
[
λ (vH − vL)
M + 1
e−λ
tk−1
(k − 1)! + C1
tk−2
(k − 2)!
]
eλt +
k∑
i=2
Ci
tk−i
(k − i)!e
λt
and
p˙k+1 − p˙k = λ (pk+1 − pk) + (pk − pk−1)
− (λ+ 1) (−λ)k−2 t
k−3
(k − 2)!
[
λ (vH − vL)
M + 1
e−λt+ C1 (k − 2)
]
eλt
hence when k ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9...}, p˙k+1−p˙k < 0. In short, p˙k+1−p˙k < 0 for any k ∈ N.
Next, we consider the problem faced by the seller in which he chooses the fire
sale time t∗K , but is forced to post pK+1 (t) when t < tK and K (t) = K + 1, and the
seller’s problem is to choose the optimal deal time.
ΠK+1 (t) = max
tK
∫ tK
t
e−λ(s−t)λ [pK+1 (s) + ΠK (s)] ds+ e−λ(tK−t)Πc (tK) , (A.7)
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where the continuation payoff Πc (tK) is given as follows
Πc (tK) =
 vL + ΠK (tK)ivL + ΠK+1−i (tK)
tK < t
∗
K−1
t ∈ [t∗K+1−i, t∗K−i)
for i = 2, 3, ...K − 1. In equilibrium, the H-buyers’ belief is correct, so the seller’s
optimal choice is indeed t∗k (∆). The first order derivative to tK is
e−λ(tK−t)λ[pK+1 (tK)− vL] + e−λ(tK−t)Π˙K (tK)
= λe−λ(tK−t) [pK+1 (tK)− vL − pK (tK) + ΠK (tK)− ΠK−1 (tK)]
At t∗k, we have
pK+1 (t
∗
k)− vL = pK (t∗k) + ΠK−1 (t∗k)− ΠK (t∗k) .
Third, we show that there is a unique t∗K that determines the auxiliary equi-
librium. At t∗K , we have pK+1 (t
∗
K) − vL − pK (t∗K) + ΠK (t∗K) − ΠK−1 (t∗K) = vL +
ΠK (t
∗
K)− ΠK−1 (t∗K)−
pK(t∗K)−vL
M+1
. Let
f 1K (t) = vL + ΠK (t)− ΠK−1 (t)−
pK (t)− vL
M + 1
for t ∈ [t∗k, t∗K−1)
Similar to the two-unit case, a simple observation is that limt→t∗K−1 ΠK (t)−ΠK−1 (t)→
vL and limt→t∗K−1
[
Et˜|t
[
e−λ(t˜−t)pK (t)
]
− vL
]
> 0 and both ΠK (t) − ΠK−1 (t) and
pK (t) are continuous function, so fK (t) < 0 for t close to t
∗
K−1. If fK (t) < 0 for
any t ∈ [0, t∗K−1), we claim that t∗k = 0. Otherwise, we let t∗k = sup{t|t ≤ tK−1,
135
fK (t) = 0 and ∃ε > 0 s.t. fK (t′) > 0 for t′ ∈ (t − ε, t)}. By construction, for
t ∈ (t∗k, t∗K−1), the optimal solution of (A.7) is t, and when t < t∗k, the seller prefers
t∗k to any tK ∈
(
t∗k, t
∗
K−1
)
. What about tK ∈
(
t∗K−i, t
∗
K−i−1
)
for i = 1, 2, ..K − 2 and
tK ∈ (t∗1, 1)? The first derivative of the seller’s objective function is given by
pK+1 (tK) + ΠK (tK)− ivL − ΠK−i (tK)− [pK−i (t) + ΠK−i−1 − ΠK−i]
for tK ∈
(
t∗K−i, t
∗
K−i−1
)
. By construction of pk, we have
pK+1 (tK) =
i+ 1
M + 1
vL +
M − i
M + 1
pK−i (t) ,
where t˜ is the H-buyer’s next regular attention time. Let
f iK (t) = ΠK (tK)− ivL − ΠK−i−1 (tK) + [pK+1 (tK)− pK−i]
= [ΠK (tK)− ivL − ΠK−i−1 (tK)]
+
{
i+ 1
M + 1
vL +
M − i
M + 1
pK−i (t)− pK−i (t)
}
= [ΠK (tK)− ivL − ΠK−i−1 (tK)] + i+ 1
M + 1
[vL − pK−i (t)] .
And by construction of Πk, ΠK (tK)− ivL−ΠK−i−1 (tK) = 0 for tK ∈ (tK−i, tK−i−1).
So f iK < 0. As a result, the seller, holding K + 1 units, prefers to sell the first unit
via a fire sale at t∗k to any tK ∈ (t∗k, 1].
Now let us verify whether, at t < t∗k, the seller’s optimal choice is t
∗
k if K (t) =
136
K + 1. The first derivative is given by
pK+1 (t)− vL − pK (t) + ΠK (t)− ΠK−1 (t)
and we know that it equals zero at t∗k. We want to show that, for any t < t
∗
k, the first
derivative is positive. The reason is simply that both p˙K+1 (t)− p˙K (t) and Π˙K (t)−
Π˙K−1 (t) are negative. The first term is proved in Lemma 5, and the second term is
shown as follows. We know that Π˙2 (t)−Π˙1 (t) < 0. Now at t∗k, Π˙K (t∗k)−Π˙K−1 (t∗k) =
0, and the limt↘t∗k
[
Π¨K (t)− Π¨K−1 (t)
]
= −λ
[
p˙K (t)− p˙K−1 (t) + Π˙K−1 (t)− Π˙K−2 (t)
]
>
0. Hence Π˙K (t) − Π˙K−1 (t) < 0 for t ∈ (t∗k − ε, t∗k) where ε is small but positive. If
Π˙K (t)− Π˙K−1 (t) > 0 for some t, by continuity of Π˙K (·)− Π˙K−1 (·), there must be a
tˆ s.t. Π˙K
(
tˆ
)− Π˙K−1 (tˆ) = 0 and Π˙K (t)− Π˙K−1 (t) < 0 for any t ∈ (tˆ, t∗k). However,
Π¨K
(
tˆ
)− Π¨K−1 (tˆ) > 0, which is a contradiction!
In short, the equilibrium of the auxiliary problem uniquely exists. Similar to
the two-unit case, off the path of play, if the fire sale is postponed such that (1)
K (t) = k and (2) t and t∗k−2 are in the same period, the H-buyer’s reservation price
is lower than pk (t) and pk−1 (t) when K (t) = k and k − 1 respectively. However,
the seller’s profit by running the fire sale in such a period is strictly less than that
in the auxiliary problem. Hence, it is strictly dominated. Consequently, in the real
problem, the seller does not have any incentive to choose a deal time later than t∗k−1
when K (t) = k.
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A.2.4.2 Verification of the Conjecture
First, we verify that in the candidate equilibrium, two sales are not in the same
period.
Lemma 6. When ∆ is small, and t∗k, t
∗
k+1 > ∆, t
∗
k − t∗k+1 > ∆, for all k ∈ N
Proof. If t∗k, t
∗
k+1 > ∆, they are both interior solutions. By construction, we have
that t∗k > t
∗
k+1. We claim that t
∗
k, t
∗
k+1are not in the same period when ∆ is small.
Suppose not, we have t∗k − t∗k+1 ≤ ∆. And at t∗k, we have
Πk+1 (t
∗
k) = Πk (t
∗
k) + vL, Π˙k+1 (t
∗
k) = Π˙k (t
∗
k) ,
Π˙k+1 (t
∗
k) = −λ [pk+1 (t∗k) + Πk (t∗k)− Πk+1 (t∗k)] ,
Π˙k (t
∗
k) = −λ [pk (t∗k) + Πk−1 (t∗k)− Πk (t∗k)] ,
so
pk+1 (t
∗
k)− vL = pk (t∗k) + Πk−1 (t∗k)− Πk (t∗k) .
but at t∗k+1, we have
pk+2
(
t∗k+1
)− vL = pk+1 (t∗k+1)+ Πk (t∗k+1)− Πk+1 (t∗k+1)
= pk+1
(
t∗k+1
)− vL + ∫ t∗k
t∗k+1
[
Π˙k (s)− Π˙k+1 (s)
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(∆)
.
However, pk+1 (t
∗
k) − pk+2
(
t∗k+1
)
is bounded away from zero for any ∆. So, when
∆ → 0, we have a contradiction! Thus, when ∆ is small, we have the desired
result.
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Second, we verify that the equilibrium path
{
pk (t) , t
∗
k−1
}K+1
k=1
can be supported
as a equilibrium. The proof is almost identical to the two-unit case. In any histories
with K (t) = k, the seller posts either pk (t) or vL, thus Φ0 (t) = 1. Since t
∗
k is the
optimal fire sale time when K (t) = k and Φ0 (t) = 1, the seller has no incentive to
deviate. So the conjecture equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
Uniqueness. Similar to the K = 2 case. In any period, there is no non-
selling time intervals. Given that, the only possible equilibrium is the equilibrium
we proposed. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Equilibrium Construction
Proof of Lemma 2:
If v-buyer accepts pτ in period τ , then v − pτ ≥ e−r∆(1− λα∆)U(v, ατ , Hτ ). We
want to show that v′ − pτ > e−r∆(1 − λα∆)U(v′, ατ , Hτ ). Since from τ + 1 on, the
v player can always adopt the optimal strategy of v′-buyer, that is, accept exactly
when v′-buyer accepts, then
U(v, ατ , Hτ ) ≥
∞∑
j=0
e−jr∆
j∏
i=0
(1− λατ+i∆)γτ+1+j(v′, α,Hτ+1+j)(v − pτ+j+1),
U(v′, ατ , Hτ ) =
∞∑
j=0
e−jr∆
j∏
i=0
(1− λατ+i∆)γτ+1+j(v′, α,Hτ+1+j)(v′ − pτ+j+1),
where γ(v′, ατ , Hτ ) is the probability conditional on Hτ and ατ that agreement is
reached at time τ + 1 + j and the buyer use v′-buyer’s optimal strategy from time
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τ + 1 on. In other words,
U(v′, ατ , Hτ )− U(v, ατ , Hτ )
≤
∞∑
j=0
e−jr∆
j∏
i=0
(1− λατ+j∆)γτ+1+j(v′, Hτ )(v′ − v)
≤ v′ − v. (B.1)
Since v − pτ ≥ e−r∆(1− λατ∆)U(v, ατ , Hτ ), we have
v′ − pτ − e−r∆U(v′, ατ , Hτ )
≥ v′ − (v − e−r∆U(v, ατ , Hτ ))− e−r∆U(v′, ατ , Hτ )
= (v′ − v)− e−r∆[U(v′, ατ , Hτ )− U(v, ατ , Hτ )]
= (v′ − v)− [U(v′, ατ , Hτ )− U(v, ατ , Hτ )]
+(1− e−r∆)[U(v′, ατ , Hτ )− U(v, ατ , Hτ )].
By (B.1),
(v′ − v)− [U(v′, ατ , Hτ )− U(v, ατ , Hτ )] ≥ 0,
and
(1− e−r∆)[U(v′, ατ , Hτ )− U(v, ατ , Hτ )] > 0,
we have v′ − pτ > e−r∆(1− λ)U(v′, ατ , Hτ ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We first show the screening ends in finitely many periods in any equilibrium.
Then, we construct the unique equilibrium by induction. The following lemma shows
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that screening offers are suboptimal, when the seller is sufficiently pessimistic about
the long-lived buyer’s value.
Lemma 7. There is a K∗ > v such that screening is not optimal when k ∈ [v,K∗).
Proof. The seller can switch to the strategy “waiting offer forever” and obtain the
expected value J0 in any period. We first show that once the seller optimally posts
one period waiting offer, he would not use screening offers in future. Suppose the
seller posts a waiting offer in period t, it must be true that
R(k) = J(k) > V (k).
The game goes to period t + 1 if no short-lived buyers appears. By posting the
waiting offer, the seller cannot screen the long-lived buyer’s value. Thus, k′ = k, and
V (k′) = V (k) < J(k) = J(k′). Hence, the seller will post the waiting offer in period
t + 1. As a result, once the seller posts a waiting offer in period t, he will post the
waiting offer until the game is over. Hence, J(k) = J0, when J(k) > V (k).
Now we want to show that there is a K∗ ∈ (v, 1] such that the seller will switch
to the waiting offer when k < K∗. Suppose not, then for any k ∈ [v, 1], J(k) ≤ V (k).
However, V (k) ≤ k, so when k is sufficiently close to v, V (k) is strictly less than J0.
There are two cases. First, J0 > V (1), then K
∗ = 1. The seller will posts waiting
offer from period 1 on. In this case, the equilibrium is trivial. In the second case,
J0 ≤ V (1). By monotonicity of V (k), there exists a K∗ such that V (k) ≥ J0 if and
only if k ∈ [K∗, 1]. Given the existence of K∗, the seller will finally switch to the
waiting offer in any equilibrium, if it exists.
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Now we show the existence of the equilibrium and its uniqueness by construction.
Because the strategy “waiting offer forever” provides a lower bound of the seller’s
value, which is strictly higher than v, this proof is essentially same as that in Ausubel
and Deneckere (1989). However, the existence of the short-lived buyer makes the
proof more complicated.
Step 1. We set
W 0(k) = J0 and σ
0(k) = 1,
where W 0(k) is the seller’s payoff from charging the waiting offer 1, and σ0(k) is
seller’s optimal choice correspondence, which is single valued in this zero step screen-
ing game by construction. Denote by β1(k) the price that k-value long-lived buyer
is indifferent between taking and having no trade. Then β1(k) is such that
k − β1(k) = 0.
That is, suppose the seller’s strategy is is to make a screening offer in the current
period and begin to charge the waiting offer forever if the current offer is rejected, the
k-value long-lived buyer is indifferent between accepting β1(k) and having no trade.
Accordingly, if this last screening offer p is rejected, the upper bound of the seller’s
belief about the long-lived buyer’s value is κ1(p) = p. Obviously, (β1)−1(p) = κ1(p).
By construction, β1(k) and κ1(p) are continuous and increasing.
Denote by W 1(k) the seller’s value from charging one screening offer and then
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switching to the waiting offer forever, so
W 1(k) = max
k′≤k
[
F (k)− F (k′)
F (k)
+
F (k′)
F (k)
λ∆]p+
F (k′)
F (k)
(1− λ∆)e−r∆J0.
Let T 1(k) be the maximum of the set of solutions to this optimization problem,
and T 1(k) exists by the maximum theorem in Ausubel and Deneckere (1993). Then
we can define σ1(k) = β1(T 1(k)) to be the seller’s price at state variable k in this
constructed game. Define k0 = max{k ∈ [v, 1]|W 1(k) = W 0(k) = J0}. By definition,
because of the existence of K∗, k0 is well defined. By this definition, for any k ≤ k0,
the seller will switch to the waiting offer, and the long-lived buyer will reject such
an offer, no matter what his value is. With (σ1, κ1;W 1, β1, T 1, k0), we can begin our
equilibrium construction.
Step 2. Set kn+1 > kn such that
F
(
kn+1
)
= min{1, F (kn) (1− λ∆) + (λ∆ + r∆)W n (kn)F (kn)}
thus when kn+1 < 1,
F
(
kn+1
)− F (kn) (1− λ∆) = F (kn) (λ∆ + r∆)W n (kn) .
Let βn+1(k) be the price will makes the k-value long-lived buyer indifferent be-
tween taking the current offer and waiting for the next period offer. Then,
k − βn+1(k) = (1− λ∆− r∆)(k − σn(k)).
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Here, βn+1(k) is non-decreasing in k. With this definition, we can define W n+1(k)
be the value of the following optimization problem:
W n+1 (k) = max
k′≤k
F (k)− F (k′) (1− λ∆)
F (k)
βn+1 (k′) +
F (k′) (1− λ∆)
F (k)
e−r∆W n (k′) ,
Denote by T n+1(k) the supremum of the set of solutions to this optimization problem
for k ∈ [v, kn+1]. We now claim that T n+1 ≤ kn.
Suppose not, then there is a k ∈ [v, kn+1] such that v = T n+1(k) and v ∈
(kn, kn+1]. By approximating e−r∆ by 1− r∆ and ignoring O(∆2) terms, we have
F (k)− F (v) (1− λ∆)
F (k)
βn+1 (v) + (1− λ∆− r∆) F (v)
F (k)
W n+1 (v)
<
F (kn+1)− F (kn) (1− λ∆)
F (k)
+ (1− λ∆− r∆)W n+1 (k)
≤ (λ∆ + r∆)W n (kn) + (1− λ∆− r∆)W n+1 (k)
≤ (λ∆ + r∆)W n+1 (k) + (1− λ∆− r∆)W n+1 (k)
= W n+1 (k) .
This leads to a contradiction! Let σn+1(k) = βn+1[T n+1(k)]. βn+1(k) may have
finitely many jumps, and it is right continuous. Define κn+1(p) as follows: (1)
κn+1(p) = (βn+1)−1(p) when βn+1(k) is invertible, or (2) if there is kˆ such that
limk↘kˆ β
n+1(k) = p+ 6= limk↗kˆ βn+1(k) = p−, κn+1(p) = kˆ for p ∈ (p−, p+]. There-
fore, by construction, κn+1 (p) is a continuous function.
Step 3. The construction of κn+1 in Step 2 suggests to us that there may be more
than one price, which induces the same state variable k′ in the next period. On the
145
kσ(k, p)
(v, v)
p˜
p−
p+
k˜ p
κ(p)
(v, v) p− p+
k′
Figure B.1: Pricing function σ and cutoff function κ.
equilibrium path, this does not cause any problem, because there is a unique sequence
of prices, and for each price p in this sequence, we have assigned an appropriate k, and
given k the continuation play is described by (σn, κn), where σn does not depend on
p. However, to complete a strategy profile, we also have to describe the continuation
play after any deviation of the seller. In this case, the flat part of the constructed
κn+1 causes σn to depend on the deviating price. Figure B.1 illustrates this case.
When we construct κn+1, if there is kˆ such that
lim
k↘kˆ
βn+1(k) = p+ 6= lim
k↗kˆ
βn+1(k) = p−,
κn+1(p) = kˆ for p ∈ (p−, p+]. This κ is illustrated in part (b) of Figure B.1. When
the seller deviates to a price pˆ ∈ (p−, p+), the equilibrium construction assigns kˆ as
the next period upper bound of the seller’s belief about the long-lived buyer’s value.
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For this belief to be correct, the kˆ-value long-lived buyer must be indifferent between
taking the current offer pˆ and waiting for future offers. However, if the seller chooses
p′+ in the next period given kˆ, the kˆ-value long-lived buyer will strictly prefer the
current offer; and if the seller chooses p′− in the next period given kˆ, the kˆ-value
long-lived buyer will strictly prefer waiting. This implies that to make the kˆ-value
long-lived buyer indifferent, the seller’s price strategy in the next period given kˆ
must be mixed. For the seller to randomize given kˆ, the seller must be indifferent
between the continuation strategies in the support of the mixed strategy in the next
period. This requires that any continuation strategies in the support of the seller’s
mixed strategy in the next period given kˆ must be part of an equilibrium at the state
variable kˆ. Therefore, after a deviating price pˆ, the seller’s strategy depends on the
value of pˆ, in the way that the seller appropriately randomizes among equilibrium
continuation strategies given kˆ. Hence, in an equilibrium, it is possible that on the
off-equilibrium path, the price depends on the last period price. This reconciles
the discussion in section 2.3.2 about weak-Markov equilibrium and strong-Markov
equilibrium.
In Step 2, we specify that on the equilibrium path, to reach the next period
state variable k′, the seller charges the highest possible price. If there are other
prices also leading to the same k′, the seller’s continuation value is the same, but
the seller gets higher current payoff. If there is no other price leading to the same
k′, the construction itself shows that the seller’s strategy is the best response to the
long-lived buyer’s strategy. Therefore, if (σn, κn) describes an equilibrium for all
k ∈ [v, kn], (σn+1, κn+1) describes an equilibrium for all k ∈ [v, kn+1].
147
Step 4. To complete the argument that the constructed (σ, κ) describes an
equilibrium, we need to show that there is N ∈ N, such that kN+1 ≥ 1. Recall that
F
(
kn+1
)− F (kn) = F (kn) [−λ∆ + (λ∆ + r∆)W n (kn)].
Because W n (k) ≥ W n−1 (k) ≥ ...W 1 (k) > J0 = λ∆r∆+λ∆ for any k > k0, F (kn+1) −
F (kn) > 0 and increases in n. Since the density function is bounded above by f¯ ,
there exists N ∈ N, such that kN+1 ≥ 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
By construction, the sequence of prices {pt} is decreasing for all t ≤ N , and from
period N + 1 on, pt = 1. So to show the lower bound of the equilibrium prices, we
just need to show that pN ≥ λλ+γ = J0. Suppose pN < λλ+γ . Then if pN is taken,
the seller’s payoff is pN < J0. If pN is not taken, the seller will charge the waiting
offer from the next period. In this case, her payoff is also strictly smaller than J0.
Therefore, in period N , the seller would like to begin to charge the waiting offer
from period N on. This is contradicted to Proposition 4. Therefore, pt ≥ λλ+γ . The
second part of the statement comes from Coasian conjecture in gap case. The proof
is omitted since it is standard. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Since we haven’t compared R(k, α) and R(k, α′), we discuss two cases. In the
first case, assume R(k, α) ≤ R(k, α′). By definition, J(k, α) = λα∆ + (1−λα∆)(1−
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r∆)R(k, α′), which is no larger than R(k, α) and R(k, α′) ( and R(k, α) ≥ v). The
waiting offer is strictly suboptimal if
λα∆ ≤ R(k, α)− e
−r∆R(k, α′)
1− e−r∆R(k, α′) ≤
R(k, α′)− e−r∆R(k, α′)
1− e−r∆R(k, α′) =
1− e−r∆
1/R(k, α′)− e−r∆ .
The right hand side is increasing in R(k, α′). Since R(k, α′) ≥ v, simple algebra
implies that waiting offer will not be posted if α ≤ α† = 1
λ∆
1−e−r∆
1/v−e−r∆ .
In the second case, assume R(k, α) > R(k, α′). A sufficient condition for
R(k, α) = V (k, α) > λα∆ + (1− λα∆− r∆)R(k, α′) (B.2)
is
R(k, α) ≥ λα∆ + (1− λα∆− r∆)R(k, α).
This holds if and only if (λα+ r)R(k, α) ≥ λα, which is true if and only if rR(k,α)
1−R(k,α) ≥
λα. Since R(k, α) ≥ v, it is obvious that if α < α†, the equation (B.2) holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
We first show the existence of the equilibrium and its uniqueness of a continuation
game starting from (k, α), where α ∈ B∆(α†).
Step 1. For each α ∈ B∆
(
α†
)
, define for all (k, α) with k ∈ [v, 1] and α ∈ B∆(α†),
W 0(k, α) = v, σ0(k, α) = v, and κ0(v, α) = v,
where W 0(k, α) is the seller’s value from posting the offer σ0(k, α) = v, and the
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long-lived buyer with a value bigger than or equal to v accepts this offer. Now define
β1 (k, α) and κ1 (p, α) such that
k − β1 (k, α) = (1− λα∆− r∆) (k − v) ,
κ1 (p, α)− p = (1− λα∆− r∆) (κ1 (p, α)− v) ;
thus, κ1 (β1 (k, α) , α) = k. Moreover, define
W 1 (k, α)
= max
k′≤k
F (k)− F (k′) (1− λα∆)
F (k)
β1 (k′, α)
+
F (k′) (1− λα∆)
F (k)
e−r∆W 0 (k′, α′) .
Let T 1(k, α) be the maximum of the set of solutions to this optimization problem,
we can define σ1(k, α) = β1(T 1(k, α), α′).
Define
k0 (α) = max
{
k|W 1 (k, α) = v} .
So when k < k0(α), the seller will charge price σ(k, α) = v. Obviously, in this
constructed zero stage game, (σ0, κ0) describes an equilibrium for k ∈ [v, k0(α)).
Step 2. With (σ1, κ1;W 1, β1, T 1, k0), we now construct the equilibrium by in-
duction. For each kn(α′), let kn+1(α) be the largest k such that
F (k) = min{1, F (kn(α′))[1 + λα∆(1− β
n+1(k, α))
βn+1(k, α)− v ]},
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for all n ≥ 0.
F (kn+1(α)) ≤ F (kn(α′))[1 + λα∆(1− β
n+1(k, α))
βn+1(k, α)− v ].
For each α ∈ B∆
(
α†
)
, if the seller chooses a cutoff value k as the next period
state variable, she need to make the k-value long-lived buyer indifferent between the
current offer and the offer in the next period. Since (k, α′) will be the next period
state variable, in the next period offer will be, by definition, σn(k, α′). Therefore,
the current offer, which makes the k-value long-lived buyer indifferent would be
βn+1(k, α) such that
k − βn+1(k, α) = (1− λα∆)e−r∆(k − σn(k, α′)).
Using this definition, we can define W n+1(k, α) as the value of the following opti-
mization problem:
W n+1 (k, α)
= max
k′≤k
F (k)− F (k′) (1− λα∆)
F (k)
βn+1 (k′, α)
+
F (k′) (1− λα∆)
F (k)
e−r∆W n (k′, α′) . (B.3)
We claim that for any k ∈ [kn(α′n+1(α)), the maximum of the set of solutions to
the optimization problem B.3 T n+1(k, α) < kn(α′).
Suppose not, then let v = T n+1(k, α) ≥ kn(α′). Consider the following two
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conditions. First, because α ≤ α†,
W n+1(v, α) > λα∆ + (1− λα∆)W n+1(v, α′).
Second, since the seller at the state variable (k, α) can employ the strategy using at
(v, α), we have
F (k)W n+1(k, α) ≥ F (v)W n+1(v, α) + p(F (k)− F (v)),
where p is the price making the long-lived buyer with value T n+1(v, α) indifferent
between taking the offer p and waiting for another period. These two conditions
imply
F (k)W n+1(k, α)
> λα∆F (v) + (1− λα∆− r∆)F (v)W n+1(v, α′) + p(F (k)− F (v)),
which in turn implies that
(1− λα∆− r∆)F (v)W n+1(v, α′)
< F (k)W n+1(k, α)− λα∆F (v)− p(F (k)− F (v)).
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Now, we have
F (k)W n+1(k, α)
= [F (k)− F (v)(1− λα∆)]βn+1(v, α) + F (v)(1− λα∆− r∆)v
≤ [F (k)− F (v)(1− λα∆)]βn+1(v, α)
+F (v)(1− λα∆− r∆)W n+1(v, α′)
< [F (k)− F (v)(1− λα∆)]βn+1(v, α)
+F (k)W n+1(k, α)− λα∆F (v)− p(F (k)− F (v))
= [F (k)− F (v)](βn+1(v, α)− p) + F (k)W n+1(k, α)− λα∆F (v)[1− βn+1(v, α)]
≤ [F (kn+1(α))− F (kn(α′n+1(v, α)− v)
+F (k)W n+1(k, α)− λα∆F (kn(α′n+1(v, α)]
= F (k)W n+1(k, α).
This leads to the contradiction.
Step 3. Similar to the equilibrium construction in the no learning case, we have to
specify the continuation play after the seller’s deviation. For any k′, which is induced
by a unique price p in the current period, the continuation play is as constructed
in Step 2. So the construction in Step 2 shows that deviating to such a price is
not profitable. If multiple prices induce a same k′, the seller must randomize among
continuation strategies, each of which is part of an equilibrium of the game beginning
at (k′, α′). In addition, how the seller randomizes depends on the deviating price,
that is, the seller will choose an appropriate mixed strategy to make the k′-value
153
long-lived buyer indifferent between taking the current deviating price and waiting
for the next period offer. On the equilibrium path, the seller charges the highest price
inducing k′, so after the deviation, the seller’s continuation payoff is the same as that
on the equilibrium path. But the seller has higher current payoff by following the
equilibrium price, so such a deviation is not profitable either. Therefore, if (σn, κn)
describes an equilibrium for all α ∈ B∆(α†) and all k ∈ [v, kn(α)), (σn+1, κn+1)
describes an equilibrium for all α ∈ B∆(α†) and all k ∈ [v, kn+1(α)).
Step 4. Now we show that a finite number of repetitions of the above argument
extends
(
σN
∗
α , κN
∗
α ;WN
∗
α , βN
∗
α , TN
∗
α , kN
∗
α−1
)
to k ∈ [v, 1] for any α ∈ B∆
(
α†
)
. By
the construction of sequences of {kn(α)} for all α ∈ B∆(α†), suppose for any finite
number Nα, k
Nα(α) < 1. There are two cases. In the first case, there is an  > 0,
such that kn(α) < 1− . But then
F (kn+1(α))− F (kn(α′))
= F (kn(α))λα∆
1− βn+1(kn+1(α), α)
βn+1(kn+1(α), α)− v
≥ F (kn(α))λα∆ 
1− − v .
Because the density function is bounded above by f¯ , we can find the contradiction.
In the second case, for any  > 0, there is N such that for all n ≥ N , kn(α) > 1− .
Since
F (kn+1(α))− F (kn(α′))
= F (kn(α))λα∆
1− βn+1(kn+1(α), α)
βn+1(kn+1(α), α)− v ,
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f ′(1) = 0 implies kn+1(α) − kn(α′) is bounded away from 0. So we also get the
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7:
By Lemma 3, the waiting offer will not be posted when αt ∈ B∆(α†), and any
continuation game, which starts with (k, α) such that k ∈ [v, 1], α ∈ B∆(α†), ends
in N∗
α† periods. Hence, the seller’s continuation value and associated pricing policy,
R(k, α†) and σ(k, α†) can be calculated for all k ∈ [v, 1]. And the k-buyer’s equilib-
rium payoff U
(
k, k, α†|σ, κ) under the continuation play can also be calculated.
We move to (k, α2) where k ∈ [v, 1]. First, any (k, α†) can be reached from (k, α2)
by one period waiting offer. By making a waiting offer, the seller’s payoff is given by
J
(
k, α2
)
= λα2∆ +
(
1− λα2∆− r∆)R (k, α†) ,
the buyer has no relevant choice to make, and the game ends in N∗
α† + 1 periods.
Second, construct β (k, α2) as follows.
k − β (k, α2) = (1− λα2 − r∆)U (k, k, α†|σ, κ) ,
where β (k, α2) is the highest price such that k-buyer is indifferent between taking
it and waiting to obtain a continuation payoff U
(
k, k, α†|σ, κ). Following Ausubel
and Deneckere (1989), without loss of generality, assume σs (k, α2) is monotone and
right continuous. Define κ (β (k, α2) , α2) = k if it is well defined. As Ausubel and
Deneckere (1989) noted, β (k, α2) may have jumps at finitely many points. For any
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jump point kˆ such that β
(
kˆ, α2
)
= pˆ+ and limk→kˆ− β (k, α
2) = pˆ−, where pˆ− < pˆ+,
let κ (p, α2) = kˆ for all p ∈ [pˆ−, pˆ+]. Hence, by construction, κ (p, α2) is continuous
with respect to p, and κ−1 (k|α2) = β (k, α2) is defined.
For any k ∈ [v, 1], we define the seller’s value by posting an optimal screening
offer as follows:
V (k, α2) = max
k′∈k
[1− F (k
′)
F (k)
(1− λα2∆)]β (k′, α2)+ F (k′)
F (k)
(1− λα2∆)e−r∆R(k′, α†).
Let T s(k, α2) be the maximum of the set of solutions to this optimization prob-
lem, and σs(k, α2) = β(T s(k, α2), α2). Since both R(k, α†) and β(k, α2) is well de-
fined, V (k, α2) and T s(k, α2) are well defined. By posting an optimal screening offer
σs(k, α2) in the current period, the seller obtains V (k, α2), and the game ends in at
most N∗
α† + 1 periods.
Define R (k, α2) = max{V (k, α2) , J (k, α2)} as the seller’s value by choosing an
optimal offer with a price
σ(k, α) =

σs (k, α) , if V (k, α) ≥ J (k, α)
1, otherwise
Hence, we extend the equilibrium to (k, α2) for any k ∈ [v, 1]. The game ends in at
most N∗
α† + 1 periods regardless of the choice of offers in the current period. Given
the continuation payoff at (k, α2) for any k ∈ [v, 1], the k-buyer’s continuation payoff,
U (k, k, α2|σ, κ) can be calculated.
Since, from α0 to αt = α
†, there are finitely many periods, we can apply the
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above arguments for finitely many times to extend the equilibrium to (k, α0) for any
k ∈ [v, 1]. Q.E.D.
B.2 Equilibrium Properties
Proof of Proposition 8:
The value of outside option by waiting forever is given by
J0 (αt) = λαt∆ + (1− λαt∆) e−r∆λαt+∆∆
+ (1− λαt∆) (1− λαt+∆∆) e−2r∆λαt+2∆∆ + ....
Since αt is strictly dicreasing, for any αt, we have
J0 (αt) < λαt∆ + (1− λαt∆) e−r∆λαt∆
+ (1− λαt∆) (1− λαt∆) e−2r∆λαt∆ + ....
or
J0 (αt) <
λαt∆
1− e−r∆ (1− λαt∆) .
Aslo, J0 (αt) satisfies the following recursive equation:
J0 (αt) = λαt∆ + (1− λαt∆) e−r∆J0 (αt+∆) .
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Hence, we have
J0 (αt)− J0 (αt+∆) = λαt∆ +
[
(1− λαt∆) e−r∆ − 1
]
J0 (αt+∆)
> λαt∆− λαt+∆∆ > 0
and therefore J0 is strictly increasing in αt. For small α, J0 (α) < v, but there is a
α (∆) such that J0 (α) > v for all α > α (∆). When J0 (α) is greater than v, the
seller does not want to post p = v. Hence, fix ∆ and T , there is a sufficiently large
α0 < 1 such that αT > α (∆). Thus, pt > v. Since the updating process of αt is
exogenous, for any finite T , we can find an α0 large enough but smaller than one
such that αT > α (∆). Take the smallest α0 such that αT > α (∆) as α¯.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Suppose not. Consider the following equilibrium outcome induced by an equilib-
rium strategy profile which can be described by (σ, κ), the state evolves as follows:
on the path of play, suppose that a screening offer p−1 induces a state (k, α). The
seller optimally posts two consecutive screening offers p1 and p2 in the following two
periods, which induce state variables (k′, α′) and (k′′, α′′) respectively. We will con-
struct a profitable deviation such that (1) the seller posts screening offer p˜ instead
of p1, and induces (k
′′, α′).
By using three consecutive screening offers, the seller’s payoff can be decom-
posed into three parts: the flow payoff in two periods, and the continuation payoff
conditional on no trade.
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The flow payoff in the first period is
[(
F (k)− F (k′)
F (k)
) +
F (k′)
F (k)
λ∆α]p1,
where (F (k)−F (k
′)
F (k)
) is the probability that the long-lived buyer takes the offer, and
F (k′)
F (k)
λ∆α is the probability that a short-lived buyer takes the offer in the first period.
The flow payoff in the second period is
F (k′)
F (k)
(1− λ∆α)× (1− r∆) [F (k
′)− F (k′′)
F (k′)
+
F (k′′)
F (k′)
λ∆α′′]p2,
where F (k
′)
F (k)
(1 − λ∆αt) is the probability that no trade happens in the first period,
F (k′)−F (k′′)
F (k′) is the conditional probability that the long-lived buyer takes the offer p2,
and F (k
′′)
F (k′) λ∆α
′ is the conditional probability that the short-lived buyer takes the offer
in the second period.
The continuation value is
F (k′)
F (k)
F (k
′′
)
F (k′)
(1− λ∆α)(1− λ∆α′) (1− r∆)2R(k′′, α′′),
where F (k
′)
F (k)
F (k
′′
)
F (k′) (1−λ∆α)(1−λ∆α′) is the probability that no trade happens in the
first two periods, and R(k′′, α′′) is the seller’s continuation value conditional on his
belief on both long-lived buyer’s value and short-lived buyer’s existence.
Consider an alternative pricing strategy which we described above. By construc-
tion, κ is right continuous in p for any α; thus, the seller can always find the price p˜
such that k′-long-lived buyer is indifferent between taking p˜ given αt and waiting.
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The seller’s payoff can be decomposed into two parts again: the flow payoff in
the first period and the continuation payoff.
The flow payoff in the first period is
[(
F (k)− F (k′′)
F (k)
) +
F (k′′)
F (k)
∆λα]p˜,
where p˜ is the deviation price which can induce k′′-long-lived buyer to be the marginal
type.
Discounted continuation value is
F (k′′)
F (k)
(1− λ∆α) (1− r∆)R (k′′, α′) .
By definition, R (k′′, α′) ≥ J (k′′, α′); thus the lower bound of deviation payoff is
R˜ (k, α) = [(
F (k)− F (k′′)
F (k)
) +
F (k′′)
F (k)
∆λα]p˜+
F (k′′)
F (k)
(1− λ∆α) (1− r∆) J (k′′, α′) .
We are going to show that this lower bound is greater than the equilibrium payoff
R (k, α) when ∆ is small. Note that J (k′′, α′) can be decomposed into two parts:
the flow payoff in the second period,
F (k′′)
F (k)
(1− λ∆α) (1− r∆)λ∆α′ × 1,
where the price is 1, and the continuation value,
F (k′′)
F (k)
(1− λ∆α)(1− λ∆α′) (1− r∆)2R(k′′, α′′).
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Multiplying F (k) to the lower bound of the difference of the payoff induced by
two strategy yields
(F (k)− F (k′))(p˜− p1) + (F (k′)− F (k′′))(p˜− (1− r∆) p2)
+∆λα(F (k′′)p˜− F (k′)p1) + F (k′′)(1− λα) (1− r∆)λ∆α′(1− p2).
The sum of first three terms of the difference is
(F (k)− F (k′))(p˜− p1) + (F (k′)− F (k′′))(p˜− (1− r∆) p2)
+λα∆(F (k′′)p˜− F (k′)p1).
We claim it is O(∆2) because the following reason. In each period, there is a
marginal type of the long-lived buyer who is indifferent between taking the offer now
and waiting for a lower price latter. Hence, we have
k′ − p1 = (1− r∆) (1− λαt∆) (k′ − p2) ,
in equilibrium; thus p1 − p2 is O(∆) from simple algebra. Same logic, p−1 − p1 is
also O (∆). By condition 1, both k − k′ and k′ − k′′ are also at most O(∆); thus,
F (k)− F (k′) ≤ (k − k′)f¯ and F (k′)− F (k′′) ≤ (k′ − k′′)f¯ are also at most O(∆).
To induce k′′ rather than k′ in the first period, the seller has to decrease the price
to p˜ < p1. By condition 2, we have that the difference between p2 and
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The last term of the difference is
F (k′′)(1− λ∆α) (1− r∆)λ∆α′(1− p2) > 0,
which is O(∆) since k′′ is bounded away from zero, and p2 < k′ < 1. Keep applying
the above logic if σ(k′′, α′) 6= 1. A finite number of repetitions of the above argument
complete the proof.
Keep applying the above logic can prove that no more than N consecutive
screening offer will show up in equilibrium when ∆ is small. Note the cutoff ∆α
depends on α! Yet, on the path of play, there are finitely many realization of
α ∈ B∆ (α0) \B∆
(
α†
)
, hence we can find the smallest ∆¯ = min{∆α} for all possible
α ∈ B∆ (α0) \B∆
(
α†
)
such that when ∆ ∈ (0, ∆¯), the statement holds. Q.E.D.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Omitted Proof
Proof of Proposition 10
Existence and Uniqueness. The proof follows the standard contraction mapping
fixed-point argument. Given any S (u) ∈ [ b
r
, λ
r
], from (3.2,3.4,3.5), there exists a
unique solution S(α) such that
S(α) = S (u) +
∫ α
α∗
h(x, S(x))dx, (C.1)
where h(α, S(α)) is the right-hand side of (3.5) divided by r.
And θ (u) = arg max{p(θ)[S(α0)− S(α)]− kθ}. For an unemployed worker,
rS (u) = b+ max
θ
{p(θ)[S(α0)− S (u)]− kθ},
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or
S (u) =
b+ p(θ (u))S(α0)− kθ (u)
r + p(θ (u))
. (C.2)
The envelop theorem implies that
dS (u|S(α0))
dS(α0)
=
p(θ (u|S(α0)))
r + p(θ (u|S(α0))) ∈ (0, 1). (C.3)
Combining (C.1) and (C.2) yields
S(α) =
b+ p(θ (u))S(α0)− kθ (u)
r + p(θ (u))
+
∫ α
α∗
h(x, S(x))dx.
Define an operator T p : C[0, α0]→ C[0, α0] where S(α) ∈ C[0, α0] is any bounded
continuous differentiable function and T pS =
b−p(θ(u))S(α0)−kθ(u)
r+p(θ(u))
+
∫ α
α∗ h(x, S(x))dx
where S is such that (C.1) and (C.2) hold. To prove the uniqueness of S(ω), one
needs to verify whether T p is a contraction mapping. For the second part of T pS,
by the standard contraction mapping argument of the existence and uniqueness to
the solution in the problem of an ordinary differential equation with initial value,
T 2pS =
∫ α
α∗ h(x, S(x))dx satisfies the Blackwell sufficient condition. Moving to the
first part, T 1p, one needs to check whether the Blackwell sufficient condition holds.
Let S1 > S2, then S (u|S1 (α0)) > S (u|S2(α0) following (C.3); thus, the mono-
tonicity of T 1p is proved. Move to the discounting property. Let n ∈ R+, and
S3 = S1+n. Following (C.3),
dS(u|S(α0))
dS(α0)
< 1 for all S (α0) ∈ [S1 (α0) , S1 (α0)+n]; thus
the discounting property of T 1p holds. Hence, T p = T
1
p + T
2
p satisfies the Blackwell
sufficient condition, and therefore it is a contraction mapping on a complete func-
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tional space, C[0, α0]. There exists a unique solution S(α) such that S(α) = T pS(α),
and S (u) is also determined uniquely!
Convexity. Consider two α1, α2 such that (1) α1, α2 ∈ (0, α0], and (2) α∗ < α2 <
α1 ≤ α0. Let αζ = ζα2 +(1−ζ)α1 where ζ ∈ (0, 1). I want to show that for all α1, α2
and αζ , S(αζ) ≤ ζS(α2) + (1− ζ)S(α1). Denote θζ(α) as the path of optimal on-the-
job search starting from αζ during the current match. Denote by Sg(θ) the expected
surplus from an arbitrary path of on-the-job search θ conditional on the true match
quality being good and similarly for Sb(θ). Then S(αζ) = αζSg(θζ) + (1−αζ)Sb(θζ).
And it holds that
S(α1) ≥ α1Sg(θζ) + (1− α1)Sb(θζ),
S(α2) ≥ α2Sg(θζ) + (1− α2)Sb(θζ),
since θζ is a feasible price path. Hence
ζS(α2) + (1− ζ)S(α1) ≥
 ζ[α1S
g(θζ) + (1− α1)Sb(θζ)]
+(1− ζ)[α2Sg(θζ) + (1− α2)Sb(θζ)]

= (ζα1 + (1− ζ)α2)Sg(θζ)
+(1− ζα1 − (1− ζ)α2)Sb(θζ)
= αSg(θζ) + (1− α)Sb(θζ) = S(α),
which contradicts the fact that the solution of the HJB function maximizes the
planner’s individual worker problem. This proves the claim.
Monotonicity of S (α). Since S ′′ ≥ 0, and S ′(α∗) = 0, S ′ ≥ 0 for all α ∈ [α∗, α0].
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There are three cases. The first one is S ′ = 0 for all α ∈ [α∗, α0], which implies that
α∗ = α0. The second one is that S ′ = 0 for all α ∈ [α∗, αˆ] but S ′ > 0 for α ∈ (αˆ, α0].
But in this case, S (α) = S (u) and S ′ = 0 for α ∈ (α∗, αˆ], which contradicts the
definition of α∗. The third one is that S ′ > 0 for all α ∈ (α∗, α0].
Properties of θ (α). The optimal on-the-job search decision satisfies p′(θ(α))[S(α0)−
S(α)] = k. When α → α0, S (α) → S (α0), so p′ (θ (α)) → 0 and θ (α) → 0. Differ-
entiating p′(θ(α))[S(α0)− S(α)] = k yields
p′′(θ(α))[S(α0)− S(α)]θ′(α) = p′(θ)S ′(α),
since S(α0) − S(α) > 0 for any α < α0, p′′ < 0, I have θ′(α) < 0. Also, p′, p′′ and
S(α0) − S(α) is bounded. When α goes to α∗, S ′(α) goes to zero, and therefore θ′
goes to zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12
The optimality of workers’ OJS search implies that θ (α) must satisfy the following
first-order condition: p′ (θ) [x (θ)−M (α)] + p (θ)x′ (θ) = 0, which implies that
x′ (θ (α)) = −p
′ (θ (α)) [x (θ (α))−M (α)]
p (θ (α))
< 0.
By Proposition 10, θ′ (α) < 0; thus, I have dx
dα
= x′ (θ (α)) θ′ (α) > 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 13
Differentiate ξeet yields
ξ˙eet = p
′θ′α˙σt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− α0λ exp(−λt)p(θ(α))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
.
The first term of the right hand side is that conditional on the match not having sent
a good signal before, the matched worker becomes more pessimistic over time, and
therefore, his on-the-job search becomes more aggressive. Thus the probability of
getting a new job becomes greater, and this raises the EE rate. The second one that
lowers the EE rate is simply the decreasing probability of a good match not having
sent a good signal. When t is small, by assumption of the matching function, p′(θ)
is large, so the first force dominates the second. As t approaches t∗, α goes to α∗.
By Lemma 10, θ′ (α) goes to zero, which implies that the effect of the first force goes
to zero. Hence, the second one becomes dominant. Yet, if a random match’s tenure
is greater than t∗, only the good match can survive, in which case the EE transition
rate is zero. Q.E.D.
C.2 Stationary Distribution
In a large labor market with a continuum population of workers, by assuming
”the law of large number” holds, the invariant distribution, if it exists, can be inter-
preted as the stationary cross-sectional distribution of workers’ state. In particular,
the following Proposition shows that the market equilibrium has the unique station-
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ary wage distribution µ∗ : There are two mass points at ω = 1 and ω = u. For
ω ∈ [α∗, α0], the probability density function is well defined. Denote the p.d.f. of
stationary belief distribution as φ(α) for α ∈ [α∗, α0], β = µ∗(1) the probability mass
at ω = 1, and υ = µ∗(u) at ω = u.
Proposition 16. The stationary distribution of workers’ state, µ∗, is characterized
by (υ, β, φ) where
υ = µ∗(u), β = µ∗(1), φ(α) is the pdf of µ∗ for α ∈ [α∗, α0],
the probability density function φ(α) is given by
φ(α) = κ(α)/A for α ∈ (α∗, α0], (C.4)
φ(α∗) = 0, (C.5)
and β, υ such that
β =
1
δA
∫ α0
α∗
λακ(α)dα, and υ =
∫ α0
α∗ λακ(α)dα +
∫ α0
α∗ δκ(α)dα + 1
Ap(θ (u))
, (C.6)
where
A =
∫ α0
α∗
κ(α)dα +
∫ α0
α∗ (λα + δ)κ(α) + 1
δp(θ (u))
∫ α0
α∗
λακ(α),
and
κ(α) = exp
[∫ α
α∗
λs+ δ + p(θ(s))
λs(1− s) ds
]
.
The stationary distribution can be calculated by making the inflow equal outflow
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at any ω ∈ Ω∗. The density at α∗ is zero since the Markov process is right continuous
with respect to calendar time. For interior point α, the only inflow comes from match
with belief α′ > α that survives but has not sent an good signal, while the outflow
is µ(α). In the steady state, µT1(α) = µT2(α) = φ(α) for any T1, T2 ≥ 0.
λα(1− α) d
dα
φ(α) = [λα + δ + p(θ(α))]φ(α), (C.7)
where φ(α) is the probability density at α.
At α0, the inflow comes from matched and unemployed workers who successfully
find a new job; outflow is φ(α0), in the steady state, µT1(α0) = µT2(α0) for any
T1, T2 ≥ 0, and thus I have
∫ α0
α∗
p(θ(α))φ(α)dα + υp(θ (u)) = φ(α0), (C.8)
where υ is the measure of u-workers. Both the left-hand side and right-hand side of
(C.8) are finite, and therefore there is no mass point at α0.
For unemployed workers, the inflow comes from the separation of an existing
match, while the outflow is the measure of unemployed workers who find a job.
Letting inflow equal outflow, I have
νp(θ (u)) = βδ +
∫ α0
α∗
δφ(α)dα + φu, (C.9)
where φu is the density of workers who have just been fired, β is the measure of
1-workers.
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Combining (C.8) and (C.9) yields
φ(α0) =
∫ α0
α∗
[p(θ(α) + δ]φ(α)dα + φu + βδ. (C.10)
For a successful match, the inflow comes from a new good signal sent by an
existing uncertain match, and the outflow comes from the exogenous separation.
Inflow equals outflow implies that
β =
1
δ
∫ α0
α∗
λαφ(α)dα. (C.11)
Given the equilibrium θ(α), α∗, and matching function p(·), one can obtain a
general solution of the ODE (C.7), which is given by
φA˜(α) =
1
A˜
exp[
∫ α
α∗
λs+ δ + p(θ(s))
λs(1− s) ds], (C.12)
where 1/A˜ is a constant positive number to ensure φ > 0. To fix A, one needs to use
a boundary condition implied by the fact that φ is a density function and ν, β are
the probability. The condition is given by
∫ α0
α∗
φ(α)dα = 1− υ − β. (C.13)
Plugging (C.9) and (C.11) into (C.13) yields
∫ α0
α∗
φ(α)dα = 1−
∫ α0
α∗ (λα + δ)φ(α)dα + φ(α∗)
p(θ (u))
− 1
δ
∫ α0
α∗
λαφ(α)dα.
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Let κ(α) = exp[
∫ α
α∗
λs+δ+p(θ(s))
λs(1−s) ds], and φA˜(α) = κ(α)/A˜. Then the A˜ = A satisfying
the boundary condition (C.13) is given by
A =
∫ α0
α∗
κ(α)dα +
∫ α0
α∗ (λα + δ)κ(α)dα + 1
δp(θ (u))
∫ α0
α∗
λακ(α)dα.
Given the solution φ(α), φ(α0), φu = limα→α∗ φ(α) = 1/A, and υ, β can be solved
by (C.9) and (C.11). Since (C.4) and (C.6) uniquely pin down µ∗, the stationary
distribution is unique. Q.E.D.
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